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In 1978, the United States Supreme Court upheld the authority
of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to order divesti-
ture of some newspaper-broadcasting combinations located in the
same geographic market. The Court's decision in FCC v. National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB)I was based in part on
an important premise: The first amendment provides "powerful
reasons" for attacking combinations which "restrain trade in news
and views." 2 The Court ruled, however, that court-ordered divesti-
ture for all co-located newspaper-broadcasting combinations would
be improper.' Thus NCCB fails to implement fully another impor-
tant first amendment premise: the "widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to
the welfare of the public."'
NCCB illustrates the difficult and perplexing problems the
Court faces in identifying the structures and types of conduct that
"inhibit"' mass media markets, and in determining the extent of
government intervention that will be necessary to promote competi-
tion in those markets.' Government intervention in mass media
1. 436 U.S. 775 (1978), rev'g in part, National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC,
555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
2. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
3. 436 U.S. at 803.
4. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
5. The Court has stated in a nonantitrust context that it "is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969) (emphasis added). This Article distinguishes between an economic marketplace
and a marketplace of ideas. See note 7 infra. If the Court's belief in an uninhibited market-
place of ideas were applied literally to the economic marketplace, the press would be sub-
jected to very different and much more stringent antitrust standards than those applied to
other forms of business. Antitrust law does not assume that all market inhibitions are illegal.
See generally A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2d ed. 1970).
6. Writing shortly after three very important decisions concerning government inter-
vention in mass media markets, Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 166 (1944), and National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), Professor Zechariah Chafee noted that employing the
antitrust laws to prevent concentration in mass communications was the most important
problem discussed in his book, and the most difficult. Z. CHAFEE, GovERNMENT AND MASS
COMMUNICATIONS 537 (2d ed. 1965). Professor Robert Bork notes that courts have been unable
to distinguish between exclusionary practices that are beneficial to competition and those
that are not. He claims that practices, such as vertical market division, that have been
attacked under the antitrust laws should be lawful because they are beneficial to consumers.
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx 297 (1978).
7. A market is defined as "a closely interrelated group of sellers and buyers. Therefore,
we may define a market as including all the sellers in any individual industry, and all the
buyers to whom [in common] they sell." J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 7 (1959).
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markets7 interferes with freedom of the press to some extent." If,
however, such intervention results in diversifying market structure
or in preventing anticompetitive conduct, it can foster freedom of
expression.? Thus, application of the antitrust laws to the press
raises important first amendment questions as well as questions of
economic policy. 0
The Court has often referred to a marketplace of ideas, a sphere in which intangible
values such as ideas compete for acceptance. Advocates of the marketplace of ideas often
assume that truth will inevitably triumph over falsity in an open encounter. For example,
John Milton stated:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be
in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength.
Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open
encounter?
J. MILTON, Areopagitica, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD: JoHN MILTON 409 (R.
Hutchins ed. 1952). Justice Holmes pursued a similar line of thought when he stated:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
While this Article assumes that the possibility for competition among ideas is enhanced
when economic markets are free of unreasonable restraints on trade and have a diversified
ownership structure, it is not assumed that truth will always dominate falsehood in such
competition.
8. Justice Murphy stated that government action when directly aimed at the methods
of collection or distribution of news is an interference with the press, although differing in
degree from government restraints on written or spoken utterances. Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 51 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
9. For general discussions of the government's affirmative role in protecting and foster-
ing freedom of expression, see Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6; T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION (1970); T. EMERSON, TowARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1966).
10. While Professor Jerome Barron and other access advocates advance a policy which
they believe would diversify expression without altering market structure, there are strong
reasons for modifying market structure. The antitrust laws, as Professor Chafee noted, are
instruments which are too crude to insure that individual mass communications firms will
have greater "openmindedness." Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 624. The antitust laws can,
however, insure that entry conditions in markets are not restricted by unreasonable restraints
imposed by existing firms, that firms are not damaged by illegal combinations or attempts
to monopolize, and that markets are not controlled by monopolistic firms. In a concentrated
market structure, the opportunity to damage weaker firms or to exclude competition is far
greater than in a competitive market structure. Alteration of market structure may induce
entry of new firms, and/or encourage strong economic competition for advertising revenue.
Such alteration may also lead to diversification of the information available to the public.
Professor Barron rejects the premise that diversification of ownership will lead to diversi-
fication of ideas, and states that "[tihe theory may be flawed. Multiplicity of ideas will not
inevitably flow from multiplicity of ownerships if all the ownerships are captives of the same
economics-or think they are." J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973). See also
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
Professor Barron oversimplifies a complex phenomenon by implying that similar economic
1252 [Vol. 32:1249
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This Article examines the Supreme Court's attempts to foster
open markets by altering either the structure or the conduct of mass
media enterprises." Structure and conduct are the two main deter-
minants of market performance. Market structure "means those
characteristics of the organization of a market that seem to exercise
a strategic influence on the nature of competition and pricing within
the market." 2 Some characteristics of market structure include
degree of buyer concentration, degree of seller concentration, degree
of product differentiation, and entry conditions. Market conduct, on
the other hand, comprises the practices, policies, and devices which
firms employ in adjusting to changes in their markets. Structure can
have an impact on conduct, and conversely, conduct can affect
structure. Thus, when the Supreme Court addresses the structure
of mass media enterprises, their conduct and performance can also
be affected, and vice versa.
constraints lead to homogeneous content. In the literature on viewer program choice, it has
been shown that programming will be highly similar among competitors when there is a small
number of firms. Although each firm is subject to the same economic restraints, however,
diversity is significantly enhanced when there are many competitors. See, e.g., R. NOLL, M.
PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEvISION REGULATION 49-53 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as R. NOLL]. Diversity in ownership will not necessarily result in diversification of
content, but the potential for heterogeneous content is certainly enhanced when there are
many competing firms. For an example of structural change resulting in diversification of
content, see text accompanying notes 302-03 and note 327 infra.
The idea of a right of access did not originate with Professor Barron; it was criticized by
Professor Chafee in the 1940's. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 149-95. Professor Chafee
believed that "liberty of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what
is to go into a newspaper." Id. at 633. The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). But cf. Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (a government-imposed access obligation on broadcasting
stations does not violate the first amendment). For an extensive critique of the recent litera-
ture on access, see Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass
Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1973). For commentary on a
case in which access was used to limit discussion of important public issues, see F. FRIENDLY,
THE GooD Guys, THE BAD Guys AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1976).
11. For general discussions of the extent to which mass communications markets are
concentrated and controlled by a few firms, see W. BAER, H. GELLER, J. GRUNDFEST & K.
POSSNER, CONCENTRATION OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP (1974); M. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1946);
B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1975); B. RUCKER, THE FIRST FREEDOM
(1968). Literature which is germane to a particular form of mass communication will be cited
in the appropriate section of this Article.
Professor Bruce Owen's book typifies one segment of the literature dealing with the
structure and conduct of mass communications. His interpretation of the first amendment
overemphasizes its affirmative aspects and underplays its restraints upon government inter-
vention. While claiming a "libertarian" underpinning for his book, Professor Owen proposes
large scale government intervention, such as transforming newspaper printing and delivery
facilities into quasi-public utilities, and one questions whether he really understands what
the term "libertarian" means.
12. J. BAIN, supra note 7, at 7.
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The total mass media marketplace includes such diverse media
as newspapers, books, periodicals, recordings, broadcasting sta-
tions, and motion pictures. Enterprises in each medium compete
not only against each other but also against enterprises in other
media as well. This Article will discuss several media separately
because conditions for entry, competitive practices, and other fac-
tors differ among mass communications industries. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has formulated distinct first amendment standards
for each medium it has confronted.13 This Article explores first
whether the Court's antitrust decisions promote open market condi-
tions for mass media. Second, this Article analyzes the important
first amendment problems that are posed by such cases. Finally,
this Article will argue that the Court should apply uniform antitrust
and first amendment standards for all media.
II. REGULATING THE STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT OF THE NEWSPAPER
INDUSTRY
The newspaper industry, as Judge Learned Hand wrote,
"serves one of the most vital of all general interests: the dissemina-
tion of news from as many different sources, and with as many
different facets and colors as is possible."" Newspapers have been
found guilty, however, of diminishing the flow of news from different
sources by attempting to preclude competition and to damage ex-
isting competitors." Newspapers and news agencies have argued
that the first amendment shields them from liability under the anti-
trust laws, but the Supreme Court has held consistently that while
freedom to publish is guaranteed by the first amendment, freedom
to combine to keep others from publishing is not."
13. The Court stated in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952), that
"[elach method [of expression] tends to present its own peculiar problems." For examples
of the distinct first amendment standards that have been developed, compare Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (newspapers) with Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcasting) and Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365
U.S. 43 (1961) (motion pictures).
14. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), off'd, 326
U.S. 1 (1945).
15. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
16. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
17. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). Only cases involving inter-
newspaper or newspaper-broadcasting competition are discussed in this section. For a case
dealing with competition within a newspaper's distribution system, see Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). Because Albrecht does not involve practices that have a significant
impact on the flow of information from diverse sources, it is not discussed in this Article.
Similarly, while antitrust activity in fields such as newsprint production and printing equip-
ment manufacturing has an impact upon the newspaper industry, it is beyond the scope of
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A. Competition in Advertising Lineage
(1) An Inauspicious Beginning: Combination Rates and Farmer's
Guide
The Supreme Court first applied the Sherman Act's to newspa-
pers in Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer
Publishing Co." Although this early case did not present first
amendment issues, it is nonetheless significant because the Court
for the first time applied its fundamental Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States" rule to the newspaper industry, holding
that a restraint of trade or an attempted monopolization may vio-
late the Sherman Act even though it does not have a nationwide
impact on the relevant industry or market.2 1
The publishers of seven farm newspapers in seven midwestern
states formed the Midwest Farm Paper Unit in 1928 to procure
advertising at a combination rate less than the rate offered for
placement in each newspaper separately. Following implementation
of the combination rate, the total advertising lineage of the Unit's
member newspapers increased substantially.2 2 At the same time,
the advertising lineage of a competing non-Unit newspaper, The
Indiana Farmer's Guide, declined.
The publisher of the Farmer's Guide brought an action against
the publishers of the Unit newspapers in federal district court
alleging that the combination rate violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. The Unit newspapers responded that the placement
of advertising did not involve interstate commerce,"3 and that the
this Article. For a case involving competition in the printing field, see United States v.
Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971).
For a discussion of concentration in the newspaper industry, see Nixon & Ward, Trends
in Newspaper Ownership and Inter-Media Competition, 38 JOURNALISM Q. 3 (1961); Nixon,
Trends in Daily Newspaper Ownership Since 1945, 31 JOURNALISM Q. 3 (1954); Nixon,
Concentration and Absenteeism in Daily Newspaper Ownership, 22 JoURNALIsM Q. 97 (1945).
A wealth of information on antitrust aspects of the newspaper industry is contained in The
Newspaper Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 1520 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); The Failing
Newspaper Act: Hearings on S. 1312 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1967-1968).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
19. 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
20. 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911).
21. 293 U.S. at 279.
22. From 1928 to 1932, the advertising lineage carried by the Unit papers increased from
44.37% to 66.92% of the total advertising lineage for an eight state territory in which the
newspapers were circulated. Id. at 278 n.2.
23. See note 24 infra; Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
252 U.S. 436 (1920).
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combination rate merely enabled them to compete more efficiently
with national farm newspapers through scale economies. At the
close of evidence, the district court granted defendants' motion for
a directed verdict, 24 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 5 Although
conceding that the Farmer's Guide had lost some advertising as a
result of the combination rate, the Seventh Circuit held that the
combination did not materially affect the farm journal advertising
business on a nationwide scale.26 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, 27 holding that sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act have
"both a geographical and distributive significance and apply to any
part of the United States as distinguished from the whole and to any
part of the classes of things forming a part of interstate com-
merce." 28
In Farmer's Guide, the Court applied to the newspaper industry
a principle that fosters open markets. If the Court had agreed with
24. Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. argued before the Supreme Court that the directed
verdict was based on a failure to show that interstate commerce was involved. While the
record is ambiguous, the Supreme Court cited the district judge's instructions to the jury
which stated in part that there had been a "failure on the part of the plaintiff in this case to
show that there has been any restraint of trade as between the different states . . . . That
being true, this court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the case at all. . . ." 293 U.S.
at 274. The Supreme Court believed that the court of appeals "impliedly assumed that
petitioner's business does include interstate commerce," id. at 277, and held that there was
sufficient evidence for the interstate commerce issue to go to the jury. Id. at 276.
25. Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 70 F.2d
3 (7th Cir. 1934).
26. Id. at 5. Such a requirement, the court of appeals explained was established by
Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931), and Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
27. 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
28. Id. at 279. The Court drew heavily upon Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Butler stated that Farmer's Guide's
right to recovery does not "depend upon the proportion that respondents control of the total
farm paper advertisements in the entire country, and it was not required to prove that
respondents imposed a restraint or attempted monopolization that would affect all commer-
cial advertisements in all farm papers wherever published or circulated." 293 U.S. at 279.
Justice Butler also stated that the court of appeals had misread the Standard Oil of Indiana
and Appalachian Coals decisions. Id. at 280. The Court ordered a new trial, and did not
address the question whether the combination rate was an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Id. at 281.
On retrial, Farmer's Guide won a judgment of $10,000, which when trebled including
attorney's fees totaled $37,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award, believing that the
Supreme Court had found sufficient evidence to prove that a restraint of trade or conspiracy
existed. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co. v. Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co., 82 F.2d
704 (7th Cir. 1936), rev'd per curiam, 299 U.S. 156 (1936). In reversing the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court explained that it had stated no opinion on whether there was a conspiracy
or restraint of trade. On reconsideration, the court of appeals found a lack of sufficient
evidence that the combination rate was an unlawful restraint or that the Unit newspapers
had conspired to restrain trade. 88 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 696 (1937).
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the Seventh Circuit that a practice must affect an industry on a
nationwide scale, it would have effectively barred antitrust prosecu-
tions directed at practices that have only local or regional impact.
The absence of that barrier is essential in promoting open newspa-
per markets, because such markets tend to be highly localized."
Furthermore, Farmer's Guide recognized that the Sherman Act
applies to "classes of things." 0 Thus, to violate the Sherman Act, a
restraint need not affect an entire mass media market, but only a
specialized submarket such as newspapers.
Despite the absence of first amendment issues in Farmer's
Guide, combination rates have far-reaching implications for free-
dom of the press. If, for example, the Unit's combination rate had
been designed solely to bring about economies of cost, and only
indirectly or incidentally made the Farmer's Guide a less favored
competitor, then freedom of expression would not have been im-
paired significantly. If, however, the purpose or effect of the combi-
nation rate was to draw advertisers away from the Farmer's Guide
so that it would be unable to continue publishing, diversity in farm
newspapers would have been diminished.
(2) The Times-Picayune Unit Plan: The Tie That Binds
In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,3' the Su-
preme Court erroneously reversed a lower court's finding that a
publisher had violated the Sherman Act. While Times-Picayune did
not promote open market conditions, it is important because of the
Court's recognition therein that restrictive practices can have legiti-
mate business justifications.
In 1933 the Times-Picayune, the dominant morning newspaper
in New Orleans, purchased the Daily States, an afternoon newspa-
per. After a competing morning newspaper ceased publication in
1941, only three daily newspapers remained in New Orleans: the
morning Times-Picayune and two afternoon newspapers, the States
and the Item, the latter of which was published independently. In
1950 the Times-Picayune Publishing Company implemented a unit
plan for general advertising that required advertisers to purchase
space in both the Times-Picayune and the States.32 The United
States filed suit in 1950, alleging that the unit plan violated sections
29. B. OWEN, supra note 11, at 50-51.
30. 293 U.S. at 279.
31. 345 U.S. 594 (1953). See generally Barber, Newspaper Monopoly in New Orleans:
The Lessons for Antitrust Policy, 24 LA. L. REV. 503 (1964); Turner, The Validity of Tying
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HAnv. L. REv. 50 (1958).
32. The publishing company had adopted a unit plan for classified advertising in 1935.
19791 1257
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1 and 2 of the Sherman Act." The Times-Picayune Publishing Com-
pany defended the practice on the basis of economic efficiency,
claiming that there could be no "tying" of products because the
Times-Picayune and States were different editions of the same
newspaper,"3 not separate newspapers.
The district court found that the newspapers were separate
products and that the unit plan was an illegal tying agreement.35
Before the Supreme Court, the Times-Picayune Company argued
that the district court had erred in its finding,6 and criticized its
failure to appreciate the difference between selling news to readers
and selling readers to advertisers. Only readers viewed the com-
pany's editorial products as being distinct, the company explained;
advertisers were interested only in reaching readers, whether they
were generated by the Times-Picayune or the States. Because of
this, the company argued, a tie-in would be present only if readers
were required to subscribe to both newspapers.37 The United States
33. The United States also attacked the 1933 acquisition of the States, a unit plan for
classified advertising, and coercion of news vendors to discontinue sales of the Item. Com-
plaint at 6-7, United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.
1952).
34. United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670, 673 (E.D. La.
1952). The Court defines a tying arrangement "as an agreement by a party to sell one product
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at
least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier." Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
35. United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670, 678 (E. D. La.,
1952). The Supreme Court believes that tying agreements serve little purpose beyond sup-
pressing competition. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). But
see R. BORK, supra note 6, at 375-81.
Data for 1950 show an average daily circulation of 188,402 for the Times-Picayune,
114,660 for the Item, and 105,235 for the States, 345 U.S. at 599 (1953). Based on the Times-
Picayune's monopoly of the morning field, and its "enormous advantage" in circulation, the
district court concluded that advertisers who wanted to cover the New Orleans market must
use the Times-Picayune. 105 F. Supp. at 674. Because the intent of the plan was to diminish
the competitive vigor of the Item, the district court enjoined use of the unit contracts. The
district court did not find that the other aspects of the government's complaint, see note 33
supra, violated the Sherman Act. 105 F. Supp. at 680.
36. Brief for Appellant at 24, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594 (1953).
37. Id. at 36. The company also argued that the unit plan was adopted primarily as a
means of achieving cost economies and that the plan did not act as a restraint upon the Item.
Id. at 14, 58. The Times-Picayune Publishing Company's position was supported by a large
group of newspapers which claimed that unit plans were widely accepted in the industry.
Brief on Behalf of 98 Newspaper Publishers as Amici Curiae, Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). One commentator noted that if the newspaper industry
wanted to avoid government regulation, it should avoid implementing discriminatory pricing
policies, forced combination advertising rates, and other practices that may constitute
"targets" for antitrust prosecution. Ray, Economic Forces as Factors in Daily Newspaper
Concentration, 29 JOURNALISM Q. 31, 42 (1952).
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argued that the tying product (space in the Times-Picayune) clearly
had the leverage that attaches to monopoly power and position.3 8
The United States also claimed that the tying contract limited com-
petition in the tied product (space in evening New Orleans newspa-
pers) more drastically than did ordinary tying contracts because the
full impact of the injury fell on a single competitor-the Item."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the morning and
afternoon newspapers did not constitute distinct markets," that the
unit plan had not handicapped the Item unduly," and that the unit
plan was motivated by legitimate business aims.12 Justice Clark's
opinion in Times-Picayune recognized the important role a
"vigorous and dauntless press . . . [plays in] feeding the flow of
democratic expression and controversy which maintains the institu-
tions of a free society," but treated the issues as though only com-
mercial practices were involved."
Tracing the decline of daily newspapers in the twentieth cen-
tury, Justice Clark noted that of the 598 daily newspapers that
began publishing between 1929 and 1950, only 38% were still pub-
lishing in 1950. Of these newspapers, forty-six competed against
established dailies that utilized unit rates, and by 1950 forty-one of
these forty-six had collapsed. Thus, a newcomer in the daily news-
paper business could calculate his chances of survival as 11% in
cities where unit plans were in effect." Despite this data, the Court
refused to view the Times-Picayune Publishing Company's unit
plan as an illegal tying agreement.
38. Brief for the United States at 24, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594 (1953).
39. Id. The government also argued that the unit plan was highly similar to block-
booking in the motion picture industry, which the Supreme Court had declared to be illegal
in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). See text accompanying
note 318 infra.
40. 345 U.S. at 613.
41. Id. at 619.
42. Id. at 622. Specifically, unit plans significantly reduce the cost of production for two
newspapers printed in the same plant.
43. Id. at 602.
44. This contrasts with Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 29 (1945). See text accompanying notes 101-04 infra.
The briefs for the Times-Picayune Publishing Company and the United States did not
argue the importance of preserving a diversified newspaper market or other first amendment
values. Unit plans, however, can have an impact on independent newspapers which compete
with a publisher that prints two newspapers in the same plant. Coupled with other factors, a
unit plan could lead to the demise of an independent newspaper in such circumstances.
45. 345 U.S. at 604. This observation should not be read as placing the entire blame
for the failure of the 41 newspapers on unit plans. A host of other factors, such as market
size, probably played an important part in the newspapers' demise.
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The Court held that a tying agreement violates section 1 of the
Sherman Act when the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the
market for the "tying" product and when a substantial volume of
trade in the "tied" product is restrained."6 Discussing the first part
of its test, the Court concluded that the newspaper advertising mar-
ket in New Orleans should be treated as a whole, not as distinguish-
able morning and afternoon markets. If each of the New Orleans
newspapers shared equally in the total volume of lineage, each
would have approximately 33% of the advertising. Since the Times-
Picayune had only about 40% of the general and classified advertis-
ing lineage, the Court held that there was no market dominance as
required by the first part of the test." Furthermore, the Court found
that the' product bought by advertisers in each of the newspapers
was identical "fungible customer potential."" Thus, because there
was no market dominance and there was no difference between the
"tying" and the "tied" products, the Court concluded that the unit
plan was not an illegal tying agreement."
The Court's analysis is fundamentally incorrect. Because it was
the only morning newspaper in New Orleans, with the largest circu-
lation, the Times-Picayune was essential to many advertisers. By
declaring that the Times-Picayune's 40% share of advertising li-
neage did not constitute dominance, the Court ignored the power of
the Times-Picayune to compel use of the States."o The Times-
Picayune had a complete monopoly on access to morning readers
and used that monopoly to restrain unreasonably the competition
between the States and the Item.5 ' Moreover, combining the lineage
of its morning and evening newspapers, the Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Company controlled about 70% of the total general and clas-
46. Id. at 608-09; see International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
47. 345 U.S. at 612-13.
48. Id. at 613.
49. Id. at 614.
50. As Justice Burton stated in a dissenting opinion in which Justices Black, Douglas,
and Minton joined, the complaint should not be dependent upon the relation of the Times-
Picayune to the entire market. Id. at 628.
51. Id. Justice Burton stated:
The complaint is that the Times-Picayune enjoys a distinct, conceded and complete
monopoly of access to the morning newspaper readers in the New Orleans area and that
it uses that monopoly to restrain unreasonably the competition between its evening
newspaper, the New Orleans States, and the independent New Orleans Item, in the
competitive field of evening newspaper advertising. Insistence by the Times-Picayune
upon acceptance of its compulsory combination advertising contracts makes payment
for, and publication of, classified and general advertising in its own evening paper an





sified advertising lineage available in New Orleans. This presents
far greater market dominance than that obtained by considering the
Times-Picayune's lineage alone. 52
The Court's analysis of the second part of its test-the product
being sold by the different newspapers-is similarly superficial.
Only in a very broad sense were the newspapers selling the same
product-readers. The Court assumed that the newspapers' readers
were identical in all respects, such as income level, and thus ignored
the fundamental distinctions newspapers draw between their read-
ers and the readers of other newspapers when competing for adver-
tising. 3 Moreover, the record showed that some general advertisers
preferred to use the Item instead of the States because they believed
that the Item did not duplicate the readership of the Times-
Picayune to the degree the States did."4 Thus, the segment of the
total New Orleans newspaper readership which was delivered by the
Item was considered by many advertisers to be distinct from that
delivered by the Times-Picayune."6
Having rejected the rationale of tying cases, the Court pro-
ceeded to test the unit plan under the Sherman Act's general prohi-
bitions of unreasonable restraints of trade and found that the plan
had not "unduly handicapped" the Item.5' This finding is consistent
with the evidence, although it was based on data for only one year.7
The Court made a significant departure from the evidence, however,
when it found that the unit plan had been adopted solely to produce
economies of operation.5 The record reveals that the unit plan for
general advertising was adopted in 1950 because the Item had be-
come significantly more competitive with the States in 1949.61 The
52. Professor Donald Turner has noted that if morning and afternoon advertising were
separate products-a necessary assumption when asking whether the dominance test of tie-
ins has been satisfied-then the Times-Picayune had a 100% monopoly of the former. Turner,
supra note 31, at 55 n.21.
53. For example, Newspaper Rates and Data, published monthly by the Standard Rate
and Data Service, commonly contains advertisements by newspapers stressing the distinctive
characteristics of their readers.
54. Record at 285, 357, 393-94, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594 (1953).
55. In fact, the readers of the Times-Picayune and the States were clearly distinguisha-
ble groups. Id. at 1484.
56. 345 U.S. at 619.
57. Professor Richard Barber's analysis of the data indicates that the Item may have
benefited to a limited extent from the unit plan. Barber, supra note 31, at 528-31. Due to
different expiration dates on existing contracts, the full impact of the unit plan would not
have been revealed in the data for 1950 alone.
58. 345 U.S. at 623; see note 42 supra.
59. Barber, supra note 31, at 521-22, 534.
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unit plan was clearly designed to inhibit the Item,"o but the Court
found that there was no specific intent to monopolize.6 1
Although the Court did not determine that unit plans may be
lawful in other circumstances," its position that different products
were not involved raises a significant barrier to tying agreement
attacks on local newspaper unit plans.13 While correct in finding
that the Item had not been harmed by the unit plan, at least for one
year, the Court failed to recognize the intent behind the plan, the
distinct products involved, and the power of the Times-Picayune to
compel purchase of space in the States. That recognition would
have fostered essential first amendment values because it might
have promoted tying agreement attacks on other unit plans that
threaten to eliminate independent newspapers."
(3) Advertising Boycotts: The Implications of Lorain Journal
The Court in Times-Picayune faced the difficult problem of
assessing the harmful effects of a unit plan. In Lorain Journal Co.
v. United States,5 however, the clarity of the issues and the evi-
dence easily supported the Court's decision against a newspaper
publisher who had attempted to modify market structure through
anticompetitive conduct. Lorain Journal presents substantial first
amendment problems and illustrates the use of the antitrust laws
to further first amendment values.
The Lorain Journal was the only daily newspaper in Lorain,
Ohio, and because of its coverage of the Lorain market, it was a
60. Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 670, 678 (E.D. La.
1952).
61. 345 U.S. at 627.
62. Id.
63. In a case decided shortly after Times-Picayune, however, the Eighth Circuit held
that two Kansas City newspapers, the morning Times and the evening Star were two separate
newspapers with distinct and separate uses for advertisers. Kansas City Star Co. v. United
States, 240 F.2d 643, 658 (8th Cir. 1957).
64. The independent Item continued to publish for a few years following the decision
in Times-Picayune. In 1958, the Item merged with the Times-Picayune Publishing Com-
pany's States to form the States Item.
Professor Keith Roberts considers combination rates to be pernicious and has urged that
the Court reexamine them. Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper Industry, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 319, 345 (1968). Professor Owen, however, concludes that Times-Picayune was not
an important decision in terms of its effects on the long term structure of the industry. B.
OWEN, supra note 11, at 53. Insofar as unit plans are not a major factor in the demise of a
particular independent newspaper, Professor Owen is correct. He ignores, however, the way
in which the result in Times-Picayune was reached. In certain cases in which a unit plan may
be a significant factor in the demise of an independent newspaper, the Court's approach to
the product issue in Times-Picayune would deter prosecution under a tying agreement theory.
65. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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"must buy" for local advertisers." From 1933 until 1948, the
Journal's "commanding and overpowering" position was virtually
unchallenged by other local mass media. 1 In 1948, however, the
FCC licensed a radio station, WEOL, to operate in Elyria, eight
miles south of Lorain. To eliminate the threat of competition from
the station, the publishers of the Journal developed a policy that
advertising from merchants who either advertised on WEOL, or
proposed to do so, would be rejected by the Journal. The United
States brought a civil action, alleging that the Journal was engaging
in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade violating sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, as well as engaging in a conspiracy to
monopolize and attempting to monopolize in violation of section 2.'"
The district court found that the Journal had violated section 2, and
enjoined any further attempt to do so."9 The evidence was quite
clear, the district court stated, that "the policy was as uncompli-
cated in purpose and as lacking in subtlety as the profit motive
itself; the Journal sought to eliminate this threat to its pre-eminent
position by destroying WEOL." 0 At trial the Journal asserted that
the first amendment prohibited the district court from enjoining the
refusal of advertising, because an injunction would involve a prior
restraint upon freedom to publish, or to refuse to publish, whatever
the publishers desired.7' The district court concluded, however, that
liberty of the press was not a license to suppress other sources of
information .7 1
Before the Supreme Court, the Journal again argued that the
Sherman Act does not empower a court to enforce a prior restraint
on the press." The United States argued that the district court
injunction recognized the differences between news and advertising,
as well as various reasons for rejecting advertising:
66. The newspaper reached 99% of the families in Lorain. United States v. Lorain
Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
67. Id. The Journal Company also attempted unsuccessfully to obtain a radio station
in Lorain. See Lorain Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
68. Complaint at 5, United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio
1950).
69. United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
70. Id. at 797. The Journal Company told advertisers who questioned the policy that it
was designed to give "radio a 'fair'-that is an exclusive-trial or they were informed that
the policy was designed to 'protect' the Lorain merchants by preserving the integrity of the
Lorain market." Id. at 796. The district court commented that this was unworthy of belief.
Id. at 797.
71. Id. at 800.
72. Id. at 801.
73. Brief for Appellant at 11, Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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The judgment in no way circumscribes the freedom of appellants to publish
news as they desire it published, to enforce editorial policies of their own
choosing, and to exercise the right to reject advertising because it is offensive
in substance or because the advertisers are not the sort of persons with whom
they wish to deal. The judgment properly prohibits appellants from refusing
to deal with an advertiser where the basis for such refusal is the desire to force
the advertiser not to have business relationships with other advertising
media."
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed and held that the injunc-
tion did not restrict freedom of the press.15 In reaching this result,
the Court determined clearly the scope of a publisher's freedom to
refuse to deal with certain advertisers. Justice Burton, explaining
that a publisher's "right" to refuse advertising was neither absolute
nor exempt from regulation, held that in the absence of any purpose
to create or maintain a monopoly, a publisher is free to exercise his
independent discretion to deal with whom he will.76 The Court was
concerned primarily with the effect of the Journal's policy on the
public and WEOL, not on advertisers. The publisher's conduct was
aimed directly at eliminating WEOL and any diversity the station
brought to the marketplace.77 The Court believed that unless pro-
tected by law, the "consuming public" would be at the mercy of
restraints and monopolizations of interstate commerce.78 The Lorain
Journal decision supports an open market concept and affirms the
use of the Sherman Act as a means of preserving a diversified mar-
ket structure. The public interest in media diversity through the
continued existence of WEOL was placed in a preferred position to
the publisher's "right" to refuse advertising from whomever it de-
sired.7 1
74. Brief for the United States at 26.
75. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155-56 (1951). The Journal
Company had argued that the Sherman Act could not apply to its activities because no
interstate commerce was involved. Brief for Appellant at 13-14. The Court, however, found
that interstate commerce was involved. 342 U.S. at 152. Moreover, building upon Farmer's
Guide, see text accompanying note 37 supra, the Court stated that the "reference in section
2 to an attempt to monopolize 'any part of the trade or commerce among the several States'
relates not merely to interstate commerce within any geographical part of the United States
but also to any appreciable part of such interstate commerce." 342 U.S. at 151 n.6.
76. Id. at 155. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)..
77. 342 U.S. at 150. The Journal Company was subsequently held liable for treble
damages because of its policy against WEOL. See Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Co. v. Lorain
Journal Co., 298 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1961).
78. 342 U.S. at 152.
79. "The word 'right' is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a
qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are
qualified." American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921).
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B. Wire Services and the Sale of News: The Associated Press Case
The Court's most important application of the Sherman Act to
further first amendment values occurred in Associated Press v.
United States,80 a case that stemmed from an attempt by the De-
partment of Justice to diversify the distribution of news. A com-
plaint, filed on August 28, 1942, against the nation's largest wire
service, the Associated Press (AP), charged violations of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. The heart of the complaint alleged that
two provisions of AP's bylaws which prohibited AP members from
selling news to nonmembers, and gave each member the power to
block its nonmember competitors from membership, had the pur-
pose and effect of protecting AP members against competition.,'
The complaint argued that by prohibiting its members from selling
news to nonmembers, AP restrained the flow of news and restricted
the freedom of newspapers.8 2 Furthermore, the complaint alleged
that the power of each member to block a competitor's membership
impeded the entry of new newspapers into markets where AP mem-
bers were established."
The district court, on a motion for summary judgment, found
that the bylaws restricted commerce and that they had hindered
and impeded the growth of competing newspapers."' Judge Learned
Hand explained that the interests of the newspaper industry were
not conclusive because the public's general interest in receiving
news from many different sources was involved. In oft-quoted lan-
guage, Judge Hand stated:
That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest
protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are
80. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). For general background on Associated Press, see Swindler, The
AP Anti-Trust Case in Historical Perspective, 23 JOURNALISM Q. 40 (1946).
81. Complaint at 27, United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y.
1943). The bylaws on admission of new members provided that AP's board of directors could
admit prospective members, except those who competed with an AP member. In that case,
the board would have to obtain the member's consent before admitting the competing appli-
cant. In the absence of such consent, the competing applicant faced three obstacles to admis-
sion. First, the applicant had to pay AP 10% of the total fees AP had collected since 1900
from the applicant's competitors. In New York City, for example, an evening competitor
would have had to pay $575,003.49 to gain AP membership. United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 367 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Second, the applicant had to relinquish any
exclusive rights it may have had to any news or news picture services when requested by an
AP member competitor. Finally, the applicant had to receive a majority vote of the regular
AP members. Id. at 365; see note 86 infra.
82. Complaint at 8.
83. Id. at 9. The Complaint considered the service of a news agency to be essential to
the operation of any newspaper. Id.
84. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
1979]1 1265
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1249
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind
of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we
have staked upon it our all."
The district court enjoined AP from observing the bylaws and from
adopting new bylaws which had a similar purpose or effect."
Before the Supreme Court, AP and some of its members argued
that the bylaw prohibiting the sale of news to nonmembers was a
reasonable ancillary restraint." AP also claimed that the district
court, by basing its decision on the public interest in the widest
possible dissemination of news, subjected the press to special and
peculiar obligations which violated the first amendment policy that
the press be as free as possible from discriminatory administrative
control." The Chicago Times argued that the first amendment pre-
cluded application of the Sherman Act to newspapers.8" The United
States challenged the contention that the press was immune from
the antitrust laws, noting that a similar first amendment defense
had been rejected in Associated Press v. National Labor Relations
Board.'" The antitrust laws do not interfere with the editorial pro-
cess, the government claimed, and the objectives of the first amend-
ment would be furthered by removing the barriers that were erected
by a private combination to block access to reports of world news."
85. Id, at 372.
86. Id. at 375. AP's original bylaws, a part of which were held to be in restraint of trade
in Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N.E. 822 (1900), provided
members with an absolute veto over competing applicants. The district court noted that the
amended bylaws, see note 81 supra, liberalized admission, but provided members with a
conditional veto. Id. at 370.
87. The Chicago Tribune in its brief stated:
When AP "admits an applicant to membership" it thereby concomitantly "agrees to sell
its services to the applicant." Ancillary to the purchase and sale. of products, it has
always been held legal for the seller synchronously to restrict his freedom of action by
agreeing not to sell the same in the restricted community of the purchaser for a limited
space of time, save with the purchaser's consent-in the absence of monopoly or at-
tempted monopoly or of a scheme to stifle competition, or unless the seller is a public
utility or engaged in a public calling.
Brief for Appellant Tribune Co. at 9.
88. Brief for Appellant Associated Press at 42.
89. Brief for Chicago Times, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 49.
90. 301 U.S. 103 (1937). The Supreme Court in that case held:
The business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it is
an agency of the press. The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the
application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties
of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. He is
subject to the anti-trust laws.
Id. at 132-33. See also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946);
Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946).
91. Brief for the United States at 54. The Government was not seeking indiscriminate
distribution of news; rather, it sought to "have the member papers free themselves from the
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed. 2 The majority
opinion by Justice Black held that the district court's summary
judgment had not injured AP, because newspaper publishers were
not entitled to a different and more favorable trial procedure than
that accorded other persons under the Sherman Act.13 Justice Black
also rejected the argument that the first amendment affords the
publisher a constitutional sanctuary in which he can with impunity
violate laws that regulate his business practices." He explained that
the government has an affirmative obligation to protect first amend-
ment freedoms, and that the Sherman Act was an appropriate
method of doing so." Central to the majority opinion in Associated
Press is the concept of a market which is free from restraints which
either destroy competition or the initiative which brings newcomers
into a field." Justice Black noted that inability to buy news from
the largest news agency, or from any of its members, can have
agreement whereby they have precluded individual freedom of contract with respect to the
distribution of such news." Id. at 134. The Government was particularly interested in attack-
ing the bylaw which prevented AP members from sharing news with nonmember newspapers.
This provision was not illegal in itself, but was an illegal means of implementing and enforc-
ing the exclusionary agreement that restrained competition. Id. at 47. Basing its argument
on Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904), and Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941), the Government argued that a combined refusal to deal which excludes
others from the market is an unlawful restraint of trade. Brief for the United States at 47-48.
The Government also argued that a restraint does not have to put a competitor out of business
or make successful operation impossible to be illegal. Nor was it necessary to show that every
member of an industry suffers from an agreement, or that the agreement suppresses all
competition. Id. at 61; see Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44
(1930); text accompanying notes 177-85 infra.
92. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
93. Id. at 6. Professor Bork believes that AP was entitled to a trial. R. BORK, supra note
6, at 340; see text accompanying note 108 infra.
94. 326 U.S. at 7.
95. Id. at 20. Justice Black stated:
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for freedom of the press which
prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the
government was without power to protect that freedom. The First Amendment, far from
providing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful
reasons to the contrary . . . . Surely a command that the government itself shall not
impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if
they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to pub-
lish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of
the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction
repression of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment affords not the
slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and
views has any constitutional immunity.
Id. (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Justice Black's failure to qualify the word "restrain"
in this passage should not be read as permitting attacks on all exclusionary practices. The
thrust of Justice Black's opinion was that only unreasonable restraints are not permissible.
96. Id. at 13.
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serious effects on the publication of competitive newspapers, both
those published presently and those which but for the restrictions
might be published in the future." Because the bylaws restrained
the sale of interstate news to nonmembers who competed with mem-
bers," and impeded the growth of competing newspapers," the
Court agreed with the district court that they violated the Sherman
Act. Perhaps more significant, however, is the Court's belief that
the bylaws also violated the spirit of the first amendment. In oft-
quoted language, Justice Black stated that the first amendment
"rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free so-
ciety."'n
In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter suggested that
the press should be subject to different antitrust standards than
other businesses. He claimed that in addition to being a commercial
enterprise, the AP had a relation to the public interest unlike that
of other profit-making enterprises, 01 because the press "sold" infor-
mation. 10 2 Thus, he concluded that the presence of rival agencies
that could supply newspapers with a product similar to AP's was
irrelevant,'03 and that the bylaws were unreasonable because they
offended "the basic functions which a constitutionally guaranteed
free press serves in our nation." 0o Like the majority opinion, Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion was based upon the concept of a
market which is free of unreasonable restraints. Justice Frankfurter,
97. Id.
98. Id. Professor Bork, in criticizing the Associated Press decision has accused Justice
Black of equating the word "competition" with "access to a particular source of supply rather
than with effectiveness of rivalry in the general marketplace." R. BoRK, supra note 6, at 340.
See also 326 U.S. at 34-47 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
explained why a restraint upon access to a particular supply of news was an unreasonable
restraint upon the marketplace. See text accompanying notes 101-04 infra.
99. 326 U.S at 12.
100. Id. at 20.
101. 326 U.S. at 27-28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 28. Justice Frankfurter explained that:
A free press is indispensable to the workings of our democratic society. The business of
the press, and therefore the business of the Associated Press, is the promotion of truth
regarding public matters by furnishing the basis for an understanding of them. Truth
and understanding are not wares like peanuts or potatoes. And so, the incidence of
restraints upon the promotion of truth through denial of access to the basis for under-
standing calls into plity considerations very different from comparable restraints in a
cooperative enterprise having merely a commercial aspect.
Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id.; see id. at 17-18.
104. Id. at 29.
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however, found that the unreasonableness test for the press was less
stringent than for other businesses.
Justice Murphy's dissent expressed concern that the majority
view would lead to excessive government regulation of the press. 05
Although noting that the press was not immune from application of
the Sherman Act,0 Justice Murphy called for "clear and unmistak-
able" evidence before the press is subjected to the sanctions of the
Sherman Act.' Moreover, because freedom of the press was in-
volved, Justice Murphy concluded that the case deserved more than
summary judgment.' If relaxed antitrust standards were applied to
the press, Justice Murphy warned, the "path [would] be made
clear for dangerous governmental interference."'
The Court, however, did not foresee any first amendment haz-
ards in mass media antitrust actions. The ideal of an open market
set forth in Associated Press is supported by both the antitrust laws
and the first amendment. This ideal would play a critical role in
later cases involving newspaper mergers and acquisitions.
105. Id. at 50. Justice Roberts seriously miscast the effect of the decision, claiming that
the Court's action would transform AP into a public utility and require it to serve all on equal
terms. Id. at 45-46 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas answered this contention in his
brief concurring opinion:
The decree which we approve does not direct Associated Press to serve all applicants. It
goes no further than to put a ban on Associated Press' practice of discriminating against
competitors of its members in the same field or territory. That entails not only a discon-
tinuance of the practice for the future but an undoing of the wrong which has been done.
Id. at 24-25.
Although prohibited from discriminating against firms which compete against AP mem-
bers, the AP bylaws still hamper the entry of new newspapers. See generally Roberts, supra
note 64.
106. 326 U.S. at 51.
107. Id. at 52. For a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of the evidence in the case,
see id. at 34-49 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 59.
109. Id. Justice Murphy issued a cautionary admonition:
We stand at the threshold of a previously unopened door. We should pause long
before opening it, lest the path be made clear for dangerous governmental interference
in the future . . . . If unsupported assumptions and conjectures as to the public interest
and competition among newspapers are to warrant a relatively mild decree such as this
one, they will also sustain unjust and more drastic measures. The blueprint will then
have been drawn for the use of the despot of tomorrow.
Id. Cf. id. at 49 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (regulation of news, in light of the constitutional
guarantee of free speech, should be examined closely by the courts).
Shortly after Associated Press, a bill was introduced in Congress which would have
exempted news-gathering agencies such as AP from the Sherman Act. See H.R. 4665, 79th
Cong., lst Sess. (1945). A similar response, although far more successful, followed the decision
in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969). See note 148 infra.
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C. Newspaper Mergers and Acquisitions: Prima Facie
Violations and the Failing-Company Defense
(1) The Prima Facie Violation in Times Mirror
The widespread acquisition of independent newspapers by
newspaper chains or multimedia firms has been a significant factor
in the decline of independent newspapers."o In Times Mirror Co. v.
United States,"' the Supreme Court encouraged government at-
tacks on concentrated markets by holding that the acquisition of
competing newspapers by the publisher of the Los Angeles Times
was a prima facie violation of the Clayton Act.112
In 1964, the Times Mirror Company acquired the Sun Com-
pany, which published morning, afternoon, and Sunday newspapers
in San Bernardino County, Los Angeles County's neighbor to the
east."' With the acquisition, the Times Mirror Company's share of
circulation.in San Bernardino County rose from 10.6% to 54.8% of
total weekday circulation, from 23.9% to 99.5% of total morning
circulation, and from 20.3% to 64.3% of total Sunday circulation.
The United States sought an order for divestiture, charging that the
acquisition unreasonably restrained commerce in violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, and that the effect of the acquisition
might substantially lessen competition in violation of section 7 of
the Clayton Act."4
The Times Mirror Company defended the acquisition against
the section 7 charge on the ground that there could be no appropri-
ate product market"' that included both the Los Angeles Times and
the San Bernardino Sun. There was no cross-elasticity of demand
for the two newspapers, the Times Mirror Company argued, because
they were not generally regarded by readers to be substitutes for one
another."' The district court ordered divestiture solely on the basis
110. During the past five years, newspaper chains have acquired independent dailies
at the rate of 55 a year. Approximately 50% of the nation's daily newspapers are owned by
firms that control more than one newspaper. See generally Louis, Independent Dailies are
an Endangered Species, FORTUNE, June 19, 1978, at 160.
111. 390 U.S. 712 (1968), aff'g per curiam, 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
113. The acquisition was stimulated by the Sun Company owner's estate planning.
Heavy estate taxes have been a key factor in the sale of independent dailies, which are often
family owned, to chains. To stem this trend Rep. Morris Udall (D. Ariz.) sponsored the
Independent Local Newspaper Act, a bill which provides special relief from taxes for family
owned newspapers. See H.R. 2770, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
114. United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 609, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 712 (1968).
115. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
116. 274 F. Supp. at 615. While it is not clear whether the Times Mirror Company
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of the section 7 charge, and held that where two products comple-
ment each other there is no barrier to section 7 if the merger may
have anticompetitive effects.117 Because the size of the merger was
"inherently suspect,"" 8 however, the district court held that it was
a prima facie violation of the Clayton Act. Thus, delineation of
anticompetitive effects was found to be unnecessary."' The district
court was nevertheless concerned with two anticompetitive aspects
of the merger that have important first amendment implica-
tions-increased concentration and barriers to entry. The district
court found initially that there was heavy concentration of daily
newspaper ownership in southern California, with four publishers
accounting for 71% of all weekday daily circulation." Moreover,
there had been a steady decline of independent newspapers in
southern California; in the greater Los Angeles market (Los Angeles
and four surrounding counties) in 1952, 63% of all daily newspapers
were independent, while in 1966 only 22% were independent.' 2' The
acquisition of the Sun was thus particularly anticompetitive be-
cause it eliminated one of the few independent morning newspapers
in southern California 22 and raised a barrier to newspapers seeking
entry to the San Bernardino County market.123
Although the parties raised no first amendment arguments in
Times Mirror, the Supreme Court's affirmance can be seen as sup-
porting the first amendment principles of Associated Press v.
United States:24 the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse sources is essential to the welfare of the public, and
argued that advertisers distinguished between the newspapers, the court found that the
newspapers competed for national advertising. Id. at 618.
117. Id.; see FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (any merger, whether
it is horizontal, vertical, conglomerate, or product extension, violates section 7 if it may
substantially lessen competition).
118. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964).
119. 274 F. Supp. at 618.
120. Id. at 621.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 622. The court found that traditionally most southern California newspapers
were evening papers, partially because the Los Angeles Times' circulation throughout south-
ern California was extremely strong. The Times accounted for 70% of southern California's
morning circulation. Id.
123. Id. The district court believed that because the market was "closed tight" no
publisher would risk the expense of starting a new daily newspaper therein. Id.
The term "barriers to entry" is quite vague and the district court did not specify exactly
what it meant. Professor Bork suggests that the definition be limited to "artificial" entry
barriers. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 311. Professor Bork claims that capitalization require-
ments, to which the district court may have been referring, are not artificial barriers to entry.
Id. at 320-24. See also R. POSNER, ANTrrRusT LAw 92 (1976).
124. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some." Al-
though actions under section 7 of the Clayton Act can attack only
mergers which threaten these principles, the trend toward horizon-
tal and conglomerate mergers of mass media firms makes Times
Mirror an important precedent. Moreover, the principles which
have been developed in section 7 litigation make it a useful tool for
preventing concentration. Where the market is already greatly con-
centrated, the importance of preventing even slight increases in
concentration and thus preserving the possibility of eventual decon-
centration is great.126 Where concentration is low but independent
competitors are declining, acquisitions can violate the Clayton
Act." Unless the merger is of such magnitude as to constitute a
prima facie violation of the Clayton Act, however, it must be ana-
lyzed on the basis of probable economic harm-a standard that
ignores the social harm of diminished diversity in the marketplace
of ideas.' Furthermore, definition of the relevant geographic mar-
ket'" poses difficult problems for section 7 cases involving the ac-
quisition of independent newspapers by newspaper chains.""
(2) The Failing-Company Defense in Citizen Publishing
When a firm is failing and has no prospective purchaser other
than a competitor, acquisition of the firm by the competitor is per-
mitted under section 7 of the Clayton Act.' In Citizen Publishing
Co. v. United States,'32 decided shortly after Times Mirror, the Su-
preme Court held that the "failing company" defense had not been
met, and that the acquisition of the Tucson Star by the Tucson
Citizen violated section 7. Moreover, in Citizen Publishing, the
Court found that the profit pooling, price fixing, and market alloca-
125. Id. at 20.
126. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42 (1963).
127. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
128. See Mahaffie, Mergers and Diversification in the Newspaper, Broadcasting and
Information Industries, 13 ANTrrrusT Buu.. 927, 931 (1968).
129. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-21 (1962).
130. One commentator has noted:
Under existing antitrust laws there is little the government can do to halt the concentra-
tion of ownership by large newspaper chains. If the trend is to be stopped, it will have
to be a result of congressional action. Specifically, Congress should provide guidelines
for the definition of the geographic dimension of relevant market areas as it pertains to
newspaper chains.
Comment, Antitrust Malaise in the Newspaper Industry: The Chains Continue to Grow, 8
ST. MARY's L.J. 160, 174 (1976). See also McIntosh, Why the Government Can't Stop Press
Mergers, CoLUM. JouRNALISM REV., May/June 1977, at 48.
131. See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
132. 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
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tion effects of a "joint operating agreement"'" were per se violations
of the Sherman Act because they inhibited entry of new newspapers
and diminished competition between existing newspapers.
In 1940, the two competing newspapers in Tucson, Arizona, the
Star and the Citizen, entered into a joint operating agreement which
provided that, although each newspaper would retain its own news
and editorial departments, the production, distribution, and busi-
ness affairs of the newspapers would be managed by a jointly owned
corporation. The purpose of the agreement was to end commercial
competition between the newspapers and inhibit entry of other
newspapers in three ways: (1) price fixing-advertising and sub-
scription rates would be jointly set; (2) profit pooling-all profits
would be distributed to the two newspapers in an agreed ratio; (3)
market control-none of the stockholders, officers and executives of
the newspapers would be permitted to engage in any other publish-
ing business in the county. The agreement also provided that if
either newspaper were offered for sale, the other newspaper would
have an option to purchase.'3
In 1965, the stockholders of the Citizen exercised their option
and acquired the Star. The United States charged that the acquisi-
tion violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, and that the operating
agreement violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.'3 On a
motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the price
fixing, profit pooling, and market allocation provisions of the agree-
ment were per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.13 1 After
trial, the court concluded that the newspapers monopolized in viola-
133. Under joint operating agreements, competing newspaper publishers merge seg-
ments of their operations, such as printing, business, and advertising, and maintain separate
editorial identities. Markets with joint operating agreements range in size from Franklin-Oil
City, Pennsylvania to San Francisco, California. For a detailed discussion of joint operating
agreements, see The Newspaper Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 1520 Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); The Failing Newspaper Act: Hearings on S. 1312 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1967-1968).
See note 148 infra.
134. The agreement appears in the Record at 30-47, United States v. Citizen Publishing
Co., 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz. 1968).
135. Complaint at 25-28, United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978 (D.
Ariz. 1968).
136. United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 993 (D. Ariz. 1968). The
district court also found that the operating agreement had the purpose of eliminating all
commercial competition between the Tucson newspapers, id., and that the stock agreement
controlled entry into the Tucson market. Id. at 983. For a discussion of per se violations, see
Bark, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2),
75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
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tion of section 2,1 and violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.'38 The
district court ordered divestiture and enjoined the newspapers from
continuing price fixing, profit pooling, and market allocation prac-
tices under the joint operating agreement.'
Citizen Publishing argued before the Supreme Court that in
light of the rapid decline of competing dailies, particularly in cities
the size of Tucson, the operating agreement could be sustained by
the rule of reason as the only reasonable means of preserving news
and editorial competition in Tucson.' The United States argued
that agreements which extinguish all economic competition be-
tween newspapers and inhibit entry of new newspapers hardly com-
port with the underlying purposes of the Sherman Act or the first
amendment."' Furthermore, the Government claimed that even if
one of the newspapers had been a failing company at the time the
joint operating agreement was established, the failing-company de-
fense could not be extended to agreements between ostensibly inde-
pendent competitors whose purpose and effect is to eliminate com-
mercial competition between them."'
The United States Supreme Court affirmed,4 3 holding that the
requirements of the failing-company defense had not been met and
sustaining the divestiture order." Most significant, however, was
Justice Douglas' statement that the restraints had no support in the
first amendment,"' indicating that the Court in Citizen Publishing
acknowledged the ideal of a market free of unreasonable restraints
upon existing firms' and upon the entry of new firms."'
137. 280 F. Supp. at 993.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 994.
140. Brief for Appellants at 36-37, Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S.
131 (1969). In its amicus curiae brief, the American Newspaper Publishers Association sug-
gested that inherent differences between the daily newspaper publishing business and other
industries would require the application of a reasonableness standard under which antitrust
policies favoring competition would be balanced against the political and social values of
competition and diversity of editorial voices. Brief for American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n
as Amicus Curiae at 4. In its brief, the United States argued that joint operating agreements
are not likely to encourage the vigorous competition in news gathering that ordinarily exists
between competing independent newspapers. Brief for the United States at 44.
141. Brief for the United States at 42-43.
142. Id. at 24.
143. 394 U.S. 131, 135 (1969).
144. Id. at 137-40. In dissent, Justice Stewart noted that the district court, in rejecting
the failing-company defense, made no finding that the company was salable. He would have
vacated and remanded the case to the district court for a determination of this question. Id.
at 145-46.
145. Id. at 139.
146. The Court found that the section 1 violations were "plain beyond peradventure."
Id. at 135. Specifically, the profit pooling was described as reducing incentives for advertising
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In light of current newspaper economics, the Citizen Publishing
Court arguably failed to promote news and editorial diversity in
Tucson because the only way that the two newspapers could exist
in that market was by violating the antitrust laws. Had the Court
found that the first amendment interest in having two newspapers
justified the restraints, however, it would have permitted the per-
sistence of an artificial barrier to entry."' That would have limited
the first amendment rights of prospective publishers. Because the
nexus between the first amendment and antitrust policy is that the
market shall not be unreasonably restrained, the result in Citizen
Publishing was correct.
D. The First Amendment, the Antitrust Laws,
and the Newspaper Industry
Justice Murphy's call, in Associated Press, for clear evidence in
media antitrust cases, evinced his awareness of first amendment
hazards in newspaper antitrust cases."' Such expressions of con-
cern, however, are rare in the Court's opinions. Although a chilling
and circulation competition. Id. Price fixing is illegal per se. See United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942).
147. The Court found that the stock agreement foreclosed entry of competing publishers
because it prohibited the stockholders, officers and executives of the Star and Citizen from
engaging in other publishing businesses in the greater Tucson market. 394 U.S. at 134. It is
unlikely that this provision, by itself, would foreclose entry of all publishers. The Court did
not explain whether this provision artificially restrained entry of all competitors.
148. Shortly after Citizen Publishing, the Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
353, 84 Stat. 466 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1976)), was enacted. The Act
permits newspapers operating under joint operating agreements to take joint action with
respect to printing; time, method, and field of publication; allocation of production facilities;
distribution; advertising solicitation; circulation solicitation; business departments; estab-
lishment of advertising rates; and establishment of circulation rates and revenue distribution;
provided there is no merger, combination, or amalgamation of editorial or reportorial staffs,
and editorial policies are independently determined. 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1976).
The Act maintains substantial artificial barriers to entry in markets where joint operat-
ing agreements are in effect, and has been widely criticized on this and other grounds. See
Flynn, Antitrust and the Newspapers: A Comment on S. 1312, 22 VAND. L. REV. 103 (1968);
Knox, Antitrust Exemptions for Newspapers: An Economic Analysis, 1971 LAw & Soc. ORD.
3; Comment, The Newspaper Preservation Act: An Ineffective Step in the Right Direction,
12 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 937 (1971); Comment, The Newspaper Preservation Act, 32
U. Prrr. L. REv. 347 (1971); Comment, Failing Newspaper or Failing Journalism: The Public
Versus the Publishers, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 465 (1970); Note, Newspaper Preservation Act: A
Critique, 46 IND. L.J. 392 (1971).
The Act was found to be constitutional in Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.,
344 F. Supp. 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Most recently, the Attorney General's consent, required
by the Act for the establishment of joint operating agreements, was held to apply only to those
newspapers which sought the Act's antitrust exemption. See Newspaper Guild v. Levi, 539
F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977).
149. See note 109 supra.
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effect on the press may result from antitrust actions instigated by a
President who is hostile toward the press,"'0 the Court has consis-
tently ignored this possibility.
To some extent, the Court's cautious avoidance of this first
amendment issue is explained by comparing the fact situations that
have been presented to the Court for adjudication. In almost all of
the Court's newspaper antitrust cases, the market structure or the
conduct of competing firms is so clearly anticompetitive and con-
trary to the first amendment interest in diversification, that the
gains from antitrust actions clearly outweigh any inhibitory effects.
The clarity of the evidence in Lorain Journal, Times Mirror, and
Citizen Publishing, for example, permitted the Court to ignore any
remotely possible chilling effect on first amendment freedoms. Only
in Associated Press, in which the Justices disagreed sharply over the
issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a motion for
summary judgment, did some members of the Court perceive first
amendment problems.'
The Court's seeming unconcern with first amendment prob-
lems in newspaper antitrust cases may also be explained by the
Court's position that business conduct of the press is beyond the
protection of the first amendment. It is striking that Justices Black
and Douglas, who argued that the first amendment was absolute in
other contexts, held in Associated Press and Citizen Publishing that
restraints of trade were not protected by the first amendment. The
Court in these cases seems to formulate an analogy to the speech
versus conduct cases in first amendment analysis; 52 business behav-
ior of the press is not protected by the first amendment in the same
way that certain behavior by a speaker is not protected by the first
amendment. 5 If an advertiser had obtained an injunction against
the Lorain Journal because the newspaper refused to carry adver-
tisements on the basis of content, the Court certainly would have
reversed on first amendment grounds." The injunction in Lorain
150. In 1972 the Justice Department brought suit against the three national commercial
television networks, charging them with violations of the Sherman Act. The networks re-
sponded that the suit was motivated by President Nixon's disdain for the news media. See
United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 65 F.R.D. 415 (C.D. Cal. 1974), appeal
dismissed, 421 U.S. 940 (1975). See generally Note, The Antitrust Implications of Network
Television Programming, 27 HASTINGs L.J. 1207 (1976).
151. See note 109 supra.
152. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
153. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937). The Court has held,
however, that while the press is not immune from general laws, it is protected from laws
designed to punish only the press. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S 233 (1936).
154. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973) (no individual or group has the right to command the use of broadcasting facilities).
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Journal was permissible only because it did not inhibit directly a
protected function-the editorial selection of news and advertising.
Because a central fuction of the press is to scrutinize the actions
of government,15 the press should be free, to the largest possible
extent, from government regulation of business affairs. Thus, any
government regulation of the press must meet four conditions: first,
the regulation must not infringe upon protected activity; second,
the regulation must be no broader than necessary; third, there must
be a compelling reason for the regulation; and finally, the regulation
must be substantially the same as that imposed on enterprises that
are not involved in expression. This test would avoid the problems
of extensive government regulation of the press that might accom-
pany the less demanding standards implicit in Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Associated Press.'5 The newspaper antitrust
cases in which the Court struck down allegedly anticompetitive
practices or market structures satisfied this test completely, be-
cause none of the cases involved protected activity, the Court's
remedy was narrowly circumscribed, the first amendment interest
in open market conditions justified regulation, and none of the rem-
edies were applied solely to the newspaper industry.
The Court did, however, change its approach to the question of
economic efficiency. In Associated Press, the Court "displayed hos-
tility to the very concept of efficiency."' In contrast, the Times-
Picayune Court supported economies of operation, claiming that
achievement of such economies was a legitimate aim of unit plans.',
Similarly, in Citizen Publishing the Court did not attack summarily
all aspects of joint operating agreements. 59 The Court's recognition
that competitive advantages do not necessarily violate the Sherman
Act undercuts the sweeping attack on competitive advantages im-
155. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,492 (1975) (without information
about government actions provided by the press, most citizens would be unable to vote
intelligently); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in govern-
ment); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (the press serves as a powerful antidote to
any abuses of power by government officials and as a constitutionally chosen means of
keeping public officials responsible to all of the people whom they were selected to serve);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717 (1931) (liberty of the press is cherished because publica-
tions charging official misconduct are immunized from prior restraints); Blasi, The Checking
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION REsEARCH J. 521; Stewart, "Or
of the Press, " 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
156. See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
157. R. BoK, supra note 6, at 341.
158. 345 U.S. 594, 623 (1953).
159. 394 U.S. 131, 135 (1969).
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plicit in Associated Press,"'o and insulates publishers from special
antitrust standards.
Some commentators observe that the economics of newspaper
publishing will inevitably lead to the decline of competing dailies
that are produced by separate publishers in separate plants.',
Faced with market forces that make concentration economically
attractive, one could question whether the Court should attack
admittedly unreasonable conduct that only hastens the inevitable.
As new technologies that alter the economics of newspaper publish-
ing become available, however, widespread resort to artificial re-
straints may drive competing firms from the market or inhibit entry
of new firms. Vigorous antitrust prosecution of unreasonable, artifi-
cial restraints would be an important means of fostering first
amendment values, and would conform to the Court's fundamental
premise that newspaper markets should not be unreasonably re-
strained.
In summary, the antitrust laws have not become the despot's
instrument that Justice Murphy feared in his Associated Press dis-
sent." Antitrust prosecutions, however, have been sporadic in the
newspaper industry and have not resulted in a substantial reduction
in anticompetitive conduct or concentrated market structures. By
contrast, antitrust prosecutions have markedly changed the motion
picture industry.
m. REGULATING THE STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT OF THE MOTION PIc-
TURE INDUSTRY
In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., " Justice Douglas
stated that "moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are in-
cluded in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First
Amendment."'" More than any other form of mass communication,
160. See 326 U.S. at 17.
161. See B. OwEN, supra note 11, at 52-53; Comment, Local Monopoly in the Daily
Newspaper Industry, 61 YALE L.J. 948, 1005-06 (1952).
162. See note 109 supra.
163. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
164. Id. at 166. Until this statement in Paramount Pictures, the Court adhered to its
dictum in Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915), that motion picture
exhibition is a "business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other
spectacles," that is not deserving of constitutional protection as an "organ of public opinion"
or of the press. Mutual Film was invalidated in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501 (1952), in which the Court expressly refused to hold that motion pictures lacked first
amendment protection because they are produced, distributed, and exhibited for private
profit. The Court cautioned, however, that motion pictures are not always subject to the rules
that govern other particular methods of expression, because each method presents its own
peculiar problems. Id. at 503. Thus, the Court has held that films may be aubject to licensing.
See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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however, the motion picture industry has been hampered by restric-
tive practices."' Consequently, antitrust actions have produced
greater change in the structure and practices of the motion picture
industry than in any other communications industry. Although the
first amendment has rarely appeared as an issue in motion picture
antitrust litigation, the Supreme Court's decisions in this area have
furthered the first amendment interest in an open market.
A. Distributor Power: Blacklists and the Integrated Producer-
Distributor
(1) Blacklists: The Simple Problem in Binderup
The Supreme Court first applied the Sherman Act to motion
pictures in Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc.'" Binderup, who
owned a motion picture theatre in Nebraska and leased a circuit of
theatres, was threatened by a group of distributors: unless he pro-
cured films from them, they would pressure other distributors to
cease doing business with him."' When Binderup refused to accede
to their threats, he was "blacklisted" by the distributors' organiza-
tion, the effect of which was to deprive him of films for his theatres.
Binderup sought treble damages under the Sherman Act. After
plaintiffs opening statement, the defendants moved for a directed
verdict, claiming that the complaint and opening statement had
failed to show that interstate commerce was restricted by the al-
leged blacklist. The trial court sustained the motio i and instructed
the jury to return a verdict for the defendants. The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed."'
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
lower courts and held that interstate commerce was involved in the
165. For general studies of restrictive practices in the industry and lower court deci-
sions, see D. BERTRAND, W. EvANs, & E. BLANcHARD, THE MOTION PIcTURE INDUSTRY-A
PA'rERN OF CONTROL, (TNEC Monograph No. 43, 1941) [hereinafter cited as D. BERTRAND];
M. CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY (1960); 2 S. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST
PoLCIEs 145-95 (1958).
166. 263 U.S. 291 (1923). Prior to deciding Binderup, the Court rejected a patent in-
fringement suit brought by the Motion Picture Patents Company, a patent pooling company
formed in 1908 by camera and projector manufacturers. Although the company attempted
to restrict commerce, the patent issues raised in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), are beyond the scope of this article. See also United States v.
Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 F. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1915), dismissed per stipulation, 247 U.S.
524 (1918).
167. For a discussion of predatory practices in the early stages of the motion picture
industry, see Cassaday, Monopoly in Motion Picture Production and Distribution: 1908-1915,
32 S. CAL. L. REv. 325 (1959).
168. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 280 F. 301 (8th Cir. 1922).
1979]1 1279
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
distribution of the films,"' explaining that since the distributors
controlled the distribution of all films in the United States, the
result of the conspiracy was to put Binderup out of business. 0 The
Court noted in dictum, however, that each distributor acting sepa-
rately could have refused to deal with Binderup without violating
the Sherman Act."'
Although the Court did not address first amendment issues in
Binderup, the conspiracy violated the first amendment as well as
the Sherman Act. Binderup was faced with the choice of exhibiting
particular films, which amounted to compulsory publication,7 2 or
discontinuing his exhibition activities. Both alternatives would
have violated the spirit of the first amendment. By finding for Bin-
derup, the Court protected his first amendment right to exhibit free
from coercion.7 3
(2) The Integrated Producer-Distributor:
Paramount Famous Lasky and First National
The practices in Binderup were clear violations of the antitrust
laws, and the Court reached its decision easily. The Court faced far
more difficult issues in Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United
States7 and United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 1 when
it addressed the question whether a joint attempt to stabilize com-
merce violates the antitrust laws.
Paramount Famous Lasky and First National Pictures
stemmed from unstable conditions in the motion picture exhibition
market during the 1920's. 7 1 In an attempt to stabilize the field, a
169. 263 U.S. at 309. The defendants had unsuccessfully argued that the Sherman Act
was not applicable, because interstate commerce was not involved. Brief for Defendants at
18-31, Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
170. 263 U.S. at 312.
171. Id.
172. Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compelling
a flag salute invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which the first amendment is designed
to protect).
173. In another motion picture case, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 166 (1948), Justice Douglas refused to discuss first amendment issues because no
monopoly of production was apparent. See text accompanying notes 299-304 infra. If one
argues that there were no important first amendment issues in Binderup because Binderup
was merely an exhibitor, then by extension, interference with a television station that
"exhibits" material primarily produced by others would similarly present no important first
amendment problems. The first amendment would be virtually meaningless if it did not
protect all forms of mass communication from production to exhibition.
174. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
175. 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
176. See generally United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., 34 F.2d 984, 985-
86 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 34 F.2d 815, 816 (S.D.N.Y.
1929); D. BERTRAND, supra note 165, at 6-7.
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group of producers, distributors, and film boards of trade (local
organizations of distributor representatives) agreed among them-
selves to adopt a standard contract. 177 One clause provided that each
party to the contract would submit any matter of disagreement to
a local board of arbitration composed of members of the local film
board and theatre managers.7 8 If an exhibitor refused to submit to
arbitration, a security deposit was to be paid to all distributors with
whom the exhibitor had existing contracts. If the exhibitor refused
to supply the security deposit, all of his contracts with the distribu-
tors would be cancelled, thus terminating his supply of films.
The United States charged that the standard exhibition con-
tract violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the district court
agreed.'7 The district court found that the contract improved trade
conditions in the industry,8 o but that it was an unreasonable re-
straint because of the distributors' coercive "power to say 'Take
what is offered or get nothing'. "'s The United States Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed.'
Justice McReynolds' majority opinion in Paramount Famous
Lasky emphasized the public interest in competition. Because the
Sherman Act seeks to protect the public against the unreasonable
destruction of competition,'" and because the effect of the standard
contract was to produce an unreasonable restraint upon trade,"'
Justice McReynolds concluded that it was unnecessary to show that
the agreement suppressed all competition between the parties. The
public interest in preserving competition, he claimed, was para-
mount."'
177. For a description of the lengthy conferences within the industry that preceded
adoption of the standard exhibition contract, see United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky
Corp., 34 F.2d 984, 985-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
178. The text of section 18 is reprinted in 282 U.S. at 37-39.
179. United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., 34 F.2d 984, 988-89 (S.D.N.Y.
1929).
180. The district court found, however, that the distributors had brought about this
beneficial result by exercising their combined "irresistible economic force" and imposing
their will upon the industry. Id. at 989.
181. Id.
182. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
183. Id. at 43.
184. Id. at 41.
185. Id. at 44. After Paramount Famous Lasky was decided, a motion picture exhibitor
refused to accept, exhibit, or pay for films that were sent to him pursuant to contracts
identical to those in Paramount Famous Lasky. Fox Film Corporation brought an action
against the exhibitor for breach of contract, and the exhibitor answered that the contracts
were invalid under the Sherman Act. A Minnesota court agreed with the exhibitor, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court opinion in Paramount
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In United States v. First National Pictures, Inc.,"' a companion
case to Paramount Famous Lasky, the Supreme Court held that a
somewhat different type of agreement between competing distribu-
tors violated the Sherman Act. In doing so, the Court reversed a
lower court holding that the practice in question regulated but did
not suppress competition.'
During the 1920's, motion picture studios each spring would
announce the films that they would make available for exhibition
during the coming season. Motion picture exhibitors would bid on
the films and arrange engagements accordingly. After exhibition
contracts were completed, however, some theatre owners would
transfer ownership of their theatres to avoid honoring the contracts.
Because new motion picture products decline sharply in market
value within a short time after release, distributors sustained heavy
losses when exhibitors transferred ownership in this manner. As a
result, a group of competing distributors in 1926 caused thirty-two
film boards of trade to establish local credit committees. Upon
transfer of a theatre, the credit committee would send the new
owner a credit questionnaire asking, inter alia, if existing exhibition
contracts would be honored.18 If the new owner failed to respond to
the questionnaire, or failed to post a security bond, his theatre was
placed on a list kept by the credit board and distributors were
prohibited from dealing with that theatre.
The same district court that had decided Paramount Famous
Lasky found no unreasonable restraint, explaining that the purpose
and effect of the distributors' combination was to regulate, not sup-
press competition."' The district court found that the situation was
one that could "only be dealt with by joint action of the distributing
group, in protection of their interests as a group.""' The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed, explaining that the arrangement was
Famous Lasky, 34 F.2d 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), rendered illegal all standard exhibition con-
tracts. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 192 Minn. 212, 255 N.W. 845 (1934), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 294 U.S. 696 (1935). After the United States Supreme Court dis-
missed the writ of certiorari because it appeared that no final judgment had been entered,
the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision. 194 Minn. 654, 260 N.W. 320 (1935).
The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari, 295 U.S. 730 (1935), but subse-
quently dismissed the writ for want of pendent jurisdiction. 296 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1935).
186. 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
187. United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 34 F.2d 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), rev'd, 282
U.S. 44 (1930).
188. The questionnaire and related documents appear in United States v. First Nat'l
Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44, 51-54 (1930).
189. 34 F.2d at 818. The district court also found that there was no evidence of intent
to exclude anyone from exhibiting motion pictures. Id.
190. Id. at 816.
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coercive and restricted a "free and untrammeled market." 9' The
Court held that enterprises in the same market which combine to
protect themselves against inimical trade conditions violate the
Sherman Act."2
The Court was correct in rejecting the district court's attempt
to distinguish First National. It could have applied easily the dis-
trict court's Paramount Famous Lasky analysis, because the credit
boards' positive effects on competition, assuming there were any,
were achieved by the distributors' "irresistible economic force,"
which enabled them to fix the terms under which they would dis-
tribute films."' The district court's distinction between the two
cases was therefore tenuous,"' and if the Court had affirmed, it
would have established a dangerous precedent. Instead, the Court
found that the public interest in preserving competition, which was
a primary consideration in Paramount Famous Lasky, pertained to
First National as well, and that the interests of a combination are
insignificant when compared to the public interest in a market free
of coercion and collective refusals to deal."'
191. 282 U.S. at 54. On remand, the district court entered a decree prohibiting the
defendants from conspiring with one another. United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 51
F.2d 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
192. 282 U.S. at 55. See also FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565, 574 (1924)
(an act which is legal when done by one firm may become illegal when done by many acting
in concert, and may be prohibited if the result harms the public or the individual to whom
the concerted action is directed).
193. 34 F.2d at 988-89.
194. In Paramount Famous Lasky, the district court found that the standard exhibition
contract was oppressive because it was being forced on exhibitors by distributors. Id. at 989.
The practices in First National were similarly forced on exhibitors by distributors.
195. Professor Chafee's comment on Paramount Famous Lasky also applies to First
National:
The vital question in the case is whether the Contract and the Rules went too far in
safeguarding the distributors. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court made no effort to con-
sider this question. So it is hard to say just how this particular attempt to bring order
out of chaos should have been revised to make it lawful.
Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 568 (footnote omitted). The thrust of both Paramount Famous
Lasky and First National, however, is that joint attempts to regulate commerce violated the
Sherman Act. Certainly any distributor could have refused to deal with an exhibitor that
lacked an approved credit rating or failed to post a security bond, and Professor Chafee
appears to have overlooked this fact. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Dis-
trib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); text accompanying notes 335-39 infra.
As in Binderup, the Court did not address first amendment issues in either Paramount
Famous Lasky or First National. These cases are similar, however, in terms of the severe
penalty imposed by the restrictive agreement-termination of films for exhibition-and that
penalty has an important first amendment aspect. By holding that the practices in First
National restricted an exhibitor's freedom to select from among the available films, the Court
promoted the exhibitor's first amendment right to exhibit.
For another motion picture case involving a combined refusal to deal, see United States
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B. Circuit Buying Power: The Exhibitor Strikes Back
Binderup, Paramount Famous Lasky, and First National each
involved the power of producer-distributors. By the late 1920's the
theatre circuit-a chain of theatres controlled by a single firm-had
become another powerful component of the motion picture industry.
Beginning with Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. United States,'" the
Court addressed the monopolistic effects of circuit buying power."'
(1) First-Run versus Subsequent-Run Theatres: Defusing
Interstate Circuit
The Interstate Circuit, which operated forty-three first-run and
second-run theatres in Texas, had a monopoly of first-run theatres
in all cities in which it operated except Houston. An affiliated cir-
cuit, Texas Consolidated, also operated theatres in Texas, mostly
in the Rio Grande Valley. The two circuits dominated the exhibition
markets in which their theatres were located, paying more than 74%
of the total license fees paid to distributors by all theatres in those
markets. On July 11, 1934, the joint manager of the two circuits
wrote to distributors, announcing that Interstate would cease exhib-
iting the distributors' class "A" features at its first-run theatres
unless the distributors agreed to establish a twenty-five cent mini-
mum admission price in selling "A" films for subsequent runs,'"
and agreed to prohibit double feature exhibition of certain "A"
films." These demands were directed at independent subsequent-
run theatres which were commonly showing double features at an
admission price of less than twenty-five cents. The distributors
agreed to Interstate's demands. The district court held that by act-
ing uniformly on Interstate's demands, the distributors were con-
spiring with one another, and that they had conspired with Inter-
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Mo. 1936), off'd per curiam, 298 U.S.
643 (1936).
196. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
197. For other cases in which the Court examined circuit buying power, see United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v.
United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); and United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
198. Films were exhibited in a pattern of successive release weeks or runs. First-run
theatres exhibited certain types of feature films for the first time in a market. Subsequent-
run theatres exhibited those films after the first run. See text accompanying note 259 infra
(discussion of a similar release system used in Chicago).
199. The letter appears in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 216
n.3 (1939). The letter listed branch managers of competing distributors as addressees. Thus




state to impose the restrictions on exhibitors' four Texas cities.20
The district court thus enjoined the distributors from continuing the
restrictions.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
lower court correctly inferred a conspiracy from the distributors'
similar or "parallel" actions.201 This laid the foundation for the doc-
trine that conscious parallelism can be illegal. 02 In determining
whether the agreements between Interstate and the distributors
were reasonable, the Court found that both the purpose and effect
of the agreements were to damage Interstate's competitors by forc-
ing them to raise their prices and to discontinue double features.2 3
The result was a deflection of attendance from subsequent-run thea-
tres to Interstate's first-run theatres. 20 4
The practices condemned in Interstate have grave first amend-
ment implications. If the restrictions had remained in effect, the
variety of information available to the public could have been re-
stricted. It is probable that the independent theatres would have
been either forced out of business or forced to sell out to Interstate.
In that event, Interstate would have had a complete exhibition mo-
nopoly in key Texas cities, and the consequent power to exclude
certain films from those cities if it disapproved of the content of the
films. Moreover, the restrictions on price and manner of exhibition
imposed an artificial barrier to the entry of new, independent
subsequent-run theatres. By eliminating these restrictions,
Interstate fosters the public interest in diversity of information.
(2) Divestiture of Theatre Monopolies:
Crescent, Griffith, and Schine
The Interstate Court did not discuss the Circuit's attempted
monopolization of first-run theatres in certain cities, but in subse-
quent cases in which this issue was squarely addressed, the Court
applied broad principles for divestiture. 20 5 The first of these cases,
200. United States v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 868, 873 (N.D. Tex. 1937).
201. 306 U.S. at 223. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts argued that the re-
straints were not unreasonable because they did not restrain competition between the distrib-
utors. Id. at 237. Justice Roberts also disagreed with the conspiracy finding. Id. it 240.
Justices McReynolds and Butler joined Justice Roberts' dissent.
202. See Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952); Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd,
192 F.2d 579 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952). The Court later tempered this
doctrine in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
See text accompanying notes 335-39 infra.
203. 306 U.S. at 229.
204. Id. at 231.
205. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Schine Chain
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United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 20 6 was a landmark be-
cause the Court, for the first time in the motion picture context,
approved divestiture as a means of preventing illegal activities.
From 1934 to 1939 the Crescent Amusement Company, which
owned a chain of motion picture theatres in the South, and several
closely affiliated exhibition chains 207 experienced rapid growth in
the number of towns in which they operated theatres, in the number
of towns in which they faced no competition, and in earnings. Cres-
cent and its affiliates insisted that distributors give them monopoly
rights in towns in which they faced competition. If a distributor
refused this request, the exhibitors refused to exhibit the distribu-
tor's films in their monopoly towns. 208 This policy was designed to
restrict the availability of films for the Crescent group's competi-
tors, and its threat was sufficient to cause many theatres to sell out
to the Crescent group.
The United States charged that the phenomenal growth of
Crescent and its affiliates was the result of restraints of trade that
violated section 1, and of monopolistic practices that violated sec-
tion 2, of the Sherman Act. The district court found that the exhibi-
tors had violated the Sherman Act by combining their licensing
policies for monopoly towns and competitive towns, thus forcing
distributors to license films on a noncompetitive basis and to dis-
criminate against independent competitors. 200 Moreover, the district
court found that the exhibitors had coerced independent theatres to
sell out to them. The district court entered a decree requiring the
exhibitors to divest themselves of stock in other exhibition corpora-
tions, prohibiting the practice by which licensing of films in compet-
itive towns was conditioned upon licensing in monopoly towns and
permitting further theatre acquisitions only if the owner offered to
sell without coercion.
Before the Supreme Court, the United States argued that the
exhibitors should affirmatively show that future acquisitions would
not unreasonably restrain competition. 2 10 The Supreme Court af-
firmed those parts of the district court's decree pertaining to divesti-
ture and licensing of films, but required such an affirmative showing
before acquisitions would be permitted.2 11 The Court, noting the
Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement
Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
206. 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
207. The chains were interrelated through stock ownership and principal officers.
208. 323 U.S. at 181.
209. Id. at 179.
210. Brief for the United States at 33.
211. 323 U.S. at 187, 189, 190. The Court found that the combination was designed to
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combination's success in eliminating competition, 212 explained that
the public interest would not be protected by the lower court's ac-
quisition requirement.2 13 Where the proclivity for unlawful conduct
was evident, the Court concluded, the decree should operate as an
effective deterrent to repetition of the conduct. 214
The exhibitors had become closely aligned through ownership
of stock in other exhibitors, and the district court ordered divesti-
ture so that none of the exhibitors would own stock in other exhibi-
tion corporations. 215 This provision of the decree, they argued, was
inequitable, but the Court sharply disagreed, explaining that since
the combination violated the Sherman Act, the exhibitors could not
claim hardship as a means of avoiding "an undoing of their unlawful
project." 2 18 Because acquisition of stock in many of the other corpo-
rations resulted from the predatory practices, and because there
would be a tempting opportunity to continue to act in combination
against independent theatres if the exhibitors remained affiliated
with one another, the Court concluded that divestiture was the only
effective remedy.217
By holding that dissolution of a combination will be ordered if
the creation of the combination violates the Sherman Act, 218
Crescent establishes a key precedent for divestiture of mass media
enterprises. Because the Crescent rule applies not only to horizontal
combinations of motion picture exhibitors, but also to horizontal
and vertical combinations of producers and distributors, it is an
important tool for the restructuring of groups that unreasonably
restrain competition.219 Moreover, Crescent is important because of
the Court's willingness to modify and strengthen a decree. 2 0
The Court took an equally significant step in United States v.
"crush competition," id. at 183, and there was ample evidence that the combination had used
its buying power to either restrict its competitors' ability to license films or to eliminate
competition by acquiring its competitors' property. Id. at 181. Prohibition of the licensing
plan, which was the chief anticompetitive weapon of the combination, was plainly warranted.
212. Id. at 183.
213. The Court has modified decrees where it has approved the conclusions of lower
courts on the character of Sherman Act violations. See United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106, 184-88 (1911); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78-
82 (1911).
214. 323 U.S. at 186.
215. Some officers were also forced to resign from the affiliates.
216. 323 U.S. at 189.
217. Id. at 189-90.
218. Id. at 189.
219. See Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); text accom-
panying notes 236-55 infra.




Griffith, 2 1 holding that a finding of specific intent to restrain trade
or to build a monopoly was not prerequisite to a finding that the
antitrust laws had been violated.222 Moreover, Griffith condemns
monopoly power even if unexercised.2" On April 28, 1939, as part of
an extensive attack on the conduct and structure of the motion
picture industry, the United States brought a suit against the Grif-
fith theatre circuit and its affiliates operating in Texas, Oklahoma,
and New Mexico. Griffith and its affiliates, which operated theatres
in eighty-five towns, fifty-three of which were monopoly situations,
bargained as a unit with distributors. The United States charged
that the circuit's use of its total buying power to obtain special
privileges from distributors violated the Sherman Act. 2 4 The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint, finding that the agreements
between Griffith and the distributors had not restrained trade, that
no conspiracy existed, and that Griffith had not conditioned the
licensing of films in competitive towns on the licensing of films in
closed towns.21 The district court distinguished Crescent, in which
circuit buying power was used with the intent to eliminate competi-
tion. Finding no intent to monopolize, 26 the district court concluded
that the existence of circuit buying power per se did not violate the
Sherman Act,227 absent a specific intent to use that power to elimi-
nate competition.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that proof
of specific intent was not necessary to establish a violation of the
Sherman Act, 2" and that the district court had failed to make ade-
quate findings on the effects of the circuit's buying power.226 The
Court readily perceived the anticompetitive tendencies of circuit
buying by recognizing that whenever a circuit uses the strategic
position of a closed town to obtain exclusive privileges in a competi-
221. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
222. Id. at 105.
223. Id. at 107.
224. These privileges included preventing independent theatres from obtaining films on
a first-run basis and forcing independents to maintain prices higher than those warranted by
a film's quality.
225. United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 68 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Okla. 1946).
226. Id. at 196.
227. The district court was drawing upon United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S.
693, 708 (1927), in which the Supreme Court held that the mere size of a corporation or its
unexerted power does not in itself constitute an offense when unaccompanied by unlawful
conduct in the exercise of its power. The district court concluded by emphasizing "what . . .
was done, and any fair inferences we can gather from those acts regarding the intent of those
who acted." United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 68 F. Supp. 180, 189 (W.D. Okla. 1946)
(emphasis in original).
228. 334 U.S. at 105. Justice Frankfurter dissented, agreeing with the district court.
229. Id. at 109.
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tive town, it is employing its monopoly power as a trade weapon.210
The Court saw great potential for abuse of circuit buying power,
especially when there are a large number of monopoly towns, be-
cause such monopoly power could be used to drive independent
competitors out of business.2sl Since the Court believed that Grif-
fith's monopoly power had some effect on competition and the
growth of Griffith's circuit, it remanded the case to the district court
to determine the extent of the effect. 2
By striking at a prevalent device by which circuits used their
collective buying power to force concessions from motion picture
distributors and thereby force independent theatres out of business,
the Griffith Court was promoting the public interest in diverse
sources of information. A component of many circuit buying plans
was a restriction on the number and quality of films which competi-
tors could obtain, an obvious impediment to the flow of information
from diverse sources. 3 If allowed to continue unabated, circuit buy-
ing plans would lead to expanded chains and presumably an in-
crease in the number of closed towns. The threat that this posed was
readily apparent, because "a monopoly of theatres in any one town
commands the entrance for all films into that area." 234 Moreover,
when used to obtain restrictive agreements from film distributors,
circuit buying power enables the circuit to impede entry of new
exhibitors into the market.235 All of these results would constrict the
market and diminish the flow of information to the public.
In Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States,mB a companion
case to Griffith, the Supreme Court similarly addressed circuit buy-
ing power. While Griffith did not address the issue of divestiture,
Schine held that divestiture could be used to render impotent mo-
nopoly power which violates the Sherman Act? The Schine theatre
230. Id. at 107.
231. Specific intent to drive competitors out of business was not necessary, the Court
explained, because "the end result is the necessary and direct consequence of what he did."
Id. at 108. Professor Bork has strongly criticized the Griffith Court's linking of two markets
without predatory conduct. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 142.
232. 334 U.S. at 109. Large scale buying was not held to be unlawful per se. Id. at 108.
On remand the district court enjoined the defendants from licensing films for closed towns
and competitive towns in single contracts, but did not order divestiture. See United States
v. Griffith Amusement Co., 94 F. Supp. 747, 755 (W.D. Okla. 1950).
233. For example, Griffith was charged with restricting the availability of first-run and
other classes of films. See United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 68 F. Supp. 180, 181
(W.D. Okla. 1946).
234. 334 U.S. at 107.
235. Id.
236. 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
237. Id. at 129.
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chain was the largest nonstudio affiliated theatre circuit in the
United States during the 1940's. Of the seventy-six towns in which
it operated theatres in 1942, sixty were closed towns. In 1928 Schine
had operated theatres in only four closed towns. As in Crescent and
Griffith, the United States charged the circuit with restraining com-
petition by using the combined buying power of its closed and open
towns to obtain concessions, including lengthy "clearances," from
distributors that were not available to competing theatres .2 1 More-
over, Schine was charged with forcing or attempting to force compe-
titors out of business by threatening to use its buying power to re-
strict a competitor's supply of films.239 The district court found that
Schine and several major film distributorS24 0 had conspired with
each other to violate sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. It entered
a decree enjoining various practices41 and ordering divestiture of
Schine and its affiliates. 24 2
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court in part and
reversed in part, with Justice Douglas writing for a unanimous
Court.2 3 The Court explained that since clearances were not per se
unlawful restraints under the Sherman Act,244 the unreasonableness
of the clearance agreements in question must be clearly estab-
lished.2 5 Because the district court did not give any specific content
to the concept of unreasonableness, the Court was unable to deter-
mine what standards had been applied .2  The Court thus set aside
the district court's findings on clearances so the lower court could
delineate more precisely what it meant by unreasonableness. By
doing so, the Court balanced the public interest in competition
against the interest of the press in being free from harassment in the
form of unjustified litigation. If left undefined, the concept of unrea-
238. A clearance is a period of time between the conclusion of one exhibition run of a
film in a market and subsequent runs. In addition to receiving lengthy clearances, Schine
was able to restrict the supply of first- and second-run films available to its competitors. See
United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 229 (W.D.N.Y. 1945).
239. Schine would also threaten to build theatres in an attempt to discourage competi-
tion. Id. at 232.
240. The distributors were Columbia, Fox, Loew, Paramount, RKO, United Artists,
Universal, and Warner. Id.
241. Id. at 241. The decree enjoined the licensing of films based on the licensing of films
in other competitive situations, unreasonable clearances, and monopolization of first and
second-run films. Id.
242. Id. at 241-42.
243. 334 U.S. at 110.
244. Id. at 121.
245. "If reasonableness is the test," Justice Douglas stated, "the factors which bear on
it would appear to be numerous." Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of clearances, see
D. BERTRAND, supra note 165, at 40-41.
246. 334 U.S. at 122.
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sonableness could be used as a tool to hamper the press and ulti-
mately the flow of information,"2  but the requirement that unrea-
sonableness be defined is not an insurmountable barrier to a finding
that trade has been unduly restrained.
The Court also set aside the lower court's divestiture decree
because it was improperly fashioned. The Court thus deprived the
defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy and broke up the
monopoly power that violated the Sherman Act.249 In requiring
Schine to sell more than fifty theatres,2s0 the district court did not
determine which theatres had been acquired through Schine's anti-
competitive practices. 25 1 Thus, the plan was set aside and the case
remanded so the district court could make appropriate findings on
this question. This was a necessary step before the district court
could determine whether Schine still retained monopoly power after
being "deprived of the fruits of . . . [its] conspiracy." 25 The Court,
noting that divestiture might be necessary to diminish Schine's
monopoly power, concluded that the Sherman Act prohibits not
only the overt exercise of monopoly power but also "[t]he mere
existence of the power to monopolize, together with the purpose or
intent to do so."M
The Schine Court did not define monopoly power, but in
Griffith and United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,'" monopoly
247. Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 52, 59 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (clear and unmistakable evidence is needed to justify applying the Sherman Act
to the press).
248. In this type of case, Justice Douglas stated, it was necessary to start from the
premise that an injunction against future violations would be inadequate to protect the public
interest, because those who build their empires unlawfully would preserve them intact. 334
U.S. at 128.
249. Id. at 128-29.
250. Schine originally presented a plan to the district court that would have divided
the circuit into three separate corporations, each owned by members of the Schine family.
The district court rejected the plan, ordering the sale of theatres and prohibiting future
acquisitions, except after a showing that competition would not be unreasonably restrained.
63 F. Supp. 229 (W.D.N.Y. 1945); see note 252 infra.
251. Justice Douglas noted that the divested theatres may in fact have been lawfully
acquired, while the retained theatres may have been unlawfully acquired. 334 U.S. at 127-
28.
252. Id. at 129. On remand, Schine entered into a consent decree that involved divesti-
ture of 39 theatres. See United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., [1948-19491 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,447 (W.D.N.Y. 1949). Eventually, Schine and several affiliated corporations were
found guilty of criminal contempt for failing to dispose of all of the theatres that had been
ordered sold. See United States v. Schine, [1956] Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,580 (W.D.N.Y.
1956), aff'd, 260 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 934 (1959).
253. 334 U.S. at 130.
254. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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power was defined as the power to exclude competition as desired."'
Certainly the existence of such power is antithetical to the public
interest in receiving information from diverse sources. By emphasiz-
ing divestiture as a means not only of depriving firms of the fruits
of illegality, but also of breaking up monopoly power, Schine estab-
lishes the propriety of deconcentrating highly concentrated mass
communications markets. This principle would have its most signif-
icant application to mass communications in Paramount Pictures,
in which the Supreme Court also addressed first amendment issues.
C. The Integrated Producer-Distributor-Exhibitor: Bigelow and
Paramount Pictures
During the 1920's, it became clear to the major motion picture
producer-distributors that their ability to bargain for first-run exhi-
bition of their films depended upon their control of a theatre chain
which could be used as a reciprocal bargaining weapon when dealing
with other major vertically integrated firms.2" By the early 1930's,
the major firms in the motion picture industry were integrated ac-
cordingly to combine the production, distribution, and exhibition
functions. The problems which accompanied this vertical integra-
tion were examined in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.25 and
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.25
(1) The Chicago System of Release: An Independent
Theatre Challenges the Majors
Under a distribution plan known as the Chicago system of re-
lease, films were exhibited in Chicago in a pattern of successive
release weeks or runs. During the Loop first run, a film would be
shown in one of the large theatres located in the Loop, the heart of
Chicago's business district. After this run, a waiting period or
"clearance" of three weeks occurred, during which the film would
not be exhibited in the city. Three weeks after the Loop run had
finished, the film would be released for successive periods: the
fourth, fifth and sixth weeks were the A pre-release weeks, the sev-
enth and eighth weeks were B pre-release weeks, the ninth week was
the C pre-release week, and successive weeks were the general re-
lease period.2"
255. Id. at 173; see American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 811
(1946).
256. See M. CONANT, supra note 165, at 26.
257. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
258. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
259. For a discussion of the Chicago exhibition market and the effects of antitrust
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In 1942, Bigelow, owner of an independent theatre on Chicago's
South Side, charged that a number of theatres and distributors in
Chicago that were owned by large producers, such as RKO, Para-
mount, and Warner Brothers, had conspired to restrain trade by not
permitting independent theatres to show films prior to their exhibi-
tion in studio-owned theatres. Bigelow charged that it had sustained
an earnings loss of more than $120,000 from 1937 to 1942 because it
had been unable to play films before they were shown at studio-
owned theatres. The case went to trial solely on the question of
damages, and the jury returned a verdict for $120,000, which the
trial court trebled. The Seventh Circuit, while noting that there was
substantial evidence of a conspiracy, 260 held that Bigelow failed to
prove actual damage as a direct result of the conspiracy. 261
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and affirmed the district court. 2 2 The Court agreed with the court
of appeals that there was sufficient evidence of a conspiracy result-
ing in the discriminatory release of films in Chicago. 283 The Court,
however, concluded that the evidence on damages was sufficient to
support "a just and reasonable inference" that Bigelow had been
damaged by the conspiracy.264
Bigelow at trial sought to prove damages by introducing two
classes of evidence. The first was a comparison of earnings from 1937
to 1942 between Bigelow's theatre and a competing theatre that had
been permitted to exhibit films before Bigelow. This showed that
the competing theatre's net receipts exceeded Bigelow's by approxi-
mately $116,000. The second class of evidence compared Bigelow's
receipts for the 1937-1942 period with those for the 1932-1936 period,
and showed a falling off in net receipts of approximately $126,000
from 1937 to 1942.25 Prior to 1937, Bigelow had been able to obtain
some films which had not been shown elsewhere, but after that year,
double features became prominent, and theatres with playing posi-
tions ahead of Bigelow began to use nearly all of the available films.
The Court found that because the discriminatory release system
placed Bigelow in an inferior competitive position, it was damaging,
and that both classes of evidence tended to show damage.'
actions on that market, see M. CONANT, supra note 165, at 154-77.
260. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 150 F.2d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 1945).
261. Id. at 883.
262. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
263. Id. at 255. The Court explained that there was evidence that the integrated distrib-
utors and exhibitors conspired to give to the studio-owned theatres preferential playing posi-
tions in the release system over those accorded independent competing theatres. Id. at 256.
264. Id. at 266.
265. Neither figure included the cost of renting films.
266. 327 U.S. at 260.
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The respondents argued before the Supreme Court that the
evidence was too speculative to support a damage award. In particu-
lar, they claimed that the comparison of receipts before and after
1937 was specious on the question of damages. The comparison
assumed, they claimed, that conditions affecting profits would have
remained favorable to Bigelow after 1937 if Bigelow had been able
to obtain films not previously shown.267 The Court, citing Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. 26 and Story Parchment
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 269 replied that the jury could
infer from proof of the defendants' illegal acts the tendency of those
acts to harm the plaintiffs' business, and that the jury could infer
actual harm from a decline in profits that was not attributable to
other causes. 270 The comparison of receipts before and after 1937, the
Court concluded, was sufficient to support the jury's computation
of damages, 271
In his dissent in Bigelow, Justice Frankfurter concluded that
plaintiff, while establishing the existence of an illegal conspiracy,
failed to show that the conspiracy had caused injury, explaining
that it would have had to prove its business would have been more
profitable had the conspiracy not existed.27 2 Because the distribu-
tors, acting independently of one another, could have given prefer-
ence to their affiliated exhibitors without violating the Sherman
Act, Justice Frankfurter reasoned, Bigelow could have suffered the
same injury even if no illegal conspiracy existed. Moreover, Justice
Frankfurter accused the Court of ignoring a crucial distinction
"between proving that some damages were 'the certain result of the
wrong' and uncertainty as to the dollars and cents value of such
injuring wrong."m3
The Court in Bigelow misapplied Story Parchment's rule pre-
cluding recovery of damages that "are not the certain result of the
wrong"2 4 while permitting recovery of damages which are definitely
caused by the wrong but are uncertain in amount only. By allowing
267. Id. at 261.
268. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
269. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
270. 327 U.S. at 264.
271. Id. at 266. The Court stated in Story Parchment that while damages may not be
determined by speculation, it is sufficient if the evidence shows the extent of damages as a
matter of "just and reasonable inference." 282 U.S. at 563. In Eastman Kodak, the Court
explained that the amount of damages must be ascertainable "as a matter of reasonable
inference." 273 U.S. at 379. In both these cases, unlike Bigelow, liability was clearly estab-
lished.
272. 327 U.S. at 267.
273. Id.
274. 282 U.S. at 562.
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an inference of harm in Bigelow, the Court transferred the uncer-
tainty which Story Parchment permitted in determining the
amount of damages to the question whether the alleged conspiracy
had actually harmed plaintiff. By thus making an award of damages
easier to obtain, the Court neglected the interest of communications
firms in being free from damage awards that may not be directly
attributable to their illegal conduct. Certainly unlawful actions can
be enjoined, but to permit treble damages where there is uncer-
tainty as to whether damage is directly attributable to such actions
may unduly endanger communications firms. Nevertheless, the ef-
fect of the less rigorous Bigelow test is to promote an open market,
because it signals the danger of engaging in illegal practices.27 5
(2) Divestiture and the Majors: Paramount Pictures
The Court's most important motion picture antitrust decision,
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,2" resulted in divestiture
of the exhibition branches of the major film studios. Paramount
Pictures stemmed from the Antitrust Division's intensive attack in
the 1930's on anticompetitive practices and concentration in the
motion picture industry.277 The United States filed a complaint on
July 20, 1938 and an amended complaint on November 14, 1940,
charging that five major and three minor motion picture studios
had conspired to restrain trade in motion pictures.2 78 The five majors
were charged with monopolizing the production, distribution, and
exhibition of motion pictures, and with violating sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act by integrating vertically. The five majors ac-
cepted a consent decree on November 20, 1940, which prohibited
certain practices, such as agreements to tie licenses for newsreels to
275. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bigelow, plaintiff obtained a decree
which prohibited, inter alia, distributors from preventing Bigelow from obtaining films for
first neighborhood run. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 162 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1947). Bigelow also received an award for the period 1937-1946 of
$970,322, including costs and attorneys' fees. M. CONANT, supra note 165, at 167. This award
signaled to other exhibitors and distributors the danger of inhibiting the market illegally. For
an analysis of the decree in Bigelow, see id. at 167-72.
276. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
277. See generally E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966).
278. The major studios were Loew's, Paramount, RKO, Twentieth Century-Fox, and
Warner Brothers. The minor defendants were Columbia, United Artists, and Universal. Only
the majors were involved in production, distribution, and exhibition of films. Columbia and
Universal produced and distributed films, and United Artists was involved only in distribu-
tion. In the amended complaint, unlike the original complaint, the conspiracy charges as-
sumed a predominant position. One commentator speculates that this shift was a result of
the intervening decision in Interstate. Taubman, The Performing Arts and the Anti-Trust
Laws, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 405, 412 (1958).
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those for features, and established an arbitration system to resolve
disputes. 27 9 The decree did not alter the structure of the industry.20
In August 1944 the United States petitioned the district court
to modify the decree, most significantly to order divestiture of the
majors' exhibition circuits from their production and distribution
activities. The district court found that uniform specification of
admission prices by distributors was a horizontal price fixing con-
spiracy,281 that licensing of one film on the condition that another
film also be accepted (block-booking) was illegal, 28 2 and that pooling
agreements which combined the operation of competing studios'
circuits were illegal.23 The district court issued a decree prohibiting
these and other practices, 2 4 and ordered that films be licensed on
the basis of competitive bidding. The district court explained that
divestiture of the studio's exhibition circuits from their production
and distribution activities was unnecessary, because competition
could be safeguarded adequately by less drastic means, such as
requiring competitive bidding and prohibiting practices such as
block-booking."' Moreover, in determining the defendants' market
power, the district court analyzed data which merely showed the
percentage of all theatres in the United States which were owned
by the defendants, rather than analyzing data for different classes
of theatres. The district court therefore concluded that the owners
of little more than one-sixth of all the theatres in the United States
were not likely to exercise a monopoly of the motion picture business
such that divestiture would be an appropriate remedy.2 6 The dis-
trict court also reasoned that divestiture would not improve service
279. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., [1940-1943] Trade Cas. (CCH)
56,072 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). See generally Symposium on Arbitration in the Motion Picture
Industry, 5 ARB. J. 10 (1941); Whitman, The Consent Decree in the Moving Picture Industry,
10 FORDHAM L. REV. 65 (1941); Note, The Sherman Act and the Motion Picture Industry, 13
U. Cm. L. REV. 346 (1946).
280. One commentator concluded that the decree would have the effect of freezing the
existing pattern of competition. Comment, Operation of the Consent Decree in the Motion
Picture Industry, 51 YALE L.J. 1175, 1194 (1942).
281. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 337 (1946), modified
70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
282. Id. at 350.
283. Id. at 351. The district court also found that pooling agreements between a studio-
owned circuit and an independent circuit were illegal. Id.
284. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 53, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
See generally Note, Judicial Regulation of the Motion-Picture Industry: The Paramount
Case, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 662 (1947).
285. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 355 (1946). The dis-
trict court also believed that establishment of competitive bidding would create conditions
such that new theatres could enter the exhibition market. Id. at 353-54.
286. Id. at 353. The court also found insufficient proof that ownership of first-run
theatres by the major studios was the result of an attempt to monopolize. Id. at 354.
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to the public because new owners would be less experienced than
the existing ownersY7
Before the Supreme Court, the United States attacked the ade-
quacy of the district court's relief. The Government conceded that
the defendants had not monopolized film production, but main-
tained that their control over the distribution and exhibition fields
unreasonably restricted opportunities for independent producers. 288
The Government also argued that the concentration of first-run
theatre ownership by the defendants29 was so great that no distribu-
tor could succeed without access to these theatres.29 0 There was no
compelling economic justification for integration of distribution and
exhibition, the Government claimed, explaining that the defen-
dants desired "market control" with the resulting opportunity to
control prices, exclude competition, and extract monopoly profits. 291
Thus, the only way the domestic film market could be opened to
competition, the Government argued, was to divorce the majors
from their exhibition circuits. 29 2
First amendment issues were also raised in Paramount
Pictures. The government accepted the theory that markets which
are free of unreasonable restrictions will lead to a diverse flow of
information, and argued that only by assuring that the distribution
field "is equally open to all may the fullest diversity of film content
be had."m2 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in an ami-
cus curiae brief similarly asserted that the majors' market power in
the distribution and exhibition fields denied the public diversity in
films, 294 and inhibited the public's first amendment right to receive
information.2 5 The ACLU argued that the first amendment as well
as the Sherman Act presented important reasons for diminishing
the majors' market control, explaining that if "our fundamental
guarantees of free speech, free assemblage, and free press, under the
First Amendment, could not be invoked to arrest such control over
287. Id. at 353.
288. Brief for the United States at 10; see text accompanying notes 300-03 infra.
289. The majors owned 70% of all first-run theatres in cities with a population of at least
100,000. Brief for the United States at 20.
290. Id. at 61.
291. Id. at 105.
292. Id. at 50. The Government argued that acquisition and use of market control for a
similar purpose by vertical combinations had resulted in dissolution in other Supreme Court
cases construing the Sherman Act. See United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255
(1920).
293. Brief for the United States at 124.
294. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 16.
295. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (the first amendment
embraces the right to distribute literature and necessarily protects the right to receive it).
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so basic a medium of communications as motion pictures, then,
indeed, it will not be long before they may seem illusory." 2
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, elim-
inating the system of competitive bidding9 ' and directing the dis-
trict court to restudy divestiture.2 " The Court, however, read the
first amendment issues narrowly. While noting that motion pictures
are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the first
amendment, the Court claimed that first amendment concerns
would have been focused only if the case had involved monopoly in
the production of moving pictures. 2 09 The district court had indeed
found that the defendants had not attempted or conspired to mo-
nopolize the production of motion pictures,00 and the government
did not contest this finding before the Supreme Court. The Court's
assumption that such a finding eliminates any and all first amend-
ment issues, however, demonstrates a lack of understanding of the
first amendment implications of the majors' domination of first-run
exhibition. The Court explained as follows:
The main contest is over the cream of the exhibition business-that of the
first-run theatres. By defining the issue so narrowly we do not intend to belittle
its importance. It shows, however, that the question here is not what the public
will see or if the public will be permitted to see certain features. It is clear that
under the existing system the public will be denied access to none. If the public
cannot see the features on the first-run, it may do so on the second, third,
fourth, or later run. The central problem presented by these cases is which
exhibitors get the highly profitable first-run business. That problem has im-
portant aspects under the Sherman Act. But it bears only remotely, if at all,
on any question of freedom of the press, save only as timeliness of release may
be a factor of importance in specific situations.3'
The Court's assumption that the public was not denied access to
films is fundamentally incorrect. First, by controlling first-run exhi-
bition in major cities, the five majors could prevent an independent
producer from exhibiting in their theatres, and thus virtually pre-
vent that producer from establishing the desirability of a film for
subsequent runs. Second, in his study of the motion picture indus-
try, Professor Michael Conant concluded that by controlling first-
run theatres, the five majors obtained indirect control of production
and successfully curtailed entry by independent producers.30 2 Fi-
296. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 6.
297. 334 U.S. at 161-66.
298. Id. at 166-75.
299. Id. at 166.
300. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 53, 60. (1947).
301. 334 U.S. at 166-67.
302. M. CONANT, supra note 165, at 37. Professor Conant adds that
the independent producer of better quality, more costly pictures had to turn to a member
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nally, the five majors' domination of first-run theatres permitted
them to enforce a production code which minimized the diversity
of motion pictures. The majors agreed that a film which did not
conform to the guidelines established by the Production Code Ad-
ministration, an agency which they controlled, would not be exhib-
ited in their theatres. Consequently, a film treating a controversial
subject that would violate the code often could not establish its
desirability for subsequent runs.3 13 Certainly there were important
first amendment problems in the majors' control of first-run thea-
tres, but neglect of these issues did not prevent the Court from
reaching a result that promoted first amendment values.'"
The Court disagreed with the district court's approach to di-
vestiture, because the Sherman Act problem is not solved merely by
measuring concentration in terms of size or extent of holdings.
Rather, the Court emphasized the relationship between the unrea-
sonable restraints of trade and the position of the defendants in the
first-run exhibition field.30o The Court agreed with the district court
that the defendants conspired with one another, but because the
lower court had failed to consider what the defendants had gained
in terms of theatre holdings as a result of the conspiracy, the Court
directed an examination of this question on remand.0 0 The Court
also concluded that the district court's findings of a lack of purpose
on the part of the five majors to obtain a national exhibition monop-
oly was deficient for three reasons. First, the district court had erred
by considering the percentage of all theatres which the five majors
owned, rather than the percentage of first-run theatres.3 1 Second,
of the combination for distribution in order to secure entry into enough key theatres for
revenue to cover his costs. He had to pay their monopolistic distribution fees and also
to conform to their production code. It is reasonable to conclude that the monopolization
of first-run theatres facilitated monopolization of distribution, in both its input and
output markets.
Id. at 47.
303. Id. at 40-43. Professor Conant found that after separation of the majors' exhibition
circuits, the Production Code Administration's power of enforcement was markedly reduced.
Id. at 113. For an example of an independent producer's difficulties with the Production Code
Administration prior to divorcement, see Hughes Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 66 F.
Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). For a general study of code enforcement, see M. SCHUMACH, THE
FACE ON THE CUTrrING RooM FLOOR (1964).
304. From a first amendment standpoint, Paramount Pictures is also notable for the
statement that motion pictures are included as part of the press. This position departed from
Mutual and was later affirmed in Burstyn. See note 164 supra. Paramount Pictures led some
commentators to criticize Mutual. See Kupferman and O'Brien, Motion Picture Censor-
ship-The Memphis Blues, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 273 (1951); Note, Motion Pictures and the First
Amendment, 60 YALE L.J. 696 (1951).
305. 334 U.S. at 172.
306. Id. at 171.
307. Id. at 172-73.
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in its reference to an absence of purpose, the district court had
meant an absence of specific intent, and specific intent is not neces-
sary to establish a purpose or intent to create a monopoly."8 Finally,
the district court had failed to address the problem of monopoly
power-the power to exclude competition when it is desired to do
so-which may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act even though it
remains unexercised.0o The Court also directed the district court to
study vertical integration, explaining that vertical integration in the
motion picture industry was not a per se violation of the Sherman
Act,310 and that the question whether such integration was illegal
turned on "the purpose or intent with which it was conceived," or
the power it creates.311
By remanding these issues, the Supreme Court opened the door
to the most significant change in the structure of a mass medium
to be achieved to date under the antitrust laws. On remand, the
district court found that the theatre holdings of the five majors
played a vital role in causing violations of the Sherman Act,3 12 that
there was a close relationship between the vertical integration of the
five majors and the illegal practices such as price fixing,313 and that
monopoly power was present.3 14 The district court ordered separa-
tion of exhibition from production and distribution, and subse-
quently each of the majors complied.315
The Court eliminated the competitive bidding provisions of the
district court's decree for two reasons. First, the system placed those
with the "longest purse" in a preferred position, and thus might
increase the concentration of economic power in the industry.316 Sec-
ond, judicial supervision of the bidding would involve courts in
business management, a task for which they are unsuited.317 The
Court sustained the district court's rulings on the illegality of trade
308. Id. at 173; see text accompanying note 228 supra.
309. Id. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 811 (1946).
310. 334 U.S. at 174.
311. Id.
312. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1949),
aff'd per curiam, 339 U.S. 974 (1950).
313. 85 F. Supp. at 893.
314. Id. at 894.
315. For a discussion of the divestiture, see M. CONANT, supra note 165 at 107-12.
Howard Hughes, owner of 24% of RKO's stock, agreed to a consent decree that permitted him
to place the stock in trust. This decree was modified to require compulsory sale of the stock,
but the Court held this was error because of the absence of a hearing on the modification.
See Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952).
316. 334 U.S. at 164.
317. Id. at 163.
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practices such as block-booking,318 formula deals and master agree-
ments, 3 and price fixing, 320 and sustained the district court's find-
ing that the defendants had developed a system of unreasonable
clearances and runs.321 Unlike the district court in Schine, the dis-
trict court in Paramount Pictures established clear standards for
determining whether clearances were unreasonable.32 2 The Court
supported this approach and agreed that there was ample evidence
to sustain a finding of an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade by
imposing unreasonable clearances.3ss The Court also agreed that
pooling agreements, whereby the majors pooled the operation of
their theatres, and joint ownership of theatres by the majors were
blatant attempts to substitute monopoly for competition and sus-
tained their dissolution.324 The Court concluded, however, that dis-
solution of joint first-run theatre ownership by majors and indepen-
dents was improper because the lower court had not inquired into
the particular circumstances under which a particular interest had
been acquired. 3 25
The Court in Paramount Pictures sought to establish a freer
motion picture exhibition market, and its prohibition of block-
booking, unreasonable clearances, and similar practices has had
that effect.3 26 The subsequent separation of the majors from their
theatres has increased the opportunities for independent produ-
cers, 3 27 although the Court apparently did not have this result in
mind.3 28 The Paramount Pictures Court recognized structural
318. Id. at 158. The Court did not suggest that films may not be sold in groups when a
buyer is not compelled to purchase more than one film, but held merely that a refusal to
license one or more copyrights unless another copyright is accepted is illegal. Id. at 159.
319. Id. at 154. A formula deal is a licensing agreement between a distributor and a
circuit of theatres in which the license fee of a given feature is measured by a percentage of
the feature's national gross. Id. at 153. A master agreement that covers exhibition in two or
more theatres in a particular circuit permits an exhibitor "to allocate the film rental paid
among the theatres as it sees fit and to exhibit the features upon such playing time as it deems
best, and leaves other terms to the discretion of the circuit." Id. at 154.
320. Id. at 143-44. Drawing on Interstate, the Court explained that it was "not necessary
to find an express agreement in order to find a conspiracy." Id. at 142.
321. Id. at 147.
322. 66 F. Supp. 323, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
323. 334 U.S. at 146-47.
324. Id. at 149.
325. Id. at 152.
326. See 2 S. WHITNEY, supra note 165, at 161. For a discussion of motion picture
distribution following Paramount Pictures, see Cassady, Impact of the Paramount Decision
on Motion Picture Distribution and Price Making, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 150 (1958).
327. See M. CONANT, supra note 165, at 112. Significant tax incentives have also opened
up the market for independent producers. See 2 S. WHTNEY, supra note 165, at 180-81.
Divestiture has also dissipated the power of the five majors to enforce the production code,
and thus has increased diversity in film offerings.
328. The Court's discussion of monopoly power was addressed primarily to the exhibi-
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change as a means of eliminating monopoly power in mass media.
Moreover, the Court's lack of concern for the issue of government
interference with the press by divestiture implies support for the
position that the first amendment does not immunize the press from
the antitrust laws. In fact, as stated in Associated Press, the first
amendment provides "powerful reasons" for attacking groups such
as the Paramount Pictures defendants. 329
D. Problems After Divestiture:
Theatre Enterprises and Loew's
After Paramount Pictures there was a tremendous increase in
private treble damage suits against the Paramount Pictures defen-
dants. 330 Under section 5 of the Clayton Act, the decrees in the case
became prima facie evidence in suits which sought awards for dam-
ages inflicted prior to the decrees by the illegal combination of the
Paramount Pictures defendants.3 3 1 Moreover, the method of proving
damages in Bigelow and the conscious parallelism doctrine of
Interstate posed serious threats to the Paramount Pictures defen-
dants in cases which challenged their post-Paramount Pictures ac-
tions.33 2 In Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distribut-
ing Corp.,333 however, the Supreme Court tempered the doctrine of
conscious parallelism.
tion market and did not focus on the majors' power to exclude competitors in either the
distribution or production markets. See 334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948).
329. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
330. There were also private actions against the Griffith and Schine circuits. See Webs-
ter Rosewood Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd,
263 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959); Duffy Theatres, Inc. v. Griffith
Consol. Theatres, Inc., 208 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954). See
generally Cassady and Cassady, Damage Measurement in Motion Picture Industry Private
Antitrust Actions, 37 S. CAL. L. REV. 389 (1964).
331. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part that
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the
effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such
defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant
under said laws . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
332. For application of the doctrine of conscious parallelism, see Milgram v. Loew's,
Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 929 (1952).
333. 346 U.S. 537 (1954). Prior to deciding Theatre Enterprises, the Court decided FTC
v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953), which dealt with the production
and distribution of filmed advertisements that were shown between features. The Court
sustained the FTC order prohibiting the defendants from entering into exclusive contracts
with theatres for more than one year. Because this Article focuses on the production, distribu-
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(1) Theatre Enterprises: No Evidence of Conspiracy
Theatre Enterprises opened a theatre six miles from downtown
Baltimore in February 1949. Before and after the theatre's opening,
its management attempted to obtain feature films on a first-run
basis. The important national film distributors, each of which had
been a defendant in Paramount Pictures, refused to license feature
films on a first-run basis to the suburban theatre. Theatre Enter-
prises sought treble damages and injunctive relief, alleging that the
distributors had conspired to restrict first-run films to downtown
Baltimore theatres. There was no direct evidence of a conspiracy to
deny first-run films to the plaintiff, and during the trial, the plain-
tiff offered the decrees entered against the defendants in the
Paramount Pictures case as evidence of conspiracy. The trial judge
refused to direct a verdict for the plaintiffs and instructed the jury
that additional evidence was needed to relate the conspiracy to the
claimed damage period and to Baltimore. The jury returned a ver-
dict for the defendants, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.3 11
The Supreme Court affirmed, citing Interstate for the proposi-
tion that business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence
from which a court may infer conspiracy.3 5 The Court cautioned,
however, that proof of parallel business behavior does not conclu-
sively establish agreement, nor does such behavior constitute a
Sherman Act offense.336 The crucial question, the Court concluded,
is whether the defendants' actions toward the plaintiff stemmed
from an independent decision or from a tacit or express agree-
ment.' There was substantial evidence that the distributors had
each refused Theatre Enterprises' request because they had inde-
pendently decided that the suburban theatre, because of location,
absence of transportation facilities, and similar factors, would not
be a successful first-run theatre.' This was sufficient, the Court
held, to support the trial judge's decision to submit the question of
conspiracy to the jury.33'
tion, and exhibition of other types of films, and Motion Picture Advertising did not have a
significant impact on those other types of films, it is not discussed. For commentary on this
case, see R. BORK, supra note 6, at 308-09; Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional
Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 444-45 (1965).
334. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 201 F.2d 306 (4th Cir.
1953).
335. 346 U.S. at 540.
336. Id. at 541.
337. Id. at 540.
338. Id. at 541-42. The defendants apparently were trying to maximize their profits.
339. Id. at 542. The Court also held that the Paramount Pictures decrees alone could
not support the charge of conspiracy, because they did not rest on findings relating to runs
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The denial of first-run films to Theatre Enterprises was not part
of an unreasonable system of clearances and runs, nor was it part
of a conspiracy to eliminate the firm. The public was not denied
access to any first-run films; they were available at the firm's subur-
ban theatre twenty-one days after the first-run had concluded.
Many firms adopt similar marketing practices without tacit agree-
ment or unreasonable restraints of trade. Although it was not at-
tempting to do so, the Court in Theatre Enterprises protected the
first amendment interest of the press in being free from undue gov-
ernment interference. If the Court had found that parallelism of
action constituted conspiracy regardless of business justification
and absence of evidence of tacit agreement, it would have fashioned
an instrument for repressing the press.3'0
(2) The Problem of Block-Booking: Loew's
The Supreme Court affirmed Paramount Pictures' prohibition
of block-booking in United States v. Loew's, Inc.341 Loew's resulted
from civil antitrust actions brought by the United States in 1957
against six major distributors of motion pictures for television exhi-
bition. The distributors were charged with violating section 1 of the
in Baltimore, and they involved a conspiracy that was enjoined before June 25, 1948. Theatre
Enterprises' claim for damages covered the period from February 1949 to March 1950. Thus,
the Court found Paramount Pictures to be irrelevant. Id. at 544. In dissent, Justice Black
argued that the jury instruction on burden of proof deprived the jury of benefits accorded by
the prima facie evidence provision of section 5 of the Clayton Act. Id.
In Eagle Lion Studios, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 248
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1957), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 358 U.S. 100 (1958),
another motion picture case involving section 5 of the Clayton Act, the Court held that a
judgment on one cause of action is not conclusive in a subsequent suit on a different cause of
action as to questions of fact not determined in the first suit. Eagle Lion produced and
distributed motion pictures and attempted to introduce a finding in Paramount Pictures as
evidence of a conspiracy to exclude Eagle Lion from licensing its films to the defendants' New
York theatres. The Second Circuit distinguished Paramount Pictures, explaining that while
the Paramount Pictures plaintiffs were independent exhibitors, the instant plaintiffs were
independent distributors who had not been the target of the Paramount Pictures conspiracy.
248 F.2d at 444-45 (2d Cir. 1957).
340. Commenting on Theatre Enterprises, Professor Conant stated that there can be
no inference of conspiracy when there is no evidence of conspiracy. M. CONANT, supra note
165, at 191. Professor Turner argued that conscious parallelism is not meaningful in the
absence of additional facts which indicate that the decisions of the alleged conspirators were
"interdependent." Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655, 658 (1962).
In another motion picture conspiracy case, the Court interpreted Theatre Enterprises as
requiring that conspiracy must be proved in conscious parallelism cases. See Viking Theatre
Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided court, 378 U.S. 123 (1964). Theatre Enterprises and Viking Theatre clearly
protect the press from unsupported conspiracy actions.
341. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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Sherman Act by refusing to deal except on the basis of block-
booking. For example, to get films such as Casablanca and Treasure
of the Sierra Madre, a station would also have to purchase films
such as Gorilla Man and Tugboat Annie Sails Again. The district
court, drawing upon Paramount Pictures' prohibition of block-
booking,"' found that each of the distributors had engaged in this
practice.3 3 The district court enjoined the distributors from block-
booking, but permitted distributors to refuse to break films out of
packages on a "temporary" basis pending an attempt to sell the
entire package to other customers.3 1
The United States argued before the Supreme Court that the
"temporary" refusal to negotiate for individual films was illegal.3 11
The distributors argued that because there was no market domi-
nance by any of them, there could be no illegal tie-in?.34  The Su-
preme Court vacated the district court's decree, including the
"temporary" refusal to deal provision,3 7 and held that the block-
booking agreements were illegal tie-ins.3 8 The Court rejected the
distributors' market dominance test. Drawing upon the "sufficient
economic power" test of Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United
States,34' the Court explained that even in the absence of market
dominance, economic power could be inferred from the tying prod-
uct's desirability to consumers or from "uniqueness in its attrib-
utes."' Because each film was copyrighted, the Court agreed with
the district court's presumption of uniqueness.3 '
342. The district court concluded that the defendants could offer their films in blocks
or groups, but could not condition the license of one or more films upon the license of other
feature films. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 373, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948).
343. 189 F. Supp. at 383. For a discussion of the evidence presented against each
distributor, see id. at 383-97.
344. Id. at 395.
345. Brief for the United States at 30.
346. Brief for Appellant Screen Gems at 9.
347. 371 U.S. at 55 (1962).
348. Id. at 50.
349. 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
350. 371 U.S. at 45. If the uniqueness test had been applied in Times-Picayune, the
Court might have concluded that the newspapers' products were distinct. See text accompa-
nying notes 40-55 supra.
351. 371 U.S. at 48. In his critique of Loew's, Professor George Stigler concluded that
two copyrights are substitutes for each other and that in setting the price of one, a distributor
must take into account its effects on the sales of others. Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.:
A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 152, 154. To regard all copyrights as substitutes
for one another, however, miscasts the issues in Loew's. The Loew's Court recognized that
there are different grades of feature films, see 371 U.S. at 48 (1962), and that films of the
highest grade are considered to be unique, since "to television as well as motion picture
viewers there is but one 'Gone With The Wind.' " 371 U.S. at 48 n.6. The implication is that
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The Court ordered the district court to modify its decrees in
several important ways. First, the district court permitted each dis-
tributor to offer films in a package without listing individual prices
for each film. The Court believed that this practice might permit
distributors to violate surreptitiously the decree against block-
booking by allowing salesmen to be reluctant to produce the individ-
ual price list on request, so that some stations would buy an entire
block rather than negotiate for individual films. 5 2 The Court di-
rected the district court to modify the decree so that individual film
prices could be made available on the first approach of salesmen. 3
Second, the district court permitted distributors to refuse to deal on
an individual film basis pending negotiations with others who might
purchase the entire package. This practice could have permitted
refusals to deal during negotiations which had already commenced,
or refusals to deal while awaiting other negotiations. In the latter
situation, refusals could stretch ad infinitum while the distributor
exhausted the possibility of selling an entire package. The Court
developed a more precise standard and ordered the district court to
proscribe "temporary" refusals to deal on less than a block basis,
except briefly during negotiations already under way with a compet-
ing station pursuant to which the distributor has offered to license
or sell films individually or in a package.' Finally, the district court
prohibited price differentials between a film offered as part of a
package and the same film offered individually, because such differ-
entials had the effect of conditioning the sale of one film upon the
lower grade films were considered by purchasers to be easily substitutable for each other.
Thus, the problem in Loew's was the foreclosing of markets for lower grade films through the
forced tying of distinct products.
The Court treated the tying agreement in Loew's as a per se violation and did not
examine the impact of the tying agreements. Drawing upon International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), and United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948), the Court concluded that a valid patent or copyright on the tying product gives rise
to a presumption that a tying arrangement involving the patented or copyrighted product has
anticompetitive consequences. 371 U.S. at 46. Moreover, there was no question that the
commerce involved was substantial. Id. at 49. See generally Turner, supra note 31. For
commentary on a per se rule for tying agreements, compare R. BORK, supra note 6, at 374-75
with C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 157 (1959).
Block-booking had the effect of foreclosing entry into the motion picture market for
independent producers and distributors. See M. CONANT, supra note 165, at 79, 112. Although
Loew's did not involve section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is possible that if block-booking of
motion pictures for television exhibition had continued, competitive opportunities for inde-
pendent producers and distributors would have diminished substantially, as television exhi-
bition plays a key role in determining the profitability of films.
352. A tactic used by distributors to encourage the purchase of packages was to avoid
giving a firm answer to stations that asked for individual prices. See 371 U.S. at 53-54.
353. Id. at 54.
354. Id. at 55.
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sale of another. The United States contended that this prohibition
was too vague and that distribution costs should be the only basis
for a discount. While agreeing that the decree was vague and prohib-
iting differentials that were not the result of cost savings, the Court
permitted quantity discounts if legitimately cost-justified.'
The Court's alteration of the Loew's decrees indicates the ex-
treme care it took to promote free competition.3 6 The Loew's Court
can be criticized, however, for its blind reliance on Paramount Pic-
tures' prohibition against block-booking because the block-booking
in Loew's may have lacked the pernicious effects present in
Paramount Pictures.3 17 Read together, Paramount Pictures and
Loew's erect a per se rule prohibiting forced block-booking.'
E. The First Amendment, the Antitrust Laws, and the Motion
Picture Industry
Freedom of expression is inherently laissez faire; it implies an
absence of government control."' Yet the conditions in the motion
picture industry which resulted in cases such as Binderup, Schine,
and Paramount Pictures illustrate vividly the need for government
economic intervention to foster diversity of expression. In its motion
picture antitrust decisions, the Supreme Court has attempted to
promote a freer market, but in a few instances the Court has fos-
tered that goal by unnecessarily denigrating the interest of commu-
nications firms in being free, to the greatest possible extent, from
government control.
355. Id. at 54-55.
356. Id. at 48. In a separate opinion, Justice Harlan disagreed with the Court's modifi-
cation of the decrees. Id. at 56 (Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stewart joined in Justice Harlan's opinion.
357. See note 351 supra. In fact, Paramount Pictures did not analyze the actual anti-
competitive impact of the defendants' block-booking agreements. See 334 U.S. at 156-59.
Block-booking in Paramount Pictures, however, foreclosed the market for independent produ-
cers and distributors. See M. CONANT, supra note 165, at 79, 112. One distributor in Loew's
testified that block-booking was adopted partly because the firm had not yet converted its
films from 35 mm. theatre prints to the 16 mm. prints required for television exhibition.
Testimony pointed out that in a full library sale, taking perhaps seven years to play off in a
television market, the station would not need all of the prints immediately, yet a buyer of
selected films who needed the product immediately could not obtain it immediately because
of the delay caused by the conversion of the prints. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 189 F.
Supp. 373, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Professor Bork has criticized the per se treatment of tying
agreements, arguing that they can have beneficial effects. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 375-
81. See also R. WARREN, ANTITRUST IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 220 (1975).
358. Professor Turner, commenting on International Salt, indicated that while that
case did not erect a per se rule on tying agreements, it came about as close as any case can.
Turner, supra note 31, at 53. Professor Turner's comment is equally applicable to the block-
booking in Paramount and Loew's.
359. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 38 (1966).
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The standards of proof on the issues of conspiracy in
Interstate3 10 and damages in Bigelow"' may pose problems for the
press. Conscious parallelism should not lead to an inference of con-
spiracy unless there also is evidence that the allegedly conspiring
firms were engaged in interdependent decisionmaking. Fortunately,
the Court tempered Interstate in Theatre Enterprises by requiring
evidence of tacit or express agreement among firms.16 2 Without this
qualification, a host of practices adopted merely on the basis of
sound business principles might be attacked as constituting con-
spiracy. The damages problem in Bigelow, however, remains. There
is a clear distinction between uncertainty as to the amount of dam-
ages and uncertainty as to whether a plaintiff was actually damaged
by a defendant's conduct. While a defendant should certainly be
restrained from continuing any illegal action, a damages award
should be founded on proof that the plaintiff's losses were attributa-
ble exclusively to the restraints of trade.3 63
None of the Court's motion picture decisions have entailed in-
trusions into functions of the press that are protected by the first
amendment, and even drastic measures such as divestiture orders
have been drawn as narrowly as possible. Moreover, in each case
there has been a compelling need-the public interest in the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse sources-which
justified government intervention in the marketplace. While motion
pictures have not been singled out for antitrust standards which are
distinct from those applicable to firms not engaged in expression,
some disturbing implications arise from the Court's treatment of
first amendment issues in Paramount Pictures."
The Court's belief that first amendment issues were not present
in Paramount Pictures because of an absence of questions concern-
ing monopoly of production is shortsighted. Is the power to exclude
competitors in either distribution or exhibition less offensive from
a first amendment standpoint than similar power in production?
Certainly heavy concentration or attempts to monQpolize at any
level may inhibit another level and have harmful effects on the flow
of information. The public interest in receiving information from
diverse sources requires that all levels-production, distribution,
and exhibition-be free from unreasonable restraints, conspiracies,
860. See text accompanying note 201 supra.
361. See text accompanying notes 262-75 supra.
362. See text accompanying notes 335-39 supra.
363. See note 547 infra.
364. See text accompanying notes 298-303 supra.
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and attempts to exclude competitors." The first amendment conse-
quently supports attacks on unreasonable practices or monopolistic
structures which may occur at any level.
From a first amendment standpoint, the greatest benefit of the
Paramount Pictures decrees has been increased opportunities for
independent producers.3 " Moreover, the divestiture principles of
Crescent, Schine, and Paramount Pictures can be adapted easily to
restructure other mass communications markets. These principles
include using divestiture to eliminate an illegal conspiracy,"' force
firms to give up properties acquired through illegal schemes," elim-
inate unlawful monopoly power,3" and eliminate vertical integra-
tion that is designed to have unlawful effects or that creates the
power to bring about unlawful effects.7 0 Unfortunately, these prin-
ciples have not been applied adequately to the distribution phase
of motion pictures, which the Paramount Pictures defendants have
controlled since 1948.3"1 The principle pertaining to vertical integra-
tion, however, has an important application in the broadcasting
industry, where each of the major networks engages in production,
distribution, and station ownership.
IV. REGULATING THE STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT OF THE BROADCASTING
INDUSTRY
The broadcasting industry, unlike the newspaper and motion
picture industries, is subject to direct government control of market
structure and conditions of entry, and the Supreme Court has ap-
proved such control on the premise that broadcasting utilizes a
"scarce" resource. 372 It is fallacious to distinguish between broad-
casting and other communications industries on this premise, for
almost all resources used in the economic system are limited.3 3 The
365. Two authors believed that the only permanent solution to oligopoly in the motion
picture industry is "atomization" of the production, distribution, and exhibition phases.
McDonough & Winslow, The Motion Picture Industry: United States v. Oligopoly, 1 STAN.
L. REv. 385, 416-17 (1949).
366. For a discussion of how one feature of the Paramount Pictures decrees has been
used to limit competition in exhibition markets, see Comment, An Experiment in Preventive
Anti-Trust: Judicial Regulation of the Motion Picture Exhibition Market Under the Para-
mount Decrees, 74 YALE L.J. 1041 (1965).
367. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944).
368. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948).
369. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948).
370. Id. at 174.
371. See Crandall, The Postwar Performance of the Motion-Picture Industry, 20
ANTTRUST BULL. 49 (1975).
372. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213, 216 (1943).
373. Judge David Bazelon has asked, "When we say there is a scarcity of frequencies,
to what are we comparing this scarcity?" Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommuni-
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Court has nevertheless held consistently that because there are
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies
to allocate,37  denial of a license does not infringe upon first amend-
ment freedoms.7 5 The Court has interpreted very carefully the Com-
munications Act of 1934,78 but its analysis of first amendment is-
sues raised by government control of broadcasting markets has often
been superficial.
A. The Licensing Power: Nelson, Pottsville, and Sanders
The Court first addressed first amendment issues raised by the
FCC's licensing authority in National Broadcasting Co. v. United
cations Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 224. The newspaper industry, in particular, has recently
been troubled by scarcity of critical resources. Due to the massive grain harvest during the
summer of 1979, there has been a shortage of railroad cars available for the transportation of
newsprint. Moreover, Canadian newsprint production in 1979 is running below 1978 levels.
See Publisher's Auxiliary, August 6, 1979, at 1, col. 1. Professor Ronald Coase has been a
leading exponent of the view that although broadcasting facilities are scarce, that fact by
itself does not justify the present system of government allocation of frequencies. He has
suggested using a pricing mechanism for frequency allocation. See Coase, Evaluation of
Public Policy Relating to Radio and Television Broadcasting: Social and Economic Issues,
41 J. LAND & Pun. UTIL. EcoN. 161 (1965); Coase, The Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee, 5 J.L. & EcoN. 17 (1962); Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2
J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1959). Professor Harry Kalven called Professor Coase's position an "insight
more fundamental than we can use." Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First
Amendment, 10 J.L. & EcoN. 15, 30 (1967). Rep. Lionel Van Deerlin, chairman of the House
Communications Subcommittee, however, recently sponsored a bill which would have
charged spectrum users a fee. See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The bill, known
as the Communications Act of 1979, proposed many sweeping changes in the broadcasting
regulatory system and was the subject of extensive hearings. Congressman Van Deerlin later
announced that he will offer amendments to the Communications Act of 1934, rather than
attempt to revamp the entire Act. See BROADCASTING, July 23, 1979, at 24; BROADCASTING, July
16, 1979, at 24. For a discussion of frequency allocation and alternatives to the present system,
see generally H. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE (1971); Levin, Federal Control of Entry in
the Broadcast Industry, 5 J.L. & EcoN. 49 (1962); Robinson, Radio Spectrum Regulation: The
Administrative Process and the Problems of Institutional Reform, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1179
(1969); Note, The Crisis in Electromagnetic Frequency Spectrum Allocation: Abatement
Through Market Distribution, 53 IOWA L. Rxv. 437 (1967).
374. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). In Red Lion the
Court cited data that in 1968 there were 153 unutilized UHF television channels in the top
100 markets. Id. at 398 n.25. It appears that the Court's blanket statement about the number
of people who want to broadcast and the scarcity of facilities really only applies to some
markets and types of broadcasting facilities.
375. National Broadcasting Co. v. Unitdd States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943). There is a
need for technical regulation and licensing in broadcasting, but this does not necessarily
require other forms of regulation. Cf. Kalven, supra note 373, at 37 (the issue is not what the
need for licensing permits the FCC to do, but rather what the first amendment inhibits the
FCC from doing, even though it is given power to license). The Court, however, has held that
the need for technical regulation and licensing mandates unique first amendment standards
for broadcasting.
376. 47 U.S.C. H# 151-609 (1976).
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States (NBC).' Prior to NBC, the Court decided three cases involv-
ing government control of market structure through broadcast li-
censing-Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond &
Mortgage Co.,37 8 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 37  and FCC v.
Sanders Brothers Radio Station.38 0 Read together, Nelson,
Pottsville, and Sanders show that the "public interest" standard is
a supple but powerful instrument that can be used to alter the
structure of broadcasting markets.
In 1928, Congress amended the Radio Act of 1927 to require the
Federal Radio Commission (FRC) to allocate broadcasting licenses
according to population.3 1 WJKS, the only radio station in Gary,
Indiana, was subject to interference from stations in other commun-
ities and applied to the FRC for use of a frequency which was being
used by two Chicago stations, WIBO and WPCC.3 82 The FRC ap-
proved WJKS's application and terminated the licenses of the two
Chicago stations, an action that the FRC believed would result in a
more equitable distribution of stations according to population.'"
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the FRC, holding
that it was not consistent with legislative policy to equalize the
comparative broadcasting facilities of different states by unneces-
sarily injuring established stations.3 4 Before the Supreme Court, the
owners of WIBO argued that the FRC lacked the power to revoke a
license in an attempt to implement a quota system of distribution.3"5
377. 319 U.S. 190 (1943); see text accompanying notes 412-47 infra.
378. 289 U.S. 266 (1933); see text accompanying notes 381-92 infra.
379. 309 U.S. 134 (1940); see text accompanying notes 393-401 infra.
380. 309 U.S. 470 (1940); see text accompanying notes 402-11 infra.
381. See 47 U.S.C. § 89 (1928) (repealed 1934).
382. During the 1920's, radio receivers were unselective and transmitters tended to drift
from frequency to frequency. These technical difficulties meant that only a few frequencies
could be allocated for each market. In the larger markets, stations were required to share the
same frequency; each station would be able to broadcast only during a limited time period
each day.
383. 289 U.S. at 273. The FRC explained that WJKS's programs were designed for the
ethnic groups of Gary, and that deletion of the two Chicago stations would not deprive
listeners because the type of programming the stations broadcast could be received from other
Chicago stations. Id.
384. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. v. FRC, 62 F.2d 854, 856-57 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
The court of appeals also stated that the programming of the two Chicago stations served
the public interest to as great an extent as that of WJKS. Id. at 856. The dissent concluded
that the Commission had acted within its authority, and that the court was substituting its
own conclusions for those of the FRC. Id. at 859 (Groner, J., dissenting). Cf. Trinity Method-
ist Church v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933) (one
who applies for or obtains a permit to make use of a medium of interstate commerce subject
to the power of the government, takes such a grant subject to the power of the government
to withdraw it).
385. Brief for Respondents at 11, FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S.
266 (1933).
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The FRC argued that the owner of a station possesses no vested
right to continue to operate which is superior to federal regulatory
power.388 The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the FRC and
reversed the court of appeals, holding that the Commission had the
authority to redistribute frequencies in the public interest, as long
as the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. 87 Chief
Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, explained that in light of the
scarcity of radio facilities and the confusion that would result from
interference, the broad authority of Congress to establish a licensing
and allocation system was not open to question, 8 and included the
power to delete stations if necessary to achieve a result mandated
by Congress."' Chief Justice Hughes' view of licensing authority has
been consistently followed in subsequent Court decisions. Nelson
establishes a landmark principle of broadcasting regulation: broad-
casting markets can be restructured to achieve a legitimate end
regardless of the investments of private broadcasters.
The power of the licensing authority was paramount in Nelson,
but the Court did not hold that the public interest standard by
which licenses are granted was "so indefinite as to confer unlimited
power."" Chief Justice Hughes explained that since the Radio Act
defined the powers of the FRC, "definition is limitation."39' Because
redistribution of frequencies was within the powers granted by the
Act, the Court concluded that whether a particular redistribution
would meet the public interest standard was a question for the FRC
to determine.392
The licensing authority's broad discretion to determine the
public interest was reaffirmed in FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co.,3 11 the first case in which the Supreme Court construed the
Communications Act of 1934.311 Pottsville arose after the Pottsville
386. Brief for the FRC at 19.
387. 289 U.S. at 282 (1933). The Court defined an arbitrary or capricious finding as one
without substantial evidence to support it. Id. at 277.
388. Id. at 282.
389. Chief Justice Hughes stated:
this Court has had frequent occasion to observe that the power of Congress in the
regulation of interstate commerce is not fettered by the necessity of maintaining existing
arrangements which would conflict with the execution of its policy, as such a restriction
would place the regulation in the hands of private individuals and withdraw from the
control of Congress so much of the field as they might choose by prophetic discernment
to bring within the range of their enterprises.
Id. (emphasis added).
390. Id. at 285.
391. Id. at 276.
392. Id. at 285.
393. 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
394. Id. at 137.
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Broadcasting Company sought a construction permit from the FCC
for a broadcasting station in Pottsville, Pennsylvania. The Commis-
sion denied the application on the grounds that the applicant was
not qualified financially, and did not represent adequately local
interests in the community the station was to serve.3 15 The District
of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the FCC.3 11
Pottsville Broadcasting then petitioned the FCC to grant its original
application: the Commission, however, set the application for a
comparative hearing because two other applications for the same
facilities had been filed subsequent to Pottsville's original applica-
tion. Pottsville Broadcasting then obtained a writ of mandamus
from the District of Columbia Circuit requiring the Commission to
set aside the comparative hearing.97
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals
and ordered the dissolution of the writ of mandamus.9 8 Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the Court, explained that because the Act
recognized the rapidly changing nature of broadcasting, broad dis-
cretion was given the FCC in determining procedures for ascertain-
ing the public interest.9 9 The public interest standard, he ex-
plained, serves as a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion
by the expert body that Congress created to implement legislative
policy.,,
In Pottsville, Justice Frankfurter observed that Congress
adopted the Communications Act out of a concern for competition,
and that the licensing system was designed to prevent monopolies.40'
In FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 1 2 the Court repeated
Justice Frankfurter's dictum, and held that economic injury to an
existing station is not a criterion the Commission should take into
account in determining whether it shall grant or withhold a li-
cense.403
395. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 4 F.C.C. 318 (1937).
396. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1938). The court of
appeals did not decide whether the company adequately represented local interests.
397. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 105 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
398. 309 U.S. at 146. Before the Supreme Court, the FCC argued that it was immaterial
that Pottsville's application had been the first filed, because the public interest standard
required that the best use of the spectrum be obtained. Brief for the FCC at 11. Pottsville
argued that an applicant who is entitled to be heard first and meets the statutory require-
ments is entitled to a license without waiting for later applicants to be heard. Brief for
Respondent at 2-3.
399. 309 U.S. at 138, 145-46.
400. Id. at 138.
401. Id. at 137.
402. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
403. Id. at 476.
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In January 1936, the publisher of the Dubuque Telegraph
Herald applied to the FCC for a construction permit for a station
in Dubuque, Iowa. Shortly afterwards, WKKB, located in East
Dubuque requested that its transmitter and studios be moved to
Dubuque, and asked that it be permitted to intervene in the
Telegraph Herald proceeding. At a consolidated hearing, WKKB
argued that there was insufficient advertising revenue to support an
additional station, but the FCC approved both applications."'
WKKB appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit, which held
that the Commission's approval of the Telegraph Herald applica-
tion was an arbitrary and capricious action because the Commission
had failed to make findings on the economic injury issue.40
The FCC argued before the Supreme Court that it had no obli-
gation to protect an existing licensee from competition and that the
Communications Act expressly provided for the maintenance of
competitive conditions in broadcasting."' The Court agreed, and,
reversing the court of appeals, held that resulting economic injury
to a rival station is not, in and of itself, an element the FCC must
weigh or make findings on when considering a license application. 07
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Roberts explained that the
Act envisioned free competition and that its purpose was to protect
the public, not licensees." Justice Roberts warned, however, that
competition may result in both stations going out of business due
to insufficient advertising revenue, and thus would leave the public
without adequate radio service. The effect of competition on the
public, Justice Roberts concluded, was distinct from the considera-
tion of economic loss to a station due to increased competition. 0
404. Telegraph Herald, 4 F.C.C. 392 (1937).
405. Sanders Bros. Radio Station v. FCC, 106 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1939). The court of
appeals explained that there was no substitute for adequate findings, thus the Commission's
interpretation of the public interest standard cannot stand unless supported by adequate
findings. Id. at 324.
406. Brief for the FCC at 16, 27, FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
(1940).
407. 309 U.S. at 473. See generally Kahn, Economic Injury and the Public Interest, 23
FED. COM. B.J. 182 (1969); Meeks, Economic Entry Controls in FCC Licensing: The Carroll
Case Reappraised, 52 IowA L. REv. 236 (1966); Mayer, Sanders Brothers Revisited: Protection
of Broadcasters from the Consequences of Economic Competition, 49 Ky. L.J. 370 (1961);
Note, Economic Injury in FCC Licensing: The Public Interest Ignored, 67 YALE L.J. 135
(1957); see also Givens, Refusal of Radio and Television Licenses on Economic Grounds, 46
VA. L. REv. 1391 (1960).
408. 309 U.S. at 475.
409. Id. at 476. Cf. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(when an existing licensee offers to prove that the economic effect of another station would
be detrimental to the public interest, the Commission should afford an opportunity for the
presentation of such proof).
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In discussing broadcasting regulation, Justice Roberts, like
Chief Justice Hughes in Nelson, stressed that if Congress had not
exercised its power over interstate commerce in allocating and regu-
lating "limited" frequencies, nobody would be able to use them.o10
In Sanders, as in Nelson and Pottsville, the Court did not question
government control of entry conditions and market structure from
a first amendment standpoint. These decisions, however, promote
some first amendment values, because they reflect the Court's con-
viction that without regulation chaos would result. The need for
government allocation does not mean that the government can regu-
late a licensee without restraint. Each decision gives the Commis-
sion broad discretion to ascertain the public interest when licensing
stations, but only Sanders attempts to define the types of regulation
that are not permissible. In that case, Justice Roberts in dictum
noted that the Act does not regulate the program content, business
management, or policy of the licensee."' This statement, however,
did not settle the issue. In NBC the Court would be presented with
the question whether regulation of business relations violates the
Communications Act and the first amendment.
B. Regulation of Network-Affiliate Relations
and the First Amendment: NBC
At the insistence of Congress, the FCC began an investigation
of network broadcasting in 1938.412 After a lengthy process of hear-
ings and oral argument, the Commission issued eight regulations
pertaining to network broadcasting in May 1941 that modified or
The premise that competition may actually harm the public interest would later be an
important aspect of the Commission's restrictions on cable television systems. The Court
generally approves of the licensing and regulation of broadcasting because of the scarcity of
frequencies. See notes 372-76 supra and accompanying text. The fact that this rationale does
not apply to cable has not prevented the FCC from regulating cable systems. In United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), the Court held that the FCC had the
authority to regulate cable systems, if reasonably necessary for the regulation of television
broadcasting. Id. at 178. Southwestern arose out of the Commission's rules regarding the
importation of distant television signals by cable systems. Local stations were concerned that
importation of distant stations would fragment their audiences and reduce their advertising
revenues, thereby curtailing local public service. Professors Noll, Peck, and McGowan believe
that the local broadcasters' services would change only slightly with signal importation. See
R. NoLL, supra note 10, at 152. For a discussion of importation, see id. at 151-82 and the
authorities cited in id. at 152 n.3. Because the Southwestern Court focused on the narrow
issue of FCC authority over cable systems, and did not discuss the issue of restraining one
type of communications firm to protect another, Southwestern is not discussed in this Article.
410. 309 U.S. at 474.
411. Id. at 475.
412. See generally Friedrich & Sternberg, Congress and the Control of Radio-
Broadcasting (pt. 1), 37 AM. Pot.. Sci. REv. 797 (1943).
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prohibited certain network practices such as exclusive affiliation," 3
territorial exclusivity,' option time,"' control of station rates by
networks, 41  the right to reject programs, 17 and the length of affilia-
tion contracts.4 1 1 The regulations also sought structural changes by
413. The exclusivity provisions of affiliation contracts prohibited stations from broad-
casting the programs of another network. This was a significant barrier to the entry of new
networks, the FCC believed, because there were 45 cities with a population of more than
50,000 in which networks other than NBC and CBS could not broadcast their programs. The
Commission thus ruled that no station should enter into exclusive agreements if such agree-
ments prevent it from offering the public programs of any other network or hinder the en-
trance of new networks. FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 54 (1941) [hereinafter cited
as FCC REPORT]. Exclusivity provisions were consequently banned. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.101
(1941).
414. Often networks would agree with affiliates not to offer to other stations in the same
area programs rejected by the affiliate. FCC REPORT, supra note 413, at 58, 59. The Commis-
sion initially prohibited such territorial exclusivity entirely, but in October 1941 modified the
regulation to permit affiliated stations to have a right of first call on network programs. The
Commission nevertheless continued to prohibit contracts which prevented competitors from
obtaining network programs rejected by the affiliate. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1941).
415. Affiliates would agree to preserve certain blocks of time during the day, called
network option time, for the broadcasting of network programs. Such option time, however,
would inhibit stations from broadcasting non-network programs, such as those produced by
syndicators, and those developed by other networks. Option time is striking in its similarity
to block-booking. Initially, the FCC banned option time. In October 1941, however, the FCC
modified the regulation, limiting option time to a certain number of hours during the day
and requiring networks to notify stations 56 days in advance that an option time period would
be utilized. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.104 (1941).
416. Stations were compensated for carrying network programs according to a rate
which depended upon such factors as the station's location and transmitter power. If a station
sold time for non-network national advertising at a rate which was less than its network rate,
the network could reduce the rate at which it compensated the station. This had the effect
of decreasing a station's incentive and ability to compete for national spot advertising. FCC
REPORT, supra note 413, at 73. The FCC prohibited networks from setting rates at which
affiliates sold non-network time, and from penalizing affiliates for selling such time at a rate
which was different from their network rate. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.108 (1941).
417. NBC and CBS required affiliates to accept network programs unless they were not
in the public interest, and NBC further required affiliates to show that they had broadcast a
program that was more in the public interest than the network program they had rejected.
The Commission found these requirements particularly offensive because they removed much
of the stations' control over programming. Moreover, they made it difficult for affiliates to
broadcast non-network programs or programs from other networks. The Commission conse-
quently held that a licensee should not be bound to accept programs merely because it cannot
sustain the burden of proof that it has a better program, and that the licensee must be free
to select the programs which in its view best serve the public interest. FCC REPORT, supra
note 413, at 65, 66. The FCC prohibited contracts which prevented stations from rejecting
programs which, in the station's opinion, were contrary to the public interest. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 3.105 (1941).
418. CBS and NBC required their affiliates to sign contracts for a term of five years.
The FCC found this requirement to be offensive because it compelled licensees to accept
network programs even if during the contract term the quality of those programs deteriorated.
FCC REPORT, supra note 413, at 61. The Commission initially limited affiliation contracts to
one year, but in October 1941 modified this regulation to permit two year contracts. See 47
C.F.R. § 3.103 (1941).
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prohibiting each network from owning more than one station in the
same service area,"' and by prohibiting a company from operating
more than one network.2 0 The regulations were designed to give
affiliates greater freedom from network control, to enhance oppor-
tunities for the entry of new networks and non-network program-
ming sources, and to deconcentrate the industry. Certainly these
were antitrust policies whose enforcement was not the FCC's re-
sponsibility. Although the Commission recognized this limitation
on its rulemaking power, however, it claimed nonetheless that it
should administer its regulatory powers in light of Sherman Act
purposes, because preservation of the fullest possible measure of
competitive opportunity is a key element of the public interest stan-
dard.421 After hearing oral argument, the Commission on October 11,
1941 amended three of the regulations and set their effective date
as November 15, 1941.422 The regulation prohibiting operation by the
same company of more than one network was suspended indefi-
nitely.423
419. NBC owned two stations in each of the following cities: Chicago, New York, San
Francisco, and Washington. CBS owned eight stations, seven of which were in major markets.
The FCC saw network control of these stations as a major barrier to the entry of new networks,
because it "bottled up," or rendered inaccessible to competing networks, the best station
facilities. FCC REPORT, supra note 413, at 67. The Commission prohibited network ownership
of more than one station in the same service area, and banned network ownership in any
market where there were so few stations, or where the existing stations were so unequal (in
terms of power, for example) that competition would be substantially restrained. See 47
C.F.R. § 3.106 (1941).
420. The Commission also viewed NBC's operation of two networks-the Red and the
Blue-as a substantial barrier to the entry of new networks. NBC offered volume discounts
to advertisers, and the Commission found that this gave the Blue network a marked advan-
tage over competitors. Moreover, the Blue network was used as a buffer to protect the highly
profitable Red network against competition. Beyond competitive considerations, the Com-
mission found that the concentration of power resulting from operation of two networks by
one company was inimical to the public interest. FCC REPORT, supra note 413, at 70-72. The
Commission prohibited a network from operating more than one network at the same time.
See 47 C.F.R. § 3.107 (1941).
421. FCC REPORT, supra note 413, at 46-47.
422. See notes 414-18 supra. For a range of opinion on the regulations, see Hearings on
S. Res. 113 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
423. Prior to the October 1941 modifications in the rules, RCA had indicated the desira-
bility of disposing of one of its networks, known as the Blue network. Radio Corp. of America,
10 F.C.C. 212, 213 (1943). To facilitate this sale without a time deadline that would unduly
depress the price, the FCC indefinitely suspended the regulation pertaining to one company
operating more than one network. Id. It has been stated that RCA opposed the sale of one of
NBC's networks and fought this issue all the way to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 2 E.
BARNOUW, A HisToRy OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE GOLDEN WEB 187 (1968).
But this is incorrect. As early as 1936, NBC executives had discussed the desirability of selling
the Blue network. See Minutes of NBC Executive Meeting (June 19, 1936) (found in NBC
General Correspondence Collection, Mass Communications History Center, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.) [hereinafter cited as NBC Collection]. In 1940, NBC's
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On October 31, 1941, NBC and CBS filed suits to enjoin en-
forcement of the regulations. The district court dismissed the suits
for want of jurisdiction, but stayed enforcement of the regulations
pending direct appeal to the Supreme Court.424 The Court held that
the suits could be maintained under section 402(a) of the Communi-
cations Act, and reversed the district court's dismissal.2 1 On re-
mand, the district court granted a motion for summary judgment
and dismissed the suits on the merits.4 26 Writing for the district
court, Judge Learned Hand rejected NBC's arguments that the
Commission could not promulgate the regulations because they
dealt with the business affairs of a licensee, 27 and that the Commis-
sion could not decide antitrust questions.m2
NBC also challenged the regulations on first amendment
grounds, charging that they indirectly controlled what stations may
broadcast. Judge Hand agreed that the regulations fettered station
choices because "absolutely free choice" would include the oppor-
tunity to continue abusive practices which thwarted the growth of
competing networks. Because the public interest under which the
treasurer estimated that the Blue network lost almost $2 million in 1938, and slightly more
than $2 million in 1939. See Letter from Mark Woods to Niles Trammell and Lenox Lohr
(January 9, 1940) (in NBC Collection). When the FCC announced the regulations in May
1941, NBC executives at first publicly criticized the forced sale of a network, but this criticism
subsided quickly. NBC did not challenge the prohibition of dual network operation in court,
and the Supreme Court did not consider the validity of this regulation. See National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 208 (1943). During the litigation, see text accompa-
nying notes 424-37 infra, RCA completely severed the Blue network from NBC and began
operating it as a separate RCA subsidiary on Jan. 1, 1942. Following this separation, Mark
Woods, president of the Blue Network Company, made an intensive effort to sell the com-
pany. See Reminiscences of Mark Woods (found in Oral History Collection, Columbia Uni-
versity, New York, N. Y.). On October 12, 1943, the FCC approved the sale of the Blue
Network Company to the American Broadcasting System, Inc., the predecessor of ABC. See
Radio Corp. of America, 10 F.C.C. 212 (1943).
424. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
425. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). See 47
U.S.C. § 402(a) (1934). See generally Note, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United
States: FCC Regulation Affecting Relationship Between Broadcasting Stations and Network
as Reviewable Order, 56 HARv. L. REV. 121 (1942).
426. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
427. Id. at 943-44. Sanders was irrelevant, Judge Hand explained because the only
question decided in that case was whether injury suffered by an existing station was a mate-
rial factor in the licensing of another station. Id. at 945.
428. Id. at 944-45. Judge Hand explained that the FCC is peculiarly competent to assess
the impact upon broadcasting of restrictive or monopolistic practices. Id. at 945. NBC also
claimed the public interest standard was too vague for the regulation of the business affairs
of licensees. Judge Hand, explaining that the drafters of legislative standards cannot predict
accurately all the occasions to which they will apply, concluded that a delegation of power is




regulations were issued was none other than the interest in free
speech, however, Judge Hand concluded that they could pose no
first amendment problem. Thus, the regulations protected "the very
interests which the First Amendment itself protects, i.e. the inter-
ests, first, of the 'listeners,' next, of any licensees who may prefer
to be freer of the 'networks' than they are, and last, of any future
competing 'networks.' "42 This view of the first amendment would
be restated by Judge Hand shortly after NBC in Associated Press.3"
NBC appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Com-
munications Act permitted the FCC to regulate only the technical
or engineering aspects of network broadcasting, and that the Com-
mission could only deal with antitrust violations after a court had
supplied fact and conclusion."' NBC also contended that the first
amendment prohibited government action to foster free speech as
well as to repress free speech.4 32 Finally, NBC argued that the broad
scope of the licensing power raised the question whether freedom of
the broadcast press could continue to exist."' The United States
argued that the licensee should be responsible solely for determining
the programs it broadcast, and that the primary purpose of the
regulations was to diminish the control of networks over what their
affiliates broadcast." Through their control over affiliates, the net-
works arguably excluded diverse sources from broadcasting, and the
United States contended that such exclusion hindered the effective
use of radio."3 Interpreting the Communications Act as an instru-
ment for preserving "full opportunity for expression of viewpoints,"
the United States claimed that avoidance of concentration and con-
trol was a cardinal objective of the Act."
The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's authority to
adopt the regulations,3 7 but Justice Frankfurter's lengthy opinion
429. Id. at 946.
430. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
431. Brief for Appellant National Broadcasting Co. at 23, National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
432. Id. at 40.
433. Reply Brief for Appellant National Broadcasting Co. at 14.
434. Brief for the United States and the FCC at 118.
435. Id. at 34. The American Civil Liberties Union at pages 3-4 of an amicus curiae brief
developed a position which the Court would later adopt in Associated Press. See text accom-
panying note 100 supra. The ACLU stated that unless particular ideas are allowed to compete
in the marketplace of thought, or unless there is the potential for such competition, there can
be no freedom of thought or expression.
436. Brief for the United States and the FCC at 45.
437. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Justice Murphy in dissent argued that the Commission could
be concerned only with technical aspects of the relations between networks and affiliates. Id.
at 233. Justice Roberts agreed with Justice Murphy. For the FCC's current network affiliation
rules, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.132 (AM), 73.232 (FM), 73.658 (TV) (1978).
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for the Court miscast NBC's first amendment arguments. He noted
initially that if the regulations violated the first amendment, then
every person who was denied a license would also be denied consti-
tutional rights. Freedom of expression is necessarily abridged on
radio, he asserted, because radio facilities are inherently limited by
the laws of physics."' NBC was not arguing that the first amend-
ment prohibited licensing of broadcasting stations; it was question-
ing whether the scope of the licensing authority as applied by the
FCC violated the first amendment. Certainly denial of a license
because of a technical scarcity of frequencies is a very different
matter than denial for the business reasons presented in NBC. Yet
Justice Frankfurter approached the case as though there were no
difference. As long as an applicant was denied a license under the
public interest standard of the Communications Act, Justice Frank-
furter asserted, there was no denial of free speech.' As Professor
Harry Kalven has noted, however, different types of regulation pres-
ent different first amendment problems."o By failing to address di-
rectly the scope of the licensing authority, Justice Frankfurter in
NBC sidestepped a key first amendment issue."'
Justice Frankfurter's failure to see any first amendment limita-
tions on the scope of FCC regulation of business practices permits
the FCC to regulate far beyond the scope of the antitrust laws, and
allows the FCC to determine which practices are unreasonable in
light of the public interest standard. This places broadcasters in a
very different position than other mass media firms because a prac-
tice which may be a reasonable restraint of trade under the antitrust
438. 319 U.S. at 226. For a critique of the scarcity rationale and other principles used
to justify broadcasting regulation, see Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broad-
caster's Dilemma, 32 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 719, 757-66 (1964).
439. 319 U.S. at 227.
440. "[T]he traditions of the First Amendment do not evaporate because there is
licensing . . . . The question is not what does the need for licensing permit the Commission
to do in the public interest; rather it is what does the mandate of the First Amendment inhibit
the Commission from doing even though it is to license." Kalven, supra note 373, at 37
(emphasis added).
441. Professor Glen Robinson observes that accepting NBC at face value, it is difficult
to find any significant first amendment limitations on the Commission's authority to regulate
radio and television broadcasting, at least in the area of economic regulation, so long as the
standard of public interest is satisfied. Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Obser-
vations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 87-88 (1967).
NBC has also been interpreted as permitting program regulation. See id. at 97-163; note 444
infra.
Justice Frankfurter did, however, indicate that certain types of licensing criteria might
present first amendment problems, as where the Commission chooses among applicants upon
the basis of their political, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious ground.
319 U.S. at 226. This indicates that although business regulation does not violate the first
amendment, there are other types of regulation that could.
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laws could be found unreasonable by the FCC. Moreover, the di-
luted public interest standard presents the possibility of intimida-
tion of broadcasters through regulation of business practices which
would be legitimate, for example, in the motion picture industry. 1 2
While Justice Frankfurter's treatment of first amendment is-
sues in NBC was cursory, he carefully discussed whether the Com-
munications Act permitted more than engineering regulation. Jus-
tice Frankfurter set out at length the history of broadcasting regula-
tion and noted that because of the scarcity of spectrum frequencies,
regulation of broadcasting was as "vital to its development as traffic
control was to the development of the automobile."" In an oft-
quoted dictum, Justice Frankfurter explained:
The Act itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not limited to the
engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio communication. Yet
we are asked to regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the
wave lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other. But the Act
does not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts
upon the Commission the burden of determining the composition of that
traffic. The facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who
wish to use them. Methods must be devised for choosing from among the many
who apply. And since Congress itself could not do this, it committed that task
to the Commission.'
Justice Frankfurter suggested that in selecting applicants the Com-
mission was to be guided by the public interest standard, that the
Commission would have great discretion in determining what con-
442. The FCC is composed of presidential appointees and is also subject to great influ-
ence from Congress. Although the Justice Department is not immune from political pressures,
the courts, which supply both fact and conclusion in antitrust cases, are less subject to
political pressures than the FCC. Moreover, denial of a station license poses a far greater
threat to broadcasters than do antitrust decrees or an award of treble damages. While courts
review FCC actions to determine if they are within the authority granted by the Communica-
tions Act, and/or arbitrary and capricious, the FCC is given broad discretion in determining
the public interest. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775 (1978); text accompanying notes 527-28 infra.
443. 319 U.S. at 213.
444. Id. at 215-16. Justice Frankfurter suggested that the Commission's duty to identify
the public interest cannot be satisfied merely by determining that there are no technological
objections to the granting of the license. Id. at 216-17. The Commission has interpreted this
passage as permitting inquiries into programming service. See, e.g., FCC, PUBuc SERvicE
RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADcAST LICENSEES (1946); Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commis-
sion En Banc Programming Inquiry, 20 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1901 (1960). Close analysis of
NBC, however, indicates that Justice Frankfurter was addressing only the narrow question
whether the Act permitted the FCC to issue the regulations in question. Congress had em-
powered the Commission to make the fullest and most effective use of radio, and Justice
Frankfurter believed the regulations represented a "particularization" of the Commission's
conception of the public interest. 319 U.S. at 218. Furthermore, Justice Frankfurter was
careful to note that the Commission had been empowered to make special regulations per-
taining to network broadcasting and could be concerned with monopoly power and unreason-
able restraints of trade. Id. at 223.
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stituted the public interest, and that the Court would take a limited
approach in reviewing the actions of regulatory commissions."'
The sweeping powers the Court approved in NBC enable the
FCC to foster open markets."' Moreover, three similarities between
NBC and Associated Press may be noted briefly. First, the NBC
Court's suggestion that the first amendment does not prohibit busi-
ness regulation of the broadcast press became crystallized in the
Associated Press rule that the first amendment does not immunize
any segment of the press that adopts business practices which re-
strain freedom of expression. Second, the NBC Court's statement
that the public interest to be served under the Communications Act
was the interest of the listening public in the "larger" and "more
effective" use of radio" is in complete harmony with Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in Associated Press and its emphasis on
the public interest in diversity of information. Finally, neither Jus-
tice Frankfurter's majority opinion in NBC nor his concurring opin-
ion in Associated Press expresses any inclination to impose re-
straints upon government regulation of mass media conduct and
market structure.
C. Concentration of Ownership: Storer Broadcasting
The Court again analyzed the FCC's authority to control mar-
ket structure in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,'" but did
445. The Court's duty is complete, Justice Frankfurter claimed, when it finds that
Commission action is based on findings supported by evidence and is within its authority.
319 U.S. at 224. See also Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 (1942) (the Court
does not have the technical competence nor legal authority to pronounce upon the wisdom
of the course taken by the Commission).
446. The FCC's enforcement of the chain regulations, however, has been quite weak.
In one case, after finding massive violations of the regulations, the FCC refused to require
revocation of licenses. See Don Lee Broadcasting System, 5 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1179 (1949).
The major achievements of the chain broadcasting regulations were the structural changes
reached through the sale of NBC's Blue network and prohibition of network ownership of
more than one station in the same service area. The regulations that were aimed at network
practices did not eliminate all abusive practices. See generally Comment, The Impact of the
FCC's Chain Broadcasting Rules, 60 YALE L.J. 78 (1951). For a thorough discussion of anti-
competitive network practices in the 1950's, see HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, REPORT ON NETWORK BROADCASTING, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958).
447. 319 U.S. at 216.
448. 351 U.S. 192 (1956). Shortly before deciding Storer, the Court decided FCC v.
Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955), a minor case in which the Court again
held that the FCC had broad discretion under the public interest standard. After comparative
hearings for the use of the same AM frequency by stations in two neighboring cities, the FCC
selected the applicant from Allentown, Pennsylvania because the needs of that community
were greater than those of Easton, Pennsylvania. Easton Publishing Co., 11 F.C.C. 1339
(1947). The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Commission and remanded the case
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not address the first amendment issues therein. On November 25,
1953, after a five-year inquiry, the FCC announced new rules limit-
ing ownership of broadcasting stations by a single firm to seven AM
stations, seven FM stations, and five television stations."' On the
same date, the FCC dismissed without a hearing Storer Broadcast-
ing's application for construction of a television station in Miami. 1se
At the time of its application, Storer and its wholly-owned subsidi-
aries together owned five television stations. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit held that a multiple owner must be given a hearing to
show that another station would not give him such control of com-
munications media as to prejudice the public interest."6' The court
of appeals disagreed sharply with the FCC's preference of mechani-
cal rules over ad hoc adjudication, and ordered the Commission to
determine how each license application would comport with the
public interest, because in some cases holdings different than those
permitted by numerical rules would be in the public interest. 52
for findings upon the comparative needs of the two communities for new radio service and
the relative abilities of the applicants to serve the greater need. Easton Publishing Co. v.
FCC, 175 F.2d 344, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1949). After noting that Allentown had three AM stations,
while Easton had only one and had a greater need for an additional station, the Commission
found that both applicants were about equal in their abilities, but held that the needs of
Easton for another radio station were decisive. Easton Publishing Co., 17 F.C.C. 942 (1953).
The District of Columbia Circuit again reversed the FCC, holding that there was no substan-
tial evidence in the record to support the Commission's determination that the applicants
were about equal in abilities, and ordered it to reconsider the issue of the abilities of the
applicants. Moreover, since the Easton applicant owned the only newspaper and television
station in Easton, along with one of the town's two FM stations, the court of appeals directed
the FCC to determine whether a monopoly existed in Easton. Allentown Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 222 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Before the Supreme Court, the Commission asserted that when mutually exclusive appli-
cants seek to serve different communities, the question of which community has a greater
need for additional service must be determined before the question of which applicant can
best serve that community's needs can be determined. The Court agreed and held that the
allocation of a second license to a community to promote local competition among broadcast-
ers was within the FCC's authority. 349 U.S. at 362.
The Court analyzed the FCC's procedure for hearing mutually exclusive applications in
Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), holding that with mutually exclusive
applications, the Commission violates the Communications Act by granting one without
hearings on both. While diversification goals are important in FCC comparative license
proceedings, the FCC has often found that other goals, such as local ownership, have priority.
For a discussion of those goals, see W. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ELECTRONIC MASS
MEDIA 43-47 (2d ed. 1979).
449. The Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240, and 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations
relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 18 F.C.C. 288
(1953). See generally Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED.
CoM. B.J. 1 (1974).
450. Storer Broadcasting Co., 18 F.C.C. 300 (1953).
451. Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 204, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
452. Id.
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Certainly the numerical rules are shortsighted in their treatment of
all broadcasting stations as equals within a class.113 The court of
appeals, however, did not consider the Commission's willingness to
waive rules upon application."' This would be a key aspect of the
Supreme Court's decision."'
Before the Supreme Court, the FCC argued that its multiple
ownership rules were attempts to implement the competitive philos-
ophy of Pottsville, Sanders, and Associated Press."6' Storer, on the
other hand, claimed that the rules were in conflict with the eco-
nomic analysis required by the antitrust laws because the rules
assumed, rather than proved, that an acquisition which exceeded
the numerical limits violated antitrust policy."' The FCC responded
by claiming that, although the multiple ownership rules were in
conformity with the underlying philosophy of the antitrust laws,m
the FCC is not responsible for enforcing those laws.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the
Commission had the authority to adopt rules necessary to the or-
derly conduct of its business,' even if the rules contained limita-
tions on licensing not authorized specifically by the Communica-
tions Act."' The Court concluded that the rules were consistent with
453. The rules provided, however, for case-by-case analysis, such that in determining
whether there is a concentration of control, consideration would be given to such variable
factors as the size, extent and location of areas served, the number of people served, and the
extent of other competitive service to the areas in question. 47 C.F.R. § 3.636(a)(2) (1953).
One group of investigators found that as the rule was enforced, the Commission did not look
to particular facts but relied instead on the five VHF station ceiling, such that no applicant
owning fewer stations than the maximum was ever denied a license in the public interest.
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT ON NETWORK BROADCASTING,
H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 555 (1958). The Commission assumes falsely that
unless the numerical limits are exceeded, violation of the public interest is unlikely. One
commentator also suggests that the rules err in not considering the holdings a firm may have
in other media. See Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest: Administrative Reson-
sibility of the FCC, 66 YALE L.J. 365, 372 (1957). Quantitative limits are not always inappro-
priate. By recasting the limits in terms of audience size reached by a group owner or of the
number of competitors in each market, the FCC would have a far better approach to concen-
tration than that provided by the current numerical rules. See generally Levin, Competition,
Diversity, and the Television Group Ownership Rule, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1970).
454. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.361(c) (1953).
455. See text accompanying note 462 infra.
456. Brief for Petitioners at 12, United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192
(1956).
457. Brief for Respondent at 11. Storer also claimed the rules were invalid because they
denied an applicant a hearing. Id. at 9.
458. Brief for the United States and the FCC at 13. See text accompanying note 421
supra.
459. 351 U.S. 192, 202 (1956). On remand, the court of appeals held that the numerical
rules were valid. See Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
460. 351 U.S. at 202-03.
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the Communications Act's legislative history because Congress had
given the Commission great discretion in determining the public
interest, and because an essential purpose of the Act was the preser-
vation of competition in broadcasting."' Moreover, the Court inter-
preted the Act and rules promulgated thereunder as mandating a
hearing for those who, wanting to exceed the numerical limits, sub-
mit waiver applications.4"2
The Storer Court did not address the constitutionality of the
Communications Act or the multiple ownership rules. What is im-
portant in Storer is that, like NBC, it permits the Commission to
decide questions involving concentration of ownership, grants the
Commission broad rulemaking powers, and avoids deciding whether
the public interest would be furthered by the rules in question. In
Storer, the Commission claimed to be using its authority in con-
formity with the underlying philosophy of the antitrust laws to max-
imize diversification of program content.16 3 Yet the rules in Storer
are short-sighted in their treatment of broadcasting stations as
equals." Professor Bernard Schwartz has accused the Commission
of failing to comprehend basic principles of antitrust laws,6 5 and
this failure is illustrated by United States v. Radio Corp. of
America."'
D. FCC Action versus Subsequent Antitrust Enforcement: The
Blessings of RCA
In 1955, NBC applied to the FCC for approval of an exchange
461. Id. at 203-04.
462. Id. at 205. See also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943). Justice Harlan,
in a concurring and dissenting opinion, questioned the Court's jurisdiction in Storer because
he did not believe the Commission's adoption of the rules constituted a reviewable order. 351
U.S. at 206-07. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that Storer was not an aggrieved
party. Id. at 213.
463. The Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations
relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 18 F.C.C. 288,
291 (1953).
464. See note 453 supra. While the Commission can consider factors such as the number
of competitors when considering another license for a multiple owner who does not exceed
the numerical limits, it has often found that other factors have priority over antitrust consid-
erations. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 453, at 376-79; note 448 supra. The Commission's
record in preventing concentrated ownership is quite poor.
For the current FCC rules on multiple ownership of broadcasting stations, see 47 C.F.R.
H§ 73.35 (AM), 73.240 (FM), 73.636 (TV) (1978).
465. Schwartz, Antitrust and the FCC: The Problem of Network Dominance, 107 U.
PA. L. REv. 753, 783 (1959). Professor Robert Bennett similarly believes the FCC has a very
poor record in considering principles of section 7 of the Clayton Act when approving mergers.
See Bennett, Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing with a Section Seven Lens, 66 Nw.
U. L. REv. 159 (1971).
466. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
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of NBC's Cleveland television station for Westinghouse's Philadel-
phia television station. After an investigation of the exchange, dur-
ing which the Justice Department was informed that substantial
antitrust questions were raised, the FCC granted approval on De-
cember 28, 1955. The Commission did not hold hearings on the
exchange; the Justice Department could have requested a hearing
on the matter or filed a protest, but did nothing."' The sale occurred
on January 22, 1956, and on December 4, 1956 the Justice Depart-
ment brought an antitrust action, based on information which the
FCC had before it when it approved the exchange, alleging that
NBC and RCA conspired to upgrade the television station holdings
of NBC. To force Westinghouse to exchange its Philadelphia sta-
tion, which was in the nation's fourth largest market, for NBC's
Cleveland station, which was in the less desirable tenth largest mar-
ket, NBC was alleged to have threatened to discontinue its affilia-
tion with Westinghouse's Boston and Philadelphia television sta-
tions, and to refuse affiliation with any other television stations
Westinghouse might acquire."'
The government moved for a preliminary determination of the
sufficiency of RCA's defenses,"' and the district court dismissed the
complaint, holding that the FCC's approval of the exchange, subject
to review by the District of Columbia Circuit, prohibited the govern-
ment's actions.7 0 Before the Supreme Court, the government argued
that while the FCC could take antitrust policies into account in
administering its licensing powers, Commission action did not de-
termine the legality of conduct under the antitrust laws, and thus
did not preclude independent proceedings to enforce the antitrust
laws.4 ' RCA, on the other hand, claimed that the FCC had exclusive
jurisdiction, and that its conclusions and determinations of the pub-
lic interest, including the substantive provisions of the antitrust
467. To prevent problems such as those created by the Justice Department's failure to
intervene in the license proceeding, Dean Roscoe Barrow proposed a statute that would
provide for mandatory intervention of the Justice Department in FCC proceedings which
involve antitrust questions. See Barrow, Antitrust and the Regulated Industry: Promoting
Competition in Broadcasting, 1964 DUKE L.J. 282, 301-02.
468. Complaint at 6-7, United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 158 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.
Pa. 1958).
469. The defenses were-(1) that the district court lacked jurisdiction; (2) that the
FCC's determination of the issues raised in the complaint was final; (3) that the plaintiff had
forfeited its right to claim equitable relief under the doctrines of laches and estoppel. United
States v. Radio Corp. of America, 158 F. Supp. 333, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
470. Id. at 333.
471. Brief for the United States at 17-18, United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358
U.S. 334 (1959). See also Report on Uniform Policy as to Violation by Applicants of Laws of
the United States, 1 RAD. REG. (P & F) 91:495 (1951).
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laws, were final. 47 2
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.4 13 Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Warren reviewed the legislative history of the
Communications Act, and held that the FCC did not have power
to decide antitrust issues "as such," noting that "Commission ac-
tion was not intended to prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws
in federal court." 74 Chief Justice Warren agreed, however, with the
NBC Court that the FCC could consider antitrust policy in deter-
mining whether a broadcaster's actions would meet the public inter-
est standard. 75 Moreover, Chief Justice Warren speculated that
antitrust considerations alone might be sufficient to support a Com-
mission finding that the public interest standard had not been met,
for example, when the publisher of the only newspaper in a com-
munity applies for the only available radio and television frequen-
cies.176 Concurrent antitrust and FCC actions would not be damag-
ing, Chief Justice Warren suggested, because broadcasters are not
common carriers, 7 and therefore lack a common carrier rate struc-
ture or delicate regulatory scheme that would be disrupted by anti-
trust actions."
RCA does not deal with the Commission's discretion in deter-
mining the public interest. The significance of RCA in promoting
competitive broadcasting markets, however, should not be underes-
timated. The FCC's antitrust expertise is not very well developed, 7
and antitrust issues are often overridden by other concerns in FCC
proceedings." RCA counteracts these negative tendencies by per-
472. Brief for Appellees at 18.
473. 358 U.S. 334 (1959). Justice Harlan concurred in the result. Id. at 353.
474. Id. at 346. In reaching this result, the Court rejected RCA's claim that a 1952
amendment to the Communications Act, which deleted language permitting government
action against broadcast licensees who violated the antitrust laws, repealed that authority.
After examining the legislative history of the 1952 amendment, the Court concluded that the
deletion did not indicate Congressional disapproval of the right to bring such antitrust ac-
tions. Id. at 344-45. See generally Wall & Jacob, Communications Act Amendments,
1952-Clarity or Ambiguity, 41 GEO. L.J. 135 (1953); 57 MIcH. L. REV. 885 (1959) (comment-
ing on United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959)).
475. 358 U.S. at 351.
476. Id. at 351-52.
477. Id. at 348-49. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
478. 358 U.S. at 349-50.
479. For a critique of the FCC's shortcomings in a major merger case, see ABC-ITT
Merger, 7 F.C.C.2d 245, 278-330 (1966) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). More recently, the
FCC approved a merger of the Gannett Company and Combined Communications Corpora-
tion. See BROADCASTING, June 11, 1979, at 19. The merger creates a firm with 80 newspapers,
seven television stations, 12 radio stations, outdoor advertising, Canadian newsprint inter-
ests, marketing, research, and news service subsidiaries. Substantial antitrust questions are
created by this merger, and it may be subject to action by the Department of Justice.
480. See, e.g., note 448 supra.
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mitting the Justice Department and federal courts to separate anti-
trust questions from other factors that the FCC would weigh in
identifying the public interest."8 '
E. Divestiture of Co-located Newspaper-Broadcasting
Combinations: NCCB
The FCC's broad discretion in determining the public interest,
its rulemaking authority, and the limitations beyond which courts
may not substitute their judgment for that of the Commission coa-
lesced in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting.412
Following a lengthy rulemaking proceeding, the FCC in 1975
adopted rules which required divestiture of sixteen co-located
newspaper-broadcasting combinations in communities with only
one daily newspaper and one broadcasting station, and which pro-
spectively barred the formation of other co-located newspaper-
broadcasting combinations.1 3 The rules were designed to achieve
481. RCA culminated in the FCC ordering NBC to return the Philadelphia station to
Westinghouse. See National Broadcasting Co., 37 F.C.C. 427 (1964).
After RCA, the Court decided Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S.
464 (1962), another case stemming from network acquisition of a television station. In 1954,
the FCC modified its television group ownership rules to permit group ownership of two UHF
stations in addition to five VHF stations. CBS then cancelled its affiliation agreement with
WCAN, a UHF station in Milwaukee, and purchased WOKY, also a UHF station in Milwau-
kee. WCAN, which had been a successful station as a CBS affiliate, was unable to compete
in Milwaukee without network affiliation and subsequently sold its equipment to CBS-owned
WOKY. The owner of WCAN alleged that CBS conspired to eliminate WCAN from the
market, but the district court granted CBS's motion for summary judgment and held that
the injury suffered was damnum absque injuria. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 174 F. Supp. 802 (D.D.C. 1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd, 368 U.S. 464
(1962). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue as to material
facts and that summary judgment was inappropriate. 368 U.S. at 473. See also Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 58 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
482. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
483. Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules relat-
ing to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Second
Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Second Report and Order],
amended upon reconsideration, 53 F.C.C.2d 589 (1975). For discussion of the rules, see Mills,
Moynahan, Perlini & McClure, The Constitutional Considerations of Multiple Media Owner-
ship Regulation by the Federal Communications Commission, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 1217 (1975);
Comment, Media Cross-Ownership-The FCC's Inadequate Response, 54 TEx. L. REV. 336
(1976); Comment, A Primer on Docket Number 18110: The New FCC Cross-Ownership Rules,
59 MARQ. L. REV. 584 (1976); Note, The Power of the FCC to Regulate Newspaper-Broadcast
Cross-Ownership: The Need for Congressional Clarification, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1708 (1977).
See generally H. LEVIN, BROADCAST REGULATION AND JOINT OWNERSHIP OF MEDIA (1960); How-
ard, Cross-Media Ownership of Newspapers and TV Stations, 51 JOURNALISM Q. 715 (1974);
Levin, Economies in Cross Channel Affiliation of Media, 31 JOURNALISM Q. 167 (1954);
Sterling, Newspaper Ownership of Broadcasting Stations, 1920-1968, 46 JOURNALISM Q. 227
(1969); Toohey, Newspaper Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 20 FED. COM. B.J. 44 (1966);
Comment, Antitrust-"Cross-Media" Ownership and the Antitrust Laws-A Critical
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two goals-diversity of viewpoints and economic competition.' The
Commission emphasized the former goal and, quoting Associated
Press, ruled that the public interest could encompass many factors
such as the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources."' The prospective rule drew its sup-
port principally from this first amendment concern,486 the Commis-
sion claimed, while the divestiture order was founded upon both
first amendment and antitrust concerns. 4 87
In selecting standards for divestiture, however, the Commission
treated economic competition as a secondary concern. The Commis-
sion's primary concern was diversity in ownership as a means of
enhancing diversity in programming service to the public,"8 and it
developed a limited divestiture standard which applies only to
"egregious" cases.489 The Commission eschewed market share analy-
sis because it would result in such large scale divestiture that the
public interest might be harmed, for example by disruption of serv-
ice. 490
The District of Columbia Circuit, in a decision written by
Judge David Bazelon, affirmed the FCC's authority to issue the
rules.49' The court of appeals held, however, that the Commission
should have ordered divestiture of all co-located newspaper-
broadcasting combinations.4 1 In determining whether the prospec-
tive ban had a rational basis, the court drew upon Associated Press
Analysis and a Suggested Solution, 47 N.C.L. REv. 794 (1969); Note, Newspaper-Radio
Joint Ownership: Unblest Be The Tie That Birids, 59 YALE L.J. 1342 (1950).
484. Second Report and Order, supra note 483, at 1074.
485. Id. at 1048 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). The
Commission explained that ownership was significant from the standpoint of a diversified
flow of information because ownership entailed "the power to select, to edit, and to choose
the methods, manner and emphasis of presentation." Id. at 1050.
486. Id. at 1049.
487. Id. The Commission stated that antitrust policy suppported its diversification
policy because "requiring competition in the marketplace of ideas is, in theory, the best way
to assure a multiplicity of voices." Id.
488. Id. at 1079.
489. Id. at 1049.
490. Id. at 1079-80. Commissioner Robinson, in a concurring and dissenting opinion,
disagreed with the Commission's decision not to adopt an approach based upon
"conservatively interpreted" antitrust guidelines. Id. at 1113.
491. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Judge Bazelon construed Storer as permitting the Commission "to codify in rule its under-
standing, if reasonable, of the public interest licensing standard." Id. at 951. Judge Bazelon
also drew upon United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), see note 409
supra, to support the premise that express authority is not essential to the validity of FCC
regulations. See generally Second Report and Order, supra note 483, at 1131 (Robinson,
Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
492. 555 F.2d at 965-66.
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as evidence of the Supreme Court's approval of diversification based
on first amendment considerations,"' and concluded that the struc-
tural approach was appropriate from a first amendment standpoint
because it did not entail government supervision of speech."' More-
over, the court read RCA as permitting the FCC to follow antitrust
policy in promoting diversification.'
According to Judge Bazelon, the fairness doctrine represented
the maximum government intervention permissible to insure diver-
sification through direct content control. He did not, however, sug-
gest any first amendment limits to a structural policy designed to
diversify sources of information.4 99 The American Newspaper Pub-
lishers Association argued that the prospective ban conditioned
unconstitutionally the first amendment right to publish a newspa-
per. Drawing upon Associated Press, Judge Bazelon replied that the
first amendment does not necessarily shield publishers from regula-
tion that may make publication more difficult,"' and that in any
event the rule conformed to the spirit of the first amendment be-
cause it was designed to enhance the diversity of information avail-
able to the public.9 '
Judge Bazelon emphasized the importance of a diversified own-
ership structure in deciding whether the FCC was correct in refusing
to order large-scale divestiture without a tangible showing that the
public interest had been harmed." The Commission's position was
that evidence of harm was necessary before divestiture of cross-
ownership could be ordered,9 ' because the public interest would be
493. Id. at 949.
494. Id. at 950-51. See generally Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New
Media"-New Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. CoM. L.J. 201 (1979).
495. 555 F.2d at 949.
496. Id. at 949-50. Judge Bazelon did state, however, that any regulation must be able
to withstand rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 949 n.29. This type of examination would not call
for a weighing of the benefits of a diversification policy against its costs in terms of govern-
ment intervention with the structure of the press.
497. Id. at 953. Citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), which
involved taxation to limit the distribution of information, Judge Bazelon declared unconstitu-
tional burdens upon publication if they restrict the flow of information. 555 F.2d at 953.
498. 555 F.2d at 953-54. The FCC used similar reasoning in its Second Report and
Order, supra note 483. Responding to the American Newspaper Publishers Association argu-
ment that the FCC was inhibiting a newspaper publisher's freedom to publish, the FCC
explained that it was acting in conformity with Associated Press. Thus, the Commission could
promote diversified sources of information and ban business relations that were either unlaw-
ful or not in the public interest. Second Report and Order, supra note 483, at 1050. Commis-
sioner Robinson emphasized that the FCC's target was not newspaper owners but rather
monopolies and oligopolies which are beyond first amendment protection. Id. at 1118-19
(Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
499. 555 F.2d at 962.
500. Second Report and Order, supra note 483, at 1083. Although it called for over-
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adversely affected in several ways-local ownership and manage-
ment would be reduced because many sales would have to be made
to outside interests; continuity of operation would be broken; inter-
est rates and selling price would be affected; and local economic
dislocations would result due to an increased demand for equity
capital.so The opinion attacked each of these concerns asserting
first that because approximately one-fourth of the newspaper-
television groups were not locally owned, divestiture might spark
improvement.50 2 Since groups commonly claimed that their jointly
owned broadcasting stations and newspapers were managed sepa-
rately, Judge Bazelon suggested that owner management may be
unusual, and that there was no reason to assume that local interests
would not purchase divested broadcast properties.5 3 Second, the
opinion argued that the Commission's concern for continuity of op-
eration was specious in light of its practice of routinely approving
license assignments."' Finally, Judge Bazelon found that factors
such as selling price were relevant only when shown to have an
adverse impact on the provision of broadcasting services to the pub-
lic.' 5 Because the record did not disclose the extent to which large-
scale divestiture would impair these public interest considerations,
Judge Bazelon concluded that their potential impairment would not
outweigh the presumption against cross-ownership.'
Before the Supreme Court, several combination owners argued
whelming and unambiguous evidence to support divestiture, the Commission failed to offer
any evidence other than market structure to support its divestiture order for the 16
"egregious" cases. Judge Bazelon noted that the record developed by the Commission was
inconclusive about whether cross-ownership harms or benefits the public interest. 555 F.2d
at 962. Specifically, the record did not support the conclusion that "divestiture would be more
harmful in the grandfathered markets than in the 16 affected markets, nor did it show that
the need for divestiture in the affected markets was 'overwhelming' and the evidence
'unambiguous."' Id. at 966.
501. Second Report and Order, supra note 483, at 1078. But see id. at 1128-30 (Robin-
son, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
502. 555 F.2d at 963-64.
503. Id. at 964. In its concern for preserving local management, the FCC was concerned
that newspaper-broadcasting groups would swap stations. Second Report and Order, supra
note 483, at 1068-69. While the divestiture order alters local market structures, it does not
diminish the total number of broadcast holdings in the hands of groups.
504. 555 F.2d at 964. See Second Report and Order, supra note 483, at 1128 (Robinson,
Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
505. 555 F.2d at 964. Only two studies submitted during the rulemaking proceeding
addressed the economic impact of divestiture, and the Commission dismissed as
''exaggerated" an estimate that television stations sold under a divestiture order would sell
at 10%, to 20%> below true value. Second Report and Order, supra note 483, at 1072. Commis-
sioner Robinson commented that even if there were a diminished return, this should be of
little concern. Id. at 1130 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
506. 555 F.2d at 965.
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that the first amendment is absolute in its protection and that when
the government decides who may speak in the name of furthering
the first amendment, there is no first amendment."' The American
Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) argued that rules pre-
cluding newspaper publishers from holding licenses for co-located
broadcasting stations burden unconstitutionally the right to publish
a newspaper.0 s In its brief, the United States challenged these posi-
tions, arguing that newspaper owners do not have a constitutionally
protected right to a broadcast license, and that denial of a license
in the public interest does not violate the first amendment.'"' Both
the ANPA and the National Association of Broadcasters mistakenly
drew upon Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,1 o for the prop-
osition that the first amendment commands government to stay out
of the marketplace of ideas.5" Since Miami Herald involved direct
government regulation of newspaper content, the Court in its deci-
sion did not analyze government action to modify the structure of
economic markets, although such actions may affect the market-
place of ideas. That the FCC's rules did not involve direct govern-
ment supervision of expression was viewed as significant by the
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB),12 which
argued that structural diversification serves rather than abridges
first amendment principles.51 3 Both the NCCB and the United
States agreed that the FCC's reasons for grandfathering most com-
binations were arbitrary and unsupported by evidence.5 14 The
United States nevertheless asserted that once the court of appeals
exposed the Commission's errors, it should have remanded the case
to permit the FCC to formulate new rules, rather than ordering the
FCC to adopt a large-scale divestiture rule."' The FCC similarly
argued that its function was to weigh the relevant public interest
factors, and the court could not substitute its judgment for that of
the Commission nor could the court dictate the result the Commis-
sion must reach on remand.518
507. Brief for Petitioners The Post Company, KNUJ, Inc. and Mickelson Media, Inc.
at 11, FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). But see
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943).
508. Brief for Petitioner American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n at 26.
509. Brief for the United States at 15.
510. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
511. Brief for Petitioner National Ass'n of Broadcasters at 30; Brief for Petitioner Amer-
ican Newspaper Publishers Ass'n at 25.
512. Brief of Respondent National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting at 22.
513. Id. at 13.
514. Id. at 32; Brief for the United States at 18-19.
515. Brief for the United States at 21.
516. Brief for Petitioner FCC at 19.
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The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Commission's
prospective ban, but reversed the judgment of the court of appeals
pertaining to large-scale divestiture.517 The Court re-emphasized the
Commission's broad discretion in determining the public interest
and its rulemaking authority to restructure broadcasting markets
and thereby promote diversity. The Court in NCCB, however, found
that the first amendment does not require the FCC to give its diver-
sification policy controlling weight in all circumstances.5 18 NCCB
thus slights the first amendment requirement of greatest possible
diversity, by permitting legislatively created goals to supersede first
amendment diversification goals.519
NCCB breaks no new ground with respect to the FCC's rule-
making authority.51 The National Association of Broadcasters at-
tempted to distinguish NBC and Storer because they dealt solely
with the broadcasting industry, but Justice Marshall replied that
any distinction undersells the Commission's power to regulate
broadcasting in the public interest.5 21 Moreover, the FCC's diversifi-
cation policy was consistent with the Communications Act, and was
supported by antitrust and first amendment values. It was not in-
consistent, Justice Marshall explained, "for the Commission to con-
clude that the maximum benefit to the 'public interest' would follow
from allocation of broadcast licenses so as to promote diversification
of the mass media as a whole." 522
The Court easily disposed of the argument that the regulations
violated the first amendment rights of newspaper publishers by
quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC52 1 which held that there
is no fundamental first amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right to speak, write, or publish.524 The Court accepted the
517. 436 U.S. at 792.
518. Id. at 810.
519. The public interest standard encompasses many goals, including those of the first
amendment. NCCB does not place the first amendment goals in a preferred position. See text
accompanying notes 527-31 infra.
520. See 436 U.S. at 793-94.
521. Id. at 794.
522. Id. at 795. ANPA challenged the reasonableness of the prospective rule on two
grounds-first, that the record did not conclusively establish that prohibiting colocated cross-
ownership would lead to greater diversity, and second, that the rule was based on the fact of
diversification to the exclusion of other facts that the Commission normally considers in
licensing decisions. The Court agreed that diversification of ownership would enhance the
possibility of achieving greater diversity of viewpoints, and that the Commission's change in
policy was a reasonable response to changed circumstances in the broadcasting industry. Id.
at 796-97.
523. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
524. 436 U.S. at 799 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388
(1969)). Responding to the argument that the FCC had unfairly singled out newspaper
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need for licensing because of physical scarcity, explaining that there
was nothing in the first amendment to prevent the FCC from allo-
cating licenses to promote diversification of mass media. 25 To what
extent, however, does the first amendment require the widest possi-
ble dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources?5 2 6 The Court did not address this issue, but it clearly subor-
dinated the first amendment goals posited by Associated Press to
the FCC's discretion to determine the public interest.
The Court believed that the limited divestiture order reflected
a rational weighing of competing policies." The court of appeals
referred to factors such as disruption of service as "lesser policies"
and presumed that cross-owned stations do not serve the public
interest. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the weighing
of policies under the public interest standard is a task that Congress
delegated to the Commission in the first instance.528 Consequently,
such a presumption would contradict the Commission's practice of
giving controlling weight to the goal of the best practicable service
to the public-a goal the Court ostensibly approved in Sanders."'
Sanders did not, however, subordinate first amendment goals to
that goal, and it did not resolve the question whether other public
interest goals have priority over the first amendment goal of diver-
sity.
The Court's concern for preserving FCC discretion in determin-
ing the public interest blurred a larger constitutional issue: to what
extent should public interest goals, such as disruption of service,
take priority over first amendment goals such as diversity?""o Cer-
owners for more stringent treatment than other owners, the Court found that newspaper
owners were treated in essentially the same fashion as other multiple owners. 436 U.S. at 801.
525. 436 U.S. at 799. The Court also drew upon NBC's recognition that denial of a
license in the public interest is not a denial of free speech. Id. at 800.
526. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
527. 436 U.S. at 803. The Court found that the lack of evidence to support the FCC's
decision was not a shortcoming. The Court, relying on FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 (1961), explained that because the Commission's decision was one
involving judgment and prediction, complete factual support was not necessary or required.
436 U.S. at 814. The Court, however, supported the Commission's reasoning on the issue of
harm that might result from divestiture, even where that reasoning was faulty. For example,
the Court explained that there was no guarantee that future licensees would provide the same
level of service as previous licensees. On the other hand, there was no guarantee that new
licensees would not exceed the level of service offered by the preceding licensee. Id. at 807.
528. 436 U.S. at 810.
529. Id. at 804. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
530. This is not to suggest that the public interest standard does not take into account
first amendment goals. As the Sanders Court observed, there may be instances when licensing
another station causes broadcasters to go out of business, leaving a portion of the listening
public without adequate service. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475-76
(1940). In NCCB the FCC believed that the "mere hoped for" gains from diversity were
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tainly, under the Communications Act the Commission has the au-
thority to determine the public interest, but this does not necessar-
ily mean that statutory goals should have priority over constitu-
tional goals. In NCCB, constitutional goals should have been ac-
corded preferred status. This action would have carried the FCC's
presumption that cross-ownership is contrary to the public interest
into the area of divestiture, except that where proof is offered that
divestiture would result in specific harm to the public interest, the
Commission could waive a divestiture order. Precisely the opposite
approach is now employed-unless specific abuse can be shown,
grandfathered combinations will not be dissolved."' This approach
thwarts the attainment of the diversified market envisioned in
Associated Press.
The Commission's assumptions with respect to damages result-
ing from divestiture are similarly misplaced. The first amendment
requires the opposite presumption, and sufficient means are avail-
able in the Commission's waiver procedures to permit a careful
weighing of the gains from diversity against the damage to other
goals on a case-by-case basis. By approving the Commission's ap-
proach, the Court permitted other factors in the public interest
standard to take priority over the first amendment's goal of diversi-
fication, and failed to consider the constitutionality of this prefer-
ence.
insufficient to overcome the possible harm to the public interest caused by divestiture. Sec-
ond Report and Order, supra note 483, at 1078.
531. The Commission in its Order explained that it would scrutinize allegations of
section 2 violations on an ad hoc basis. Second Report and Order, supra note 483, at 1080
n.29. The court of appeals criticized the FCC's level of antitrust expertise and concluded that
its emphasis on antitrust issues was inconsistent with the Order's first amendment thrust.
555 F.2d 938, 966 n.108. The Court of Appeals also seemingly believed that the FCC would
not consider petitions to deny if they specified noneconomic abuses such as programming
violations. The Court interpreted the Order as foreclosing petitions to deny only if they argued
that cross-ownership was per se undesirable. 436 U.S. at 788 n.12, 791 n.13.
Judge Bazelon was quite correct in criticizing the level of the FCC's antitrust expertise.
The Commission's general tendency not to deny licenses when there has been anticompetitive
conduct, see, e.g., Don Lee Broadcasting System, 5 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1179 (1949), offers scant
hope that the Commission will break up grandfathered newspaper-broadcasting combina-
tions in ad hoc proceedings. On the issue of programming abuses, Judge Bazelon noted that
the "intrusiveness involved in the very process of attempting to uncover abuses'-such as news
distortion-might severely strain First Amendment values." 555 F.2d at 961. Cf. Second
Report and Order, supra note 483, at 1121 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (determining which stations are "better" involves qualitative judgments
which the first amendment and sound public policy would seem to forbid); Robinson, supra
note 441, at 162-63 (the first amendment comes into play when the Commission concerns
itself with programming and program operations to the point of establishing unacceptable
programming). The gains from diversity might not offset the inhibiting and conforming
effects such programming inquiries might have.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
F. The First Amendment, the Antitrust Laws, and the Broadcast-
ing Industry
Government control of market structure and entry conditions
in broadcasting raises issues that are distinct from those in other
mass communications industries. There is a technical need to assign
a limited number of frequencies to each market, and to award licen-
ses for those frequencies. This requirement, however, does not elimi-
nate all first amendment concerns in broadcasting cases. While
there does not exist an unabridgeable first amendment right to ob-
tain a frequency, those who do use broadcast frequencies should not
be subjected to regulations that would interfere with protected func-
tions in other forms of communication. Thus, the structural mea-
sures in NBC, Storer, and NCCB are particularly laudable on first
amendment grounds because they seek to diversify expression with-
out interfering directly with the editorial process. To assume that a
diversified ownership structure will result in a diverse marketplace
of ideas is a far sounder public policy than imposition of access
requirements or comparisons between applicants on the basis of
their programming proposals or performance.
The technical nature of broadcasting requires government allo-
cation, but this process does not necessitate regulation of ownership
structure or business conduct under standards which are distinct
from those applied to other forms of communication.112 NBC and
NCCB are striking in their lack of concern for restraint on govern-
ment economic regulation of broadcasters. Even if it is assumed
that the business policies of the press fall outside the first amend-
ment, this does not mean the government can impose virtually any
regulation upon those policies.13 Thus, regulation of business con-
duct in broadcasting under the public interest standard has the
potential of being overbroad.
Congress recently considered legislation that would have sub-
stantially restricted the use of public interest regulation in broad-
casting. 34 In the area of economic regulation, this bill proposed that
532. There is a distinction between allocating frequencies to a market and awarding
licenses to operate on those frequencies. In considering the acceptable level of concentration
in an award of a license, or the reasonableness of conduct, antitrust standards should be
followed. Employment of antitrust standards could be implemented through the mandatory
intervention of the Department of Justice when antitrust questions are before the licensing
authority. See generally Barrow, supra note 467.
533. Cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (the press may be subject
to ordinary taxation, but special taxation is unconstitutional).
534. See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The proposed Communications Act
of 1979 provided that market forces should determine the development, introduction, and




the allocation process would remain under government control.
Conduct and ownership structure, however, would have been regu-
lated primarily through the antitrust laws.535 This approach is a step
toward treating broadcasting like other forms of communication,
but it does not go far enough. The compelling need for allocation of
frequencies does not justify regulating broadcasters' conduct differ-
ently from newspaper publishers' or motion picture distributors'
conduct.
As NBC and RCA illustrate, there is a compelling need for the
government to intervene in economic markets when monopolistic
structure or conduct threatens. The antitrust laws, if enforced, are
fully adequate to insure that markets are deconcentrated and free
of coercion. Although none of the Court's broadcasting decisions
have involved intrusions into protected activity, the breadth of busi-
ness regulation currently permissible under the public interest stan-
dard may pose a threat to press freedom.
Despite the fact that the FCC's authority in the area of eco-
nomic regulation is largely unrestrained, it is unlikely that the Com-
mission will attempt to modify significantly the structure or con-
duct of the broadcasting industry. The problem with broadcasting
regulation is not that the Commission regulates the broadcasting
business more extensively than the antitrust laws regulate other
forms of mass communication, but rather that the Commission does
not adequately promote the public interest in diversity.536
marketplace forces were deficient would government regulation in the public interest have
been permitted. Id. § 411 (1).
535. The proposed Act, however, provided several structural controls. No licensee may
operate more than one television station, one AM radio station, and one FM radio station
per market. There was no limit on the total number of radio stations a group may own, but
group-ownership of television stations was limited to seven stations. Id. § 451. This bill, which
generally forbids balancing concentration factors against other public interest factors, is a
step toward regulating ownership structure solely by the antitrust laws. See notes 448, 532 &
534 supra.
536. The Commission's failure to promote the public interest in diversity is illustrated
by the following general observations. First, the Commission's television allocation policy is
a key factor limiting entry of new television networks. See generally Park, New Television
Networks, 6 BELL J. EcoN. 607 (1975). Second, in 1959, the Assistant Attorney General stated
that option time substantially restrained the ability of affiliates to deal with programming
sources other than networks during prime time and thus constituted an illegal tying agree-
ment. See Opinion of Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 18 RAD. REG. (P & F)
1801 (1959). Despite this opinion, the FCC found that option time was in the public interest.
See Study of Radio and Television Network Broadcasting, 18 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1809 (1959).
The FCC, however, later banned option time for television. See Option Time and the Sta-
tion's Right to Reject Network Programs, 34 F.C.C. 1103 (1963). Third, the Commission has
failed to deal adequately with vertical integration in the national television networks. Profes-
sor Robert Crandall concluded that one recent FCC attempt to promote greater program
quality and diversity will have little beneficial effect upon either. See Crandall, The Eco-
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V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE ANTITRUST LAWS, AND MASS
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES
The most challenging problems in first amendment theory
today, according to Professor Thomas Emerson, "lie in the prospect
of using law affirmatively to promote more effective functioning of
the system of freedom of expression." 37 Insofar as the general objec-
tive of the antitrust laws is to promote competition in open mar-
kets,-"' antitrust enforcement supports the first amendment interest
in such markets." Any attempt to use government power to achieve
a limited objective and simultaneously keep that power under con-
trol, however, "is a risky enterprise."5 10 Thus, government interven-
tion in the market must be restrained or it may actually inhibit the
public interest in a vigorous press. This is the central problem in
applying the antitrust laws to the press, and it is a problem that the
Court has not sufficiently addressed.
The Supreme Court views the business conduct of the press as
falling outside the protections of the first amendment. While there
can be no first amendment defense to unreasonable anticompetitive
conduct by the press, the unique constitutional position of the
press-an institution designed to scrutinize the actions of govern-
ment"'5 -requires that the press be free, to the largest possible ex-
nomic Effect of Television-Network Program "Ownership", 14 J. L. & EcoN. 385 (1971). See
generally Schuessler, FCC Regulation of the Network Television Program Procurement Pro-
cess: An Attempt to Regulate the Laws of Economics?, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 227 (1978). See also
R. NOLL, supra note 10, at 83-89. Finally, group ownership in the top fifty markets has become
increasingly concentrated, despite a poorly enforced FCC policy designed to limit such owner-
ship. See generally Comment, The "Top 50 Market Policy": Fifteen Years of Non-Policy,
31 FED. CoM. L.J. 303 (1979).
The Commission recently announced an inquiry to determine whether network practices
enable networks to exert anticompetitive influences on the industry. See Variety, Oct. 25,
1978, at 1, col. 5. If typical, this inquiry will not result in substantial alterations in market
conduct. It is more likely that the government's current antitrust suits against ABC and CBS
will result in modifications of market conduct and structure than will any FCC action. See
United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., No. 74-3599 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10,
1974); United States v. American Broadcasting Co., No. 74-3600 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 10,
1974). The cases will probably be tried during 1979. See Harwood, Judge Narrows Network
Program Case: Both Sides Told To Hurry It Up, Variety, Nov. 1, 1978, at 45, col. 3. For
analysis of the government's suits, see Fastow, Competition, Competitors and the Govern-
ment's Suit Against the Television Networks, 22 ANTrrRusT BULL. 517 (1977); Note, supra
note 150.
537. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 627 (1970).
538. Arr'y GENS. NAT'L COMM. To STUDY THE ANrrrusT LAWS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1955).
539. See Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (application of antitrust
doctrines to the mass media is not solely a question of sound economic policy; it is also an
important means of achieving the goals posited by the first amendment).
540. T. EMERSON, supra note 537, at 630.
541. See note 155 supra.
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tent, from government regulation. In the same sense that freedom
of expression rests upon the broadest possible commitment to free-
dom and the narrowest basis for restrictions,54 2 economic freedom of
the press must rest upon the broadest possible freedom, and only
where there is a compelling interest in regulation should the govern-
ment intervene.
In areas such as libel, the Court has created tests that are
designed to minimize the chilling effects on expression that may be
caused by litigation." Similarly, any government intervention in
the economic marketplace of mass media must meet the following
conditions: first, the regulation must not infringe upon protected
activity; second, the regulation must be no broader than necessary;
third, there must be a compelling reason for the regulation; and
finally, the regulation must be substantially the same as that which
is imposed on enterprises which are not involved in expression. This
four part test would prevent government attacks upon press conduct
that merely create economies without threatening open market con-
ditions. Moreover, this approach would minimize the extent of per-
missible regulation and would exclude the use of relaxed definitions
of unreasonable behavior. In effect, this test would require courts to
employ strict scrutiny in economic cases involving the press that
would approach the similar standards that they employ in cases
involving the core of the first amendment."
Despite the Court's view that business behavior of the press
falls outside the protection of the first amendment, the Court has
generally required strict antitrust standards in its mass communica-
tions cases. The Court has not subjected the press to special anti-
trust standards, and the Court's belief in open mass communica-
tions markets has not been translated into a large-scale attack on
competitive advantages.5 5 The Court has tempered any hostility it
displayed toward competitive advantages in Associated Press with
a recognition in later cases, such as Times-Picayune, that some
542. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 19 (1966).
543. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
544. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), Justice
Stone suggested that the Court should scrutinize legislation which restricts personal liberties
more strictly than legislation which restricts economic liberties. In economic cases involving
the press, the operation and effect of particular statutes should be closely analyzed. See Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931).
545. Professor Bork claims that while free competition reflects the ideal of equality of
opportunity, an undue concern for the survival of small and relatively inefficient competitors
reflects a preference for equality of outcome. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 422. For the most part,
the Supreme Court's mass communications antitrust decisions reflect a concern for equality
of opportunity and not equality of outcome.
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restrictive practices of communications firms can have legitimate
business justifications. Moreover, the Court in Theatre Enterprises
tempered substantially the doctrine of conscious parallelism, which
followed from Interstate. While the Bigelow method of awarding
damages is still in effect,5 " it has not yet resulted in any serious
problems for the press.5 7
The Court's most serious error in economic regulation of the
press has been in granting the FCC wide-ranging authority to en-
gage in business regulation that might exceed the scope of the anti-
trust laws. The Court has yet to reconsider carefully Justice Frank-
furter's statement in NBC that denial of a station license under the
public interest standard is not a denial of free speech. Certainly the
first amendment poses some limits to economic regulation. If the
Court blindly follows Justice Frankfurter's belief, it may permit the
press to be inhibited unjustifiably.
There is a need for government control of the allocation of
broadcasting facilities to prevent technical interference among sta-
tions. That requirement, however, should not be the basis for regu-
lating the ownership structure or business conduct of broadcasters
differently than other forms of communication. It is fallacious to
suggest that broadcasters are the only mass communicators using a
scarce resource. Newspaper publishers, for example, distribute their
products via fossil fuel powered vehicles. In the event of a critical
fuel shortage resulting in government allocation of fuel supplies,
would the government be able to constitutionally impose public
interest regulations on newspapers in return for their use of a scarce
resource? The first amendment requires that all forms of mass com-
munication be uniformly subject to government regulation. Laws
regulating the business of communicating should not be applied
loosely to one form of communication and rigorously to another
because the technical methods of communication differ.
VI. CONCLUSION
A viable marketplace of ideas depends in large measure upon
a competitive economic marketplace. Thus, to a certain extent, the
first amendment and the antitrust laws do not stand in philosophic
opposition to one another. As the Court asserted in Associated
546. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
547. In a recent antitrust case involving the press, Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 468
F. Supp. 226, 228-29 (N.D. Cal. 1979), a federal district court declined to follow Bigelow, and
held that a plaintiff cannot recover damages that are not the certain result of the defendant's
violation.
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Press, the first amendment provides powerful reasons for attacking
monopolistic structures and practices. Anticompetitive control of
any stage of the mass communications process, exemplified by the
theatre holdings of the major defendants in Paramount Pictures,
can have an important impact on what the public sees and hears.
Promoting competition in the economic marketplace is perhaps the
best means of fostering competition in another marketplace, the
marketplace of ideas, without direct government regulation of
speech. The failure of the government to promote open mass com-
munications economic markets would have grave consequences for
our society, but equally grave would be the consequences of un-
restrained government intervention in those markets.

